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This research is planned to explore how a regional state could improve its security during 
the time of its patron’s strategic retrenchment. It introduces a theory of a regional state’s 
security-promoting behaviors during the time of its patron’s retrenchment. According to 
this theory, it is hypothesized that there is covariation between the level of a regional 
state’s security concern and the scope of its domestic drives to increase societal 
contribution to autonomous defense posture. It also hypothesizes the existence of 
covariation between the level of a regional state’s security concern and the level of its 
commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against its patron’s strategic interests. 
Empirical findings from the case study of the security-seeking behaviors of the US allies 
in Northeast Asia support the two research hypotheses. A reader may want to test the 
validity of the theory against another context of a superpower’s strategic retrenchment 
.
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 Following the US defeat in the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration shifted the 
US strategic posture in East Asia from the Cold War confrontation to strategic 
retrenchment.1 Known as the Nixon Doctrine, the US strategic posture required that each 
of the US allies in East Asia should be in charge of its own military defense in general 
while the US looked for a more passive and secondary role in the defense of the regional 
allies. This military retrenchment was followed by the development of the Sino-American 
rapprochement, which signaled that Washington would adopt a position of strategic 
ambiguity between China and its regional allies.  
An empirical puzzle is that the US regional allies of Northeast Asia did not respond 
to the US strategic posture in a uniform fashion. For example, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK or aka South Korea) attempted to maximize the contribution of domestic society to 
an autonomous defense capability, while Japan minimized its efforts, while the Republic 
of China (ROC or aka Taiwan) introduced a moderate campaign to increase domestic 
contribution to autonomous defense posture. The Japanese leadership also directed its 
1 Retrenchment can be defined as a “policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to a 
decline in relative power.” See Paul K. Macdonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The 
Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no.4 (2011): 11.  
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military policies toward the superpower’s strategic interests while South Korea and 
Taiwan pursued military policies against the patron’s strategic interests. Why did they 
develop such a different behavior? 
To solve this empirical puzzle, the present study introduces a theory of a regional 
state’s security-promoting domestic drives in response to the patron’s retrenchment. This 
research topic has been underdeveloped by the existing scholarship on an asymmetric 
alliance. This scholarly tendency should be problematic because the structural certainty 
under anarchy and the imperative of self-help make results in internal balancing as the 
state’s default strategy. The present research discusses the state’s internal balancing 
strategy in the context of an asymmetric alliance between a regional state and its patron. 
This study also introduces a theory of a regional state’s pursuit of a military policy 
against its patron’s strategic interests. Existing scholarship has underdeveloped this 
research topic despite the significant implications involved in the security relationship 
between a superpower and its regional allies.  
This research also contributes to existing scholarship on the security relationship 
between the US and its regional allies in Northeast Asia. Each of the regional states 
examined in this study is known to be highly dependent upon the US security 
commitment. Thus it is arguably difficult to find substantial variation among them in 
terms of the scope of security-promoting domestic drives in the face of the superpower’s 
retrenchment. But the present study finds such variation in the context of the regional 
states’ security-seeking behaviors during the 1970s. Because of the substantial level of 
dependence, it is also arguably hard to expect that each of them will pursue a military 
3 
policy against the US strategic interests. But this study finds that such a behavior indeed 
is a regional state’s rational strategy to promote security.   
This research argues that the level of a regional state’s security concern is a function 
of how it perceives the military threat posed by its adversary and how it perceives the 
reliability of the patron’s security commitment. Then it hypothesizes that that there is a 
co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security concern and the scope of a 
regional state’s efforts to increase domestic contribution to an autonomous defense 
capability. It also hypothesizes that there is a co-variation between the level of a regional 
ally’s security concern and the level of its commitment to the pursuit of a military policy 
against its patron’s strategic interests.  
These hypotheses are tested against the context of the three regional states’ security-
seeking behaviors during the 1970s. The case study documents each of the states’ 
perception of security in response to the Nixon administration’s strategic posture. The 
case study finds that the Japanese leadership experienced a substantially low level of 
security concern while the leadership of South Korea experienced a substantially high 
level of security concern. In addition, the level of the Taiwan leadership’s security 
concern is estimated to be relatively higher than that of Japan but relatively lower than 
that of South Korea.  
Then the case study finds empirical evidence which lend support to the research 
hypotheses. First, it finds that the Japanese government established a minimalist approach 
to security while South Korea introduced huge-scale domestic drives to rapidly increase 
the contribution of domestic society to autonomous defense capability, while the 
leadership of Taiwan introduced relatively modest level of security-promoting domestic 
4 
drives. Second, the case study finds that South Korea was strongly committed to the 
pursuit of military policies against the US strategic interests while Japan directed its 
military policies toward the superpower’s strategic interests. It also finds several points 
which suggest that the leadership of Taiwan was less committed than its counterpart of 
South Korea to the pursuit of a military policy against the US strategic interests.  
There are three points to note regarding the implication of this research. First, this 
research suggests that a regional state’s choice between the contrasting military behaviors 
toward its patron is a function of its assessment of security in response to the patron’s 
retrenchment. In this respect, the present study suggests that a regional state’s assessment 
of security leads to a dynamic of conflict and cooperation in the security relationship 
between the regional state and its superpower patron. Second, this study suggests the role 
of perception in the dynamic of cooperation between a regional state and its superpower 
patron when they do not agree how to interpret security environment. Third, this research 
follows the second-image reversed logic, which argues that the imperative of security 
competition under anarchy induces states to organize themselves in order to meet external 
security challenges. But the present research suggests that a regional state’s perception of 
security affects its relationship with domestic society. In this respect, this study suggests 
that the role of perception needs to be fully integrated into the existing scholarship on the 
second-image reversed logic.    
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses a regional 
state’s perception of security in response to its patron’s strategic retrenchment. The third 
section suggests a theory about a regional state’s domestic drives to promote societal 
contribution to autonomous defense posture. In the fourth section, this study suggests a 
5 
theory about a regional state’s pursuit of military policy against its patron’s strategic 
interests. The last section elaborates on the research design. After suggesting research 
hypotheses, this section discusses the case study research design of this research. Then it 
elaborates on how to operationally measure the independent and dependent variables of 




1.2. A Regional State’s Security Assessment under the Retrenchment of Its Patron 
 
In the context of the alliance relationship, the patron’s extended deterrence is a 
linchpin of the ally’s security. Extended deterrence consists of threats to retaliate against 
the adversaries in order to prevent a military attack on the junior ally.2 To demonstrate 
the credibility of extended deterrence, the superpower should not only assure its ally of 
its willingness to provide security support in times of need but also persuade adversaries 
that it will defend the junior ally.3 In this respect, a regional state’s evaluation of the 
reliability of the patron’s extended deterrence is affected not only by its evaluation of the 
superpower’s willingness to provide a security guarantee for but also by its evaluation of 
the patron’s posture toward the adversaries of the alliance. 
2 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review 82, 
no.2 (1988): 424. 
3 Goldstein introduces the notion of collective goods to discuss the credibility of the security relationship 
between allies having asymmetric capabilities. According to this discussion, a regional state’s negative 
assessment of the capability and willingness of its patron will lead her to believe that the patron will regard 
the security relationship not as a collective good but as a private good. Thus, the regional ally will be 
concerned that it will be eventually excluded from the patron’s provision of security. See Avery Goldstein, 
“Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World,” International Organization 49, 
no. 1 (1995): 39-71. 
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The present research argues that a regional state uses the presence of the superpower 
patron’s conventional forces in her territory as a heuristic for evaluating the patron’s 
willingness to provide security support. A superpower deploys sizable conventional 
military forces in the territories of the regional ally as an essential strategy to maintain the 
credibility of extended deterrence.4 However, it is also tempted to retrench militarily in 
the face of a decline in its relative power vis-à-vis other major powers and domestic 
attitudes hostile to a high level of global military commitment. Pressures from the 
international and domestic situations can drive a superpower to reduce its conventional 
force deployment abroad. This military retrenchment causes a regional ally to be 
skeptical of the superpower’s commitment. 
This research also argues that a regional ally is likely to use the patron’s approach 
toward the adversary as another heuristic to evaluate the security guarantee. According to 
this argument, a regional state should be sensitive to its patron’s diplomatic initiative to 
ease tensions with the adversary. Such a diplomatic initiative will lead the superpower to 
maintain strategic ambiguity between its regional ally and the adversary. Thus, a regional 
state may be concerned that the superpower may not be solidly committed, causing the 
regional state to fear abandonment.5  
In addition, a regional state may estimate that the adversary will make use of the 
patron’s diplomatic initiative as an opportunity to wedge itself between the patron and its 
junior allies. This is particularly the case when a regional ally estimates that its adversary 
Alexander Lanoszka, “Protection States Trust? Superpower Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance 
Dynamics,” Unpublished Manuscript (2012): 18-9. Manuscript available at 
https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/A-Lanoszka-Protection-States-Trust-
022012.pdf (Accessed last March 30, 2016).  
5 Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no.4 (1984): 471-72.  
7 
will use the patron’s diplomacy as an opportunity to realize its revisionist designs.6 The 
history of the adversary’s military postures affects this estimate. The more the adversary 
has been militarily offensive, for example, the more a regional state perceives that its 
adversary will make use of the superpower’s retrenchment for its revisionist purposes. 
This in turn leads to the regional state’s opposition to the patron’s approach toward the 
adversary.7 When the adversary has not been militarily offensive, in contrast, a regional 
ally is unlikely to perceive that the patron’s retrenchment will lead to the adversary’s 
revisionist military behaviors.  
It is conceivable that a regional state’s assessment of threats is filtered through its 
perception of the patron’s reliability when it is highly dependent upon the patron 
commitment.8 For example, if a regional state has experienced high levels of threat from 
the adversary and it is skeptical of the patron’s commitment, then the level of its threat 
perception of the adversary will be substantially high. In contrast, strong confidence in 
the patron commitment should alleviate the regional ally’s threat perception of the 
adversary, even if it has experienced high levels of threats. It is also conceivable that  
 
6 For a comprehensive discussion of wedge strategies, see Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy 
Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics.” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 155-89. 
7 Given the adversary’s offensive posture, a regional state is likely to prefer the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy. This logically flows from the deterrence model, which supposes the existence of an adversary, 
whose foreign policy goal is perceived as revisionist. The deterrence model argues that great dangers arise 
if a revisionist perceives the status quo powers to have less capability or resolve. Thus it suggests that a 
status quo must display the ability and willingness to wage war to avoid such a disastrous situation. Based 
upon this policy preference, a regional state is likely to oppose to its patron’s policy of easing tensions with 
the adversary of the alliance. Regarding the discussion on the deterrence model, see Robert Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 
58-62. 
8 Victor Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and 
Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 269. 
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skepticism of the patron’s commitment may magnify a regional state’s threat perception, 
even if she is in a security-abundant environment. 
To summarize, a state’s security is dependent upon its assessment of the likely 
behavior of another state. In this respect, the present study discusses a regional state’s 
perceptions of the likely behaviors of its patron and the adversary given patron’s 
retrenchment. This leads to the argument that a regional state’s security concern is 
composed of her threat perception of the adversary and her estimate of the reliability of 
the patron. 
A superpower’s retrenchment is thus an external shock that leads its regional allies 
to reevaluate not only the patron’s commitment but also the military threats posed by the 
adversary. Facing the patron’s retrenchment, a regional state should try to increase its 
security. To develop a theory explaining a regional state’s security-driven internal and 
external behaviors in response to its patron’s retrenchment, the present research refers to 
the existing literature that suggests that a study of a state’s security-seeking behaviors 
must analyze how anarchy-driven pressures are translated via decision-makers’ 
perceptions of external security environments.9 This leads to the analysis of how a 
regional state’s assessment of security under the patron’s retrenchment affects its 
security-seeking behaviors. 
The present research explains two empirical puzzles regarding a regional state’s 
behaviors in response to its patron’s retrenchment. First, this research develops a theory 
to explain how a regional state’s security assessment affects its willingness to increase the 
9 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no.1 (1998): 
152. 
9 
contribution of domestic society toward defense. Second, the present study explains why 
one regional state pursues military behaviors that will jeopardize the strategic interests of 
its patron, while another regional state moves in a direction favored by its security 
provider. This comparative analysis helps to identify the dynamics of military conflict 




1.3. A Regional State’s Security-Promoting Domestic Drives in Response to its Patron’s 
Retrenchment 
 
A superpower’s retrenchment suggests that support from the security provider will 
become costly. Consequently, a regional state becomes more reliant on the establishment 
of an autonomous defense capability.10 This leads the state’s leadership to increase the 
contribution of domestic society to defense.  
The existing scholarship on asymmetric alliances pays little attention to a junior 
ally’s security-enhancing domestic drives in response to the retrenchment of its patron. 
Neorealism suggests that the systemic imperative of anarchy leads a state to introduce 
external balancing in the form of aggregating capabilities with other states, and internal 
balancing in the form of increasing autonomous military capabilities through costly 
10 According to the notion of arms-alliance trade-offs, a state is expected to rely on its own military 
capabilities when support from allies is relatively costly. Regarding this proposition, see Michael F. Altfeld, 
“The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test,” Western Political Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1984): 523-544; James 
D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security,” International Organization 47, no. 
2 (1993): 207-33; Gerald L. Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries,” 
International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994): 421-46. A flip side of this proposition is that the relative 
increase in the cost of the establishment of domestic programs for military build-ups should lead a state to 
search for allied support for the sake of security. Regarding this argument, see Michael N. Barnett and Jack 
S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73,” International 
Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369-95. 
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domestic drives.11 However, the neorealist literature has characterized the balance of 
power as a system in which international alliances are central. This leads the neorealist 
approach to pay little attention to a state’s security-enhancing domestic drives in response 
to external security environments.12 This scholarly tendency may be problematic because 
the imperative of self-help and structural uncertainty under anarchy makes internal 
balancing the state’s default strategy. Some level of internal balancing will take place 
even in a state that has the luxury of external security assistance.13 
However, it also needs to be noted that there are two methodological hurdles to deal 
with when it comes to using the notion of internal balancing.14 First, “it is often difficult 
to distinguish internal balancing against specific external threats from other sources of 
arms buildups.”15 In this respect, one needs to distinguish military build-ups resulting 
from domestic mobilization drives from military build-ups resulting from the vested 
interests of the military, bureaucratic politics or from domestic pressure. Second, there is 
a task of distinguishing between the state’s military build-ups as a security-enhancing  
 
11 Waltz, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 
12 In this respect, Levy and Thompson suggest that “most of the balance of power literature conceives of 
balancing in terms of counterbalancing alliances, especially for multipolar systems, which characterize the 
vast majority of the European system during the last five centuries. The literature on the absence of 
balancing against the United States also focuses on coalitional balancing.” See Jack S. Levy and William R. 
Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” 
International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 23. With regard to the relative absence of scholarly discussion on 
the state’s internal balancing, Levy and Thompson suggest that the notion of internal balancing is hard to 
operationally define, because of which discussion tends to focus on the state’s external balancing. See Levy 
and Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe.” 
Joao Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 67. 
14 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 
1495-1999,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 14 
15 Levy and Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea,” 23. 
11 
strategy and the state’s tendency to ratchet up the competitive level of military 
capabilities.  
While acknowledging the methodological hurdles above, the present research 
characterizes the internal balancing strategy as the state’s strategy to increase societal 
contribution to an autonomous defense posture in response to its patron’s strategic 
retrenchment. This characterization refers to existing scholarship that suggests that 
political leaders must draw on domestic society and economy for popular support and 
required material resources. Classical realists acknowledge that the nature of state-society 
relationship is vital to the conduct of internal balancing strategy. According to them, 
“Power over opinion is … … not less essential for political purposes than military and 
economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion 
has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader.”16 It was also 
argued that “The quality of government is patently a source of strength or weakness with 
respect to most of the factors upon which national power depends, especially in view of 
the influence the government exerts upon natural resources, industrial capacity, and 
military preparedness.”17 Yet the classical realists leave aside systemic analysis of how 
internal balancing strategy is influenced by the state’s relationship with domestic society.  
This analysis has been substantially addressed by the neoclassical realist literature, 
which suggests the need to study how a state’s response to international challenges and 
opportunities is translated through the state’s capacity to direct domestic human and 
16 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (London: Macmillan & Co, 1964), 132. 
17 Morgenthau, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New 
York: Knopf, 1966), 154.  
12 
material resources for national security purposes. For example, Fareed Zakaria traces the 
US’s rapid international expansion between 1899 and 1980 to an increase in the state’s 
capacity to direct domestic resources for national security objectives. This increase in 
extractive capacity is attributed to the emergence of a strong state vis-à-vis its domestic 
society.18 Aaron Friedberg’s study of the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
early Cold War era also discusses how the state-society relationship of the two great 
powers affected their strategies of military preparedness against each other.19 Like his 
fellow neoclassical realists, Randall Schweller explores how a state’s relationship with 
domestic society affects the state’s capacity to drive domestic mobilization campaigns for 
military preparedness against external threats. According to him, legitimate states are 
likely to possess a high level of policy capacity in mobilizing and extracting national 
resources for national security objectives. In contrast, policymakers are likely to have less 
capacity in directing domestic resources for national security purposes when the state’s 
relationship to society is weak.20  
 
18 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). 
19 Friedberg’s study of the United States’ strategy of military preparedness against the Soviet Union found 
that the state’s power over domestic society and economy was substantially limited during the early period 
of the Cold War. This induced the United States to take the “outward-directed force posture and military 
strategy” and “a supporting set of inward-directed power-creating mechanisms.”  The Soviet Union, on 
the other hand, did not witness countervailing domestic constraint on the state’s ability to direct domestic 
resources for military preparedness. This led the state to militarize its domestic society, which enabled the 
state to compete with the United States on a global scale. The end result of this “true garrison state,” 
however, was the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union. See Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of 
the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 341; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Why Didn't the United States become a Garrison 
State?” International Security 16, no. 4 (1992): 141. 
20 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 45-54. 
13 
The neoclassical realist literature examines how a state’s relationship with domestic 
society affects its internal balancing strategy against external threats.21 In this respect, it 
follows the suggestion that one should explorer how a state’s relationship with domestic 
society influences security-seeking behaviors shown by states.22 While acknowledging 
the neoclassical realist conclusion, this research alternatively explores how a state’s 
external security environments affect its capacity to direct national resources for military 
preparedness against external threats.  
This alternative approach is based upon a survey of existing literature that endorses 
the notion that external pressures shape a state’s internal structure. Gerschenkron 
explored how domestic structures of states are influenced by the timing of 
industrialization and the pressure of the international system.23 Drawing on 
Gerschenkron’s discussion, Moore argued that the pressure from an international system 
and the timing of industrialization led to the development of three possible modes of 
modernization: democratic, fascist, and communist.24 After reviewing these studies, 
Gourevitch introduced the notion of second-image reversed logic, which argues that 
anarchy-driven security competition “induces states to organize themselves internally so 
as to meet these external challenges.”25 Michael Desch finds that war and external 
21 This approach can be endorsed by a group of studies discussing how a state’s relationship with domestic 
society affects the state’s foreign economic policy. Regarding this point, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew 
Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24, no.2 (1999): 5-55. 
Matthew Evangelista, “Issue-Area and Foreign Policy Revisited.” International Organization 43, no.1 
(1989): 147-71. 
23 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1962). 
24 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of 
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).   
25 Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” 
International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 896. Introducing this notion, he examined how the state 
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threats led to the expansion of the state’s scope and to the increased cohesion of the 
state.26 Resende-Santos introduces the second image reversed logic into his critical 
review of Waltz’s version of neorealism and argues that anarchy-driven competition 
forces each state to adopt the strategy of military emulation, which in turn leads to the 
restructuring of the state’s central fiscal-administrative-coercive apparatus.27  
To establish a theory of a regional state’s internal balancing strategy in response to 
its patron’s strategic retrenchment, the present study integrates the role of perception into 
the existing scholarship on the second-image reversed logic. A regional state’s security 
concern in the face of the patron’s retrenchment shows how systemic pressure of 
international anarchy affects its security assessment. Uncertainty and insecurity are 
inherent in international anarchy. This suggests that a state’s security is contingent upon 
its assessment of the likely behavior of another state. A superpower’s retrenchment may 
make its junior ally distrustful of the patron’s commitment. In addition, the security 
provider’s retrenchment may affect its ally’s threat perception of the adversary. A regional 
state is thus supposed to organize itself internally in the face of the patron’s retrenchment 
based upon its security assessment. 
The present study should hypothesize a causal link between a regional state’s 
security concern and its efforts to increase societal contribution to autonomous defense. 
For this purpose, this study refers to Michael Barnett’s discussion on the state’s strategy 
domestic structure is affected by the following two factors at factors at the level of international politics: 
the distribution of power among states and the distribution of wealth and economic activity. 
26 Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International Organization 50, no. 
2 (1996): 237-68. 
27 Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army. 
15 
for military preparedness.28 He discusses three types of strategy: namely, 
accommodational, restructural, and international strategy.  
The essence of an accommodational strategy is that political leaders restrict 
selection of policy instruments for military preparedness to those which are presently 
contained in its central apparatus. States will invariably initiate this strategy because there 
are few domestic political costs to conducting it. As international pressure increases, 
however, states’ needs for security are unlikely to be met through the strategy of 
accommodation. This leads political leaders to look for either a restructural strategy, 
defined as the state’s attempt to restructure its present compact with society so as to 
increase the domestic contribution for national security, or international strategy, defined 
as the state’ attempt to distribute the costs of balancing strategy onto foreign states.29  
Political leaders are likely to introduce international strategy when the state’s 
relationship with its economy and society is constrained as they find it difficult to impose 
costs attached to state’s military preparedness on domestic society. Foreign assistance, 
whereas, places restrictions on the recipient’s security-related policies that the aid donor 
regards as contrary to its own strategic interests. Conversely, a state that has the 
capabilities to redeploy internal resources and impose the costs of increasing national 
security on society is likely to introduce the restructural strategy. Introducing this 
28 Michael N. Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli 
Security Policy, 1967-1977.” World Politics 42, no.4 (1990): 529-62.   
Barnett discusses two forms of the state’s restructural strategy. One is a “centralization scenarios” in 
which “the state intervenes and increases its direct control over societal resources.” This is when the state 
introduces direct taxation, moves from the reliance on a mercenary army to the establishment of a standing 
army, or nationalization of key economic sectors. The other form of the restructural strategy involves the 
expansion of the state’s material base by unleashing market forces for increasing productive activity. See 
Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 543.    
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domestic offensive strategy, however, comes with societal resistance and the cost of 
establishing expensive administrative apparatus to control a domestic society.30 
Barnett’s discussion suggests that political leaders are unlikely to make efforts to 
increase domestic contribution for military preparedness when the state is not vulnerable 
to external security environment. In contrast, they are supposed to make efforts to 
increase domestic contribution for military build-ups as the state’s external vulnerability 
increases, particularly when the state does not have an alternative source of international 
support for its security and when political leaders are not constrained by domestic 
resistance against drives for directing national resources toward military preparedness.  
The present study integrates the role of perception into the study of a state’s strategy 
for military preparedness. Accordingly, it is theorized that there is co-variation between 
the level of a regional state’s security concern under its patron’s strategic retrenchment 
and the scope of the state’s efforts to increase societal contribution to an autonomous 
defense capability.31 According to this theory, it is hypothesized that the more negatively 
a regional state estimates its security in the face of the patron’s retrenchment, the more it 
30 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 543-44.     
31 This theory can be endorsed by the argument that variation in the state’s external pressure leads to 
variation in the state’s security-promoting domestic strategy, which in turn leads to variation in the state’s 
domestic political structure. The much cited case to illustrate this argument is the geographical differences 
between England and Prussia in the 17th century. The existence of the English Channel substantially 
lessened the chances of invasion. This geographical condition induced England into maintaining a navy, 
instead of constituting a standing army and mobilizing domestic resources to sustain it. A navy force could 
not be used for domestic repression. Consequently, the absence of military tools for domestic repression 
facilitated the development of a constitutional, liberal political order in England. In contrast, Prussia was 
very vulnerable to geopolitical location in the sense that there was nothing natural that lessened the chances 
of invasion. This geographical condition in turn led Prussia to establish a standing army, which was not 
supervised by representative bodies. This in turn led to the emergence of the garrison state. Regarding the 
geographical differences between England and Prussia, see Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image 
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 
896. 
17 
is willing to increase its societal contribution to defense. It is also hypothesized that the 
less negatively a regional state estimates the security implications of the security 





1.4. A Regional State’s Military Behaviors against the Strategic Interests of Its Patron 
 
There are several cases in which a superpower’s strategic interests are jeopardized 
by the military behaviors of its regional allies. For example, a regional state’s offensive 
military behaviors will negatively affect the patron’s strategic interest to establish 
peaceful status-quo. Another example is a regional state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons that 
place a superpower’s strategy of nonproliferation at risk. A superpower must deal with 
the regional state’s military behaviors that will jeopardize its strategic interests or risk a 
loss of control over the junior ally. Despite the significant implications involved in the 
alliance between a superpower and its regional allies, existing scholarship is 
underdeveloped to explain why a regional ally pursues military behaviors against the 
patron’s strategic interests.  
For instance, this question remains an empirical puzzle for a group of studies that 
emphasize the tendency toward policy coordination between a regional ally and its 
patron. A third party to the alliance is supposed to judge the commitment of the allies to 
one another via the similarity of their foreign policies. Thus, allies are likely to look for 
intra-alliance solidarity in their foreign policy in order to send a signal to a third party 
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that their alliance is a credible one.32 From this perspective, a regional state is supposed 
to develop its military policies in line with its patron’s strategic interests. 
A regional state’s engagement in military behaviors against its patron is also a 
puzzle for studies characterizing an alliance between asymmetric capabilities as pacts-of-
restraint, through one in which the stronger party manages the behaviors of its weaker 
partner.33 According to this scholarship, a superpower has the capability to manage its 
regional allies so as to prevent them from pursuing military behaviors that will negatively 
affect its strategic interests. It is also able to punish the junior allies’ pursuit of 
objectionable military behaviors by coercive threats.34 Considering the pact-of-restraint 
aspect of the alliance, it is still puzzling why a regional state would pursue a military 
32 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (June 
2000): 69-70; Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” 164. 
33 Osgood points out that the most prominent function of an asymmetric alliance is to control and restrain 
its relatively weak ally. In this regard, Gelpi envisions an asymmetric alliance as an institutional mechanism 
through which a relatively weak ally is forced to keep its foreign policy favorable to its relatively strong 
alliance partner. Ikenberry’s case study of the security relationship between the U.S. and its regional allies 
during the early era of the Cold War similarly envisions U.S. military alliances, such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, as institutional mechanisms through which 
the hegemonic state was able to lock its regional allies into a postwar order that it favored. Such a 
restraining influence has also been focused on by a strand of the literature which discusses the dual-
containment character of an asymmetric alliance between a superpower state and her regional allies, such 
as Germany and Japan. See Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1968), 22; Christopher Gelpi, “Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control,” in 
Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, eds. Helga Haftendorn, Robert. O. Keohane, 
and Celeste A. Wallander (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 107-139; John G. Ikenberry, After 
Victory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). According to the literature, the asymmetric 
alliance not only serves to balance external threats, but also offers mechanism and venues through which a 
superpower state is able to control the security policy of its regional allies in order to make the international 
environment more predictable and stable. Regarding US dual-containment strategy toward Germany and 
Japan, see Timothy. D. Temerson, Double Containment and the Origins of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 
(Center for International Studies. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), 
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/17094/JP-WP-91-14-25982229.pdf?sequence=1; Thomas A. 
Schwartz, “The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy 
of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 19, no. 4 (1995): 549-68. 
34 Gelpi, “Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control”; Nicholas L. Miller, “The Secret Success of 
Nonproliferation Sanctions.” International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014): 913-44. 
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policy against the patron’s strategic interests, which could prompt coercive threats from 
the patron to reverse them. 
From the perspective of the existing scholarship, a regional state’s pursuit of military 
policy against its patron’s strategic interests is characterized as the state’s irrational 
behavior, which can be explained by the state’s domestic political structure or the 
existence of reckless political leaders.35 To establish a theory of the regional state’s 
military behaviors against its patron, however, this study alternatively argues that the 
notion of rationality should be fully considered in the study of a regional state’s military 
behaviors against its patron’s strategic interests. This leads to the characterization of the 
regional state’s military behavior against its patron as the state’s rational strategy to 
promote security. 
To discuss a regional state’s military behaviors against its patron, the present 
research refers to the existing scholarship to explain why a regional state pursues an 
independent nuclear weapons capability despite the existence of the nuclear protection of 
its patron. The patron’s commitment to a nuclear umbrella may be sufficient for a 
regional ally to dampen its security concern. Thus such a regional ally is unlikely to 
engage in nuclear behavior, which jeopardizes its patron’s strategic interests of non-
proliferation.36 In this respect, it is puzzling why a regional ally that enjoys nuclear 
protection of its patron pursues an independent nuclear weapons capability, which could 
prompt coercive threats from the patron to reverse the objectionable military policy. To 
35 Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34, no.3 
(2009/10): 158-96.  
36 Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51, no.1 (2007): 170. 
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resolve this empirical puzzle, one may argue the nuclear behavior as the junior ally’s 
strategy that targets not only to secure its security but also to have leverage in negotiation 
with its patron regarding the terms of the patron’s security guarantee.37  
While referring to this argument, this research characterizes a regional state’s pursuit 
of military policies against the patron’s strategic interests as a form of that state’s strategy 
to put pressure on the superpower. This characterization helps to explain why a regional 
state pursues such adventurous military policies that may prompt the patron to engage in 
coercive punishment. But the existing scholarship on a regional state’s nuclear behavior 
does not explain why a regional state develops its military policies in line with the 
strategic interests of its patron while another regional ally pursues a military policy 
against the patron’s strategic interests.       
This research theorizes that the level of a regional state’s commitment to the pursuit 
of a military policy against its patron is a function its security assessment during the 
security provider’s retrenchment. According to this theory, a regional state is supposed to 
maintain deferential behaviors toward its patron because this will raise the reputational 
costs the security provider will pay for retrenchment.38 As its security concern increases 
under its patron’s retrenchment, however, it should find a way to pressure the superpower 
to reverse the course. For this purpose, a regional ally pursues a military policy that will 
jeopardize the patron’s strategic interests. This suggests that there is covariation between 
37 Lanoszka, Protection States Trust?” 
38 Cha, Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia,” 266; Goldstein, Discounting the 
Free Ride,” 45.  
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the level of a regional state’s security concern and the level of its commitment to the 
pursuit of a military policy against its patron.  
According to the theory, it is hypothesized that the more negatively a regional state 
assesses its security in response to its patron’s retrenchment, the more it is hypothesized 
to be committed to the pursuit of a military policy against its patron’s strategic interests. 
In contrast, the less negatively a regional ally assesses the security provider’s 
retrenchment, the less it is hypothesized to be committed to pursuing a military policy 
against the strategic interests of its patron.  
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1.5.1. Research Hypotheses 
 
Test of the research hypotheses follows the “congruence method,” which suggests 
that in order to identify a causal effect between independent and dependent variables, one 
must begin with a theory positing the temporal co-variation between the variables and 
then assess the validity of the theory against historical cases.39 First, this study expects to 
find co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security concern and the scope of 
its drives to increase domestic contribution to an autonomous defense capability 
(Hypothesis 1). Second, the present research expects to find covariation between the level 
of a regional state’s negative assessment of security and the level of its commitment to 
the pursuit of a military policy against the strategic interests of its superpower patron 
(Hypothesis 2). 
   
Hypothesis 1: The more negatively a regional state estimates its security in the face 
of its patron’s retrenchment, the more it launches domestic drives to increase the societal 
contribution toward an autonomous defense capability. In contrast, the less negatively a 
regional state estimates the security implications of the patron’s retrenchment, the less it 
introduces domestic drives to establish military capability for self-defense.  
  
Hypothesis 2: The more negatively a regional state estimates its security in response 
to the patron’s retrenchment, the more it is committed to pursuing a military policy that 
jeopardizes the strategic interests of the security provider. In contrast, the less negatively 
a regional state estimates the patron’s retrenchment, the less it is committed to the pursuit 
of a military policy against the security guarantor’s strategic interests.  
 
39 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 181-204. 
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1.5.2. Case Selection 
 
The research hypotheses are tested against the context of how the US regional allies 
in Northeast Asia, namely Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, responded to the Nixon 
Administration’s strategic retrenchment in Northeast Asia during the 1970s.40 The Nixon 
Doctrine is known as the most representative instance of U.S. retrenchment in Northeast 
Asia. According to this doctrine, each of the US allies should be in charge of its own 
military defense in general, and the US would have acted as a nuclear umbrella if 
requested.41 This military retrenchment reflects the US need to look for a more passive 
and secondary role in the defense of its regional allies. The retrenchment was followed by 
the Nixon Administration’s announcement of the achievement of rapprochement with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC or aka China), which signaled that the US would adopt 
a position of strategic ambiguity between China and its regional allies in Northeast Asia. 
 
Table 1-1. The US Troop Level in Japan, ROK, and ROC, 1969-1976.42 
 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Japan 84,802 82,264 71,485 61,747 56,240 51,608 48,337 46,794 
ROK 66,531 52,197 40,740 41,600 41,864 40,387 40,204 39,133 
ROC 9,243 8,813 8,565 8,289 8,267 4,619 2,584 2,090 
 
40 The present study uses the term Republic of Korea (ROK) and South Korea interchangeably for a 
stylistic purpose. It also uses the term Republic of China (ROC) and Taiwan interchangeably.    
41 Earl G. Ravenal, “The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments,” Foreign Affairs 49, no. 2 (1971): 
201-17. 
42 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003 (Accessed 
March 29, 2016). 
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Each of the three regional states is arguably a hard case to use in supporting the 
theory about a regional state’s security-enhancing domestic drives.43 The US’s Cold War 
strategy in Northeast Asia was to create a hub-and-spokes system, with the United States 
as the hub and no apparent institutionalized military cooperation between the spokes. The 
absence of institutionalized cooperation, coupled with the bipolar nature of the period 
examined in the case study, suggests that each of the states was highly dependent upon 
the US’s security commitment. Thus, it is arguably difficult to find substantial variation 
among them in terms of the scope of security-promoting domestic drives in the face of 
the US retrenchment.  
In addition, because of their dependence on the United States, the three states were 
not supposed to engage in military behaviors that were against the strategic interests of 
the United States, which could conceivably prompt U.S. retaliation. Furthermore, the 
existing scholarship on the Cold War diplomatic history finds that the alliance between 
US and the regional allies worked as institutional mechanism to prevent the junior allies 
from provoking a larger military conflict that might spoil the patron’s strategic interests.44 
Thus, the selected states are also hard cases to use in supporting the argument that a 
The case selection follows the suggestion that a qualitative case study needs to use hard case(s) in 
supporting its own theory. See Harry Eckstein, "Case studies and theory in political science," in Handbook 
of Political Science, Vol. 7, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1975), 79-138.  
44 For example, Cha finds that the rationale on the part of the United States in the creation of the hub and 
spokes was to constrain its anticommunist allies in Northeast Asia from engaging in aggressive military 
behaviors against its adversaries. Temerson similarly argues that the alliance relationship between the US 
and Japan during the Cold War worked as an institutional mechanism via which the superpower exercised a 
decisive influence over the reform of Japan’s domestic political institutions to transform the defeated 
wartime power into a status quo regional power. See Cha, “Powerplay.”; Temerson, Double Containment 
and the Origins of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.    
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regional state’s negative assessment of security has the potential to cause it to pursue 
military behaviors that are against the strategic interests of its patron.  
The case study focuses on the Nixon Administration’s retrenchment as the primary 
factor influencing each of the regional states’ security assessments. There are two points 
to note regarding how the case study is designed to control for alternative factors that 
have the potential to affect each of the regional states’ security assessments. First, the 
case selection helps to control for alternative factors at the level of the international 
system, such as the distribution of power among great powers, offense-defense balance, 
and international economic pressure, which may affect the regional states’ security 
assessment.45 Second, each of the states was unable to find another state to act as an ally 
in response to the Nixon administration’s retrenchment. In this respect, the case study 
controls for the possibility that a superpower’s retrenchment may not lead its allies to 
work on domestic drives for military preparedness when they have alternative sources of 
allied support.  
The case selection also helps to control for the neoclassical realist argument that a 
regional state’s relationship with domestic society should affect its willingness to increase 
the societal contribution toward an autonomous defense capability. There are two points 
to note. First, South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed not only high levels of autonomy from 
domestic society but also high levels of capability to penetrate and mobilize their 
domestic societies in conducting the states’ national policies. In addition, because anti-
45 Snyder and Taliaferro characterize these factors as structural modifiers that may increase or decrease the 
likelihood of conflict. See Glenn H. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” Security Studies 5, 
no. 3 (1996): 168-71; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism 
Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/01): 136-41.   
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statist ideology was not widely embedded in the domestic societies of these two states, 
the leadership of the two states did not witness substantial domestic resistance to the 
state’s initiative to launch domestic drives toward an autonomous defense posture.46 In 
contrast, Japan’s security policy is known to have been substantially constrained by anti-
militarist norms embedded in domestic society. But the Japanese leadership did not 
witness any substantial domestic oppositional movements regarding the state’s security 
policy during the 1970s.47 Second, none of the three states are constrained by class 
conflicts. The establishment of large-scale rearmament programs is socially divisive in 
nature, and thus, a state whose society is divided by class interests is likely to be faced 
with domestic resistance when introducing mass-scale programs for the establishment of 
an indigenous military capability.48 The absence of class conflicts thus suggests another 
explanation for the absence of domestic resistance toward each of the regional states’ 
security-promoting domestic campaigns. 
 
 
46 Regarding the state-society relationship of South Korea during the 1970s, see Byung-Kook Kim and 
Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011). As for the state-society relationship in Taiwan, see Shelley Rigger, Politics in 
Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999); Hung-mao Tien, “Social Change and 
Political Development in Taiwan,” in Taiwan in a Time of Transition, eds. Harvey Feldman, and Ilpyong J. 
Kim (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 1-37; Edwin A. Winckler, “Institutionalization and Participation on 
Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?” The China Quarterly 99 (September 1984): 481-99. 
47 Izumikawa finds Japan’s security policy during the 1970s was a deviant case for the antimilitarist model 
in the sense that Japan’s security policy during this period was not constrained by domestic resistance. See 
Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan’s 
Security Policy,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 123-60. 
48 Kevin Narizny, “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of 
Rearmament,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003): 203-20. 
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1.5.3.1. A Regional State’s Security Assessment 
 
The case study should make inference of security assessment of each regional state’s 
leadership. The primary method of inference is qualitative analysis of the written and 
spoken statements of each state’s leadership regarding its adversary’s military threats and 
its patron’s reliability. Because of the limited availability of these primary source data, 
the case study also introduces two alternatives methods. First, it refers to primary source 
documents and secondary source literature that contain information on each state 
leadership’s perception of security. Second, the case study refers to the development of 
security environment each regional state directly faced. This provides circumstantial 
evidence to make inference of each state’s assessment of security. 
The case study uses documents from the following primary data sources. First, the 
U.S. Government Printing Office published two volumes of documents that contain 
information about how the leadership of South Korea and Japan assessed the state’s 
security in response to the Nixon administration’s strategic posture in Northeast Asia.49 
Second, the U.S. Government Printing Office also provides two published volumes of 
documents that contain information about how the leadership of Taiwan assessed the 
49 One is Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, eds. 
Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2010). This study refers 
to the e-book version of this volume, which is available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v19p1/pdf/frus1969-76v19p1.pdf. This 
will be abbreviated as FRUS Korea 1969-1972. The other is Investigation of Korean-American Relations: 
Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978). This will be abbreviated as Investigation of Korean-
American Relations hereinafter.   
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state’s security in response to the US retrenchment in Northeast Asia.50 Third, the 
National Security Archive, located at George Washington University, provides a digital 
compilation of declassified records on the US-Japan alliance from 1960 through 1976.51 
From this compilation, the case study obtained primary source documents that contain 
information about how the Japanese leadership assessed the state’s security under the 
Nixon administration’s retrenchment. Fourth, the National Security Archive, provides a 
digital compilation of declassified records on the US-China relations from 1960 through 
1998. From this compilation, the case study obtained documents that contain information 
about how the ROC leadership’s security assessment.52 Fifth, under the sponsorship of 
the National Security Archive, the U.S.-Japan Project conducted interviews with former 
Japanese officials who were closely involved with the formulation of Japan’s security 
policy since 1960.53 The case study of Japan obtained data from this primary source. 
In the case of Japan, the case study considers the fact that the security policy during 
the 1970s was formulated under the initiative of the Defense Agency of Japan (JDA). In 
this respect, the case study focuses on how the JDA policymakers assessed the state’s 
50 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, eds. Steven E. 
Phillips and Edward C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006); Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, eds. eds. David P. Nickles and Edward C. 
Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007). The present study refers to the e-book version of 
the two volumes. The e-book version of the former volume is available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v17/pdf/frus1969-76v17.pdf. This will 
be abbreviated as FRUS China 1969-1972. The e-book version of the latter is available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v18/pdf/frus1969-76v18.pdf. This will 
be abbreviated FRUS China 1973-1976 hereinafter.   
51 This digital compilation will be abbreviated as Japan and the United States 1960-1976 hereinafter. 
Regarding the general information on the declassified records, see  
http://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/japan1960.  
52 This digital compilation will be abbreviated as China and the United States 1960-1998 hereinafter. 
Regarding the general information on the declassified records, see 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/publications/china-us/.   
53 The interviews are available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/ohpage.htm.  
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security in response to the US retrenchment. In comparison, the case study of the other 
two states measures security assessment of the state’s top political leaders: the ROK 
president Park Chung Hee and his core policymakers in the case of South Korea, and the 
ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and his core policymakers in the case of Taiwan. In the 
case of the two states, it was relatively easy to form a consensus among policymaking 
leaders because the two states’ structure of policymaking process was highly centralized. 
The formation of a consensus allowed them to act as a realist version of a unitary actor 
under the state’s security initiative.54  
According to the theory of this research, a regional state’s security concern can be 
discussed as a continuous variable. First, at one end of the spectrum, there is a regional 
state that believes that its adversary will make use of the superpower’s retrenchment for 
its revisionist purposes and, at the same time, suspects that the superpower will not 
provide security assistance in times of needs. The level of such a state’s security concern 
should be substantially high. Second, at the opposite end, there is another regional state 
that is confident in the patron’s commitment and, at the same time, is confident that its 
adversary will not introduce revisionist behaviors. The level of such a state’s security 
concern should be substantially low.  
 
54 With respect to how the policymaking elites’ consensus affects the state’s response to the international 
security environment, Skocpol suggests the following: “it seems that organizationally coherent 
collectivities of state officials, especially collectivities of career officials relatively insulated from ties to 
currently dominant socioeconomic interests, are likely to launch distinctive new state strategies in times of 
crisis. Likewise, collectivities of officials may elaborate already established public policies in distinctive 
ways, acting relatively continuously over long stretches of time.” See Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State 
Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9. 
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In measuring the independent variable, the case study focuses on how each regional 
state’s leadership assessed the state’s security in response to the Nixon administration’s 
strategic posture in East Asia. But measuring the dependent variables makes it necessary 
for the case study to examine each regional state’s security-seeking behaviors during the 
whole period of the 1970s. This helps to fully documents how each leadership’s 
assessment of security affected the formulation of the security-promoting domestic drives 
and how each regional state’s security assessment affected its commitment to the pursuit 
of a military policy against the US strategic interests. The extension of timespan can be 
also justified by the fact that the Nixon administration’s strategic posture in East Asia was 




1.5.3.2. A Regional State’s Military Behaviors against the Strategic Interests of Its Patron 
 
The case study examines the compatibility between each of the regional states’ 
military behaviors and the US’s strategic interests in Northeast Asia. For example, the 
US’s key strategic interest in Northeast Asia was to establish a peaceful status quo in this 
region. Thus, a regional state’s military policy that was incompatible with the superpower 
state’s desire to establish a peaceful status-quo in Northeast Asia could be described as a 
military behavior that would jeopardize the US’s strategic interests in this region. 
A regional state’s willingness to engage in military behaviors against the strategic 
interests of its patron can be discussed as a continuous variable. To operationally measure 
this variable, the case study documents the level of internal cohesion within the 
leadership of the three states when pursuing such adventurous behaviors. The more the 
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cohesive leadership of a state, the more it is committed to the pursuit of a military policy 
against the patron’s strategic interests.  
In addition, the case study examines how each of the regional states responded to the 
US’s coercive efforts to reverse the military behaviors against its strategic interests. When 
a regional state is strongly committed to the pursuit of the military behaviors, it is 
unlikely to abandon them, even in the face of the patron’s coercive efforts. In contrast, a 
superpower will find it relatively easy to make its junior ally abandon the objectionable 
behaviors when the junior ally is modestly committed to the pursuit of these behaviors. 
Finally, a regional state will voluntarily abandon the pursuit of military behaviors against 
the strategic interests of its patron, even without the presence of the patron’s coercive 




1.5.3.3. A Regional State’s Security-Enhancing Domestic Drives 
 
The measurement of a regional security-promoting domestic drives begins with 
discussing the state leadership’s initiatives to direct domestic resources toward the 
establishment of an autonomous defense capability because it is the essential strategy to 
increase the contribution of domestic society to defense. Because the state is 
“institutionally separated from organized production,” political leaders should introduce 
centralized control over the economic activity of domestic society to direct national 
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resources toward achieving self-sufficiency in the establishment of an autonomous 
defense posture.55  
This domestic drive takes two forms: mobilization and extraction. Mobilization 
refers to the state’s intervention in the domestic economy to produce the required 
materials for the establishment of indigenous military capabilities, whereas extraction 
refers to the direct conversion of societal wealth into military power through taxation, 
requisition, and expropriation.56 When faced with immediate external threats, political 
leaders are likely to introduce extraction because it enables them to gain rapid access to 
domestic resources. In contrast, mobilization is a state’s relatively long-term strategy to 
establish the industrial and technological basis of the state’s military capabilities.57 
One may argue that examination of a change in defense spending as a share of 
national income is a straightforward way of measuring a regional state’s willingness to 
direct national resources toward the establishment of an autonomous defense posture. In 
this respect, the case study examines each state’s defense spending. However, there are 
two points that should be addressed in using this quantitative indicator. First, one often 
finds it difficult to exclude all appropriations of a non-military character when using an 
55 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 538.    
 In this respect, mobilization is “the creation of wealth and an investment in power,” whereas extraction 
is “the creation of power and the consumption of wealth” for security purposes. See Michael Mastanduno, 
David A. Lake and John G, Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies 
Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 463. Barnett defines mobilization as the state’s production policy for military 
build-ups, while he defines extraction as the state’s financial policy for arms-ups. See Barnett, “High 
Politics is Low Politics,” 538-40. Another way to discuss the difference between mobilization and 
extraction is via the ways in which the two methods affect the state’s short-term military security and long-
term economic capacity, both of which are the essential components of the state’s survival. From this 
viewpoint, extraction is the strategy adopted to prioritize the state’s military security over economic 
capacity, whereas mobilization is a strategy adopted to maintain a balance between short-term and long-
term security. Regarding this difference, see Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International 
Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 450-53.     
Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” 462-63. 
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existing database for the state’s military expenditure. Secondly, a change in military 
expenditures is also determined by a state’s other security needs. Thus, the quantitative 
indicator may not reflect the precise level of a regional state’s security concern in the face 
of the patron’s retrenchment.58  
A regional state’s security concern makes the state’s leadership select policy 
instruments intended to increase the domestic contribution to an autonomous defense 
capability. In doing so, political leaders will invariably begin by restricting the selection 
of policy instrument to those that are presently contained in its central apparatus in order 
to avoid domestic resistance.59 As the security concern increases, a regional state must 
introduce large-scale campaigns to direct national resources toward the establishment of 
an autonomous defense capability.60 This should decrease the amount of national 
resources that will be directed toward programs other than national defense. In addition, 
there may be large-scale institutional and societal costs involved in sustaining the state’s 
security-promoting domestic drives.61 The large-scale campaigns can thus generate 
resistance from affected societal groups.62  
The leadership of a state must overcome the societal constraints when introducing 
mass-scale domestic campaigns. This requires the leadership to place domestic drives on 
58 In this respect, Narizny argues that “defense burden indicators may be distorted by the operational costs 
of lesser conflicts that run concurrent with or immediately prior to the primary increase in threat.” Narizny, 
“Both Guns and Butter, or Neither,” 207.  
59 Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 541.    
60 The introduction of large-scale domestic drives may include the transformation of the domestic 
economic structure and even the private control of production. See Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 
539; Narizny, “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither,” 205. 
As Resende-Santos points out, “the mobilization and mustering of human and material resources will 
usually entail reform and restructuring in the rest of the state apparatus, the economy, and society.” See 
Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army. 18-9. 
62 Narizny, “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither.” 
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solid societal ground.63 For example, it may attempt to increase the institutional capacity 
to penetrate domestic society to secure societal support.64 But this comes at the cost of 
establishing an expansive administrative apparatus to penetrate into domestic society.65 
The present study examines whether each regional states attempted to establish a societal 
basis of national military preparedness when they needed to substantially increase the 
contribution of domestic society toward an autonomous defense posture.  
The inevitable tension between state and society suggests that the establishment of 
an autonomous defense posture is very much a collective undertaking, carrying 
considerable political costs and risks domestically.66 As such, political leaders should 
make efforts to increase elite-mass linkage when launching massive-scale security-
promoting domestic drives.67 This requires the leadership of a state to justify the drives 
to direct national resources toward an autonomous defense capability. Thus the case study 
examines the “ideological mobilization” as a part of the security-enhancing domestic 
drives.68  
Existing scholarship discusses three strategies with which the leadership of a state 
attempts to mobilize domestic support. First, political leaders deliberately inculcate state-
63 As Barnett points out, “the state and its political institutions must have a strong societal basis in order to 
garner societal compliance with its policies.” See Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 540. 
64 In this respect, Barnett argues that the state’s institutional capacity to penetrate domestic society should 
be the most important factor to affect the state’s ability to mobilize domestic financial resources for the 
state’s military preparedness. See Barnett, “High Politics is Low Politics,” 538.       
Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army.  
66 Randall Schweller, “Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization, Expansionist Ideology in the Age of 
Mass Politics.” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M. 
Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 227-50. 
67 Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," 
International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 173-74. 
68 Kohli points out that political leaders often introduce such “ideological mobilization” to gain societal 
support for the state’s developmental strategy. See Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political 
Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10. 
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sponsored nationalism because it tends to increase the cohesion of domestic society and 
the mass public’s propensity to identify with the state. This in turn facilitates the state’s 
efforts to direct national human and material resources toward military build-ups.69 In 
contrast, fragmented states find it difficult to direct domestic resources under the 
initiative of national security.70 Second, the leadership of a state introduces ideology as a 
way of mobilizing the mass public’s support.71 However, an ideology may thwart the 
initiative of the state’s leadership, depending on its contents.72 Third, political leaders 
manipulate international conflicts to justify costly domestic campaigns to establish 
national military preparedness.73  
 
69 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive 
State.” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 491. Posen’s case study of the security competition between 
France and Prussia/Germany during the period from the Seven Years War (1756-63) to the eve of the First 
World War shows that these European great powers inculcated nationalism to mobilize the spirit of self-
sacrifice among millions of soldiers, which in turn increased the intensity of warfare between the rivals. 
France, for example, deliberately inculcated nationalism through propaganda campaigns, political 
indoctrination, and the medium of compulsory primary education, to generate public support for the mass 
conscription during the French Revolutionary Wars. See Barry R Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and 
Military Power,” International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 80-124.  
70 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 51-4. 
71 Wohlforth investigates how the thesis of “détente through strength,” which suggests that “the more 
powerful a country is, the more inducement it can offer for an alliance and the more resources it can 
contribute, so the better able it is to play the balance-of-power game,” helped the Soviet Union to increase 
its military power. See William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold 
War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 51-4. As Taliaferro points out, the thesis of the Soviet 
regime, articulated by Joseph Stalin and the political leaders of the Soviet regime in the 1930s, justified the 
regime’s drive to extract national resources for “the crash industrialization programs in the 1930s” and the 
state’s military build-ups during the period after Second World War. See Taliaferro, “State Building for 
Future Wars,” 493.  
Friedberg finds that American anti-statist ideology, consisting of a fear of power concentrated in the 
hands of the central government, and beliefs in economic liberalism, narrowed the range of policy options 
for the state’s domestic mobilization drives to deal with the threats posed by the Soviet Union. This in turn 
led to the ineffective balancing of United States against the Soviet Union during the early part of the Cold 
War. See Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, 21-3. 
73 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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The case study discusses a regional state’s willingness to launch security-promoting 
domestic strategies as a continuous variable. Accordingly, at one end of the spectrum lies 
a state that restricts policy options to those that are presently available in its central 
apparatus. This state is unlikely to introduce any substantial domestic drives. In contrast, 
at the other end of the spectrum, there lies another state that attempts to introduce 
maximal-scale security-promoting domestic drives to establish an autonomous defense 
posture. Such a state introduces substantial domestic drives to direct national resources 
toward the establishment of an autonomous defense capability. Political leaders of this 
state also try to increase the institutional capacity to penetrate domestic society to place 
the domestic drives on solid societal ground. In addition, the leadership of this state is 
likely to mobilize mass public support for the state’s security initiatives.  
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This chapter suggested that the present research was planned to explore how a 
regional state could increase its security in response to its patron’s strategic retrenchment. 
What made this author interested in this research topic was an empirical puzzle that is 
found in the behaviors of the US allies in Northeast Asia, namely, Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, during the time of the superpower’s strategic retrenchment in the 1970s. 
Why did they develop different behaviors rather than responding to the superpower’s 
retrenchment in a uniform fashion? To solve this empirical puzzle, I introduced a theory 
of a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors during the time of its patron’s 
retrenchment, which is composed of three sections: operationalization of a regional 
state’s security concerns during the time of its patron’s retrenchment, a theory of a 
regional ally’s security-seeking domestic drives, and a theory of a regional state’s pursuit 
of a military policy against its patron’s strategic interests. 
First, the theory operationally defined a regional ally’s assessment of security under 
the patron’s retrenchment. Rather than simply considering the state’s security concern as 
the fear of abandonment, the theory treated it as a combination of a regional state’s 
perception of patron reliability and its perception of military threats posed by the 
adversary. This study will introduce three methods to infer each regional state’s security 
assessment. The primary method of inference will be qualitative analysis of the written 
and spoken statements of each state’s leadership regarding its adversary’s military threats 
and its patron’s reliability. In addition, each case study will refer to primary source 
documents and secondary source literature that contain information on each state 
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leadership’s perception of security in response to the Nixon administration’s 
retrenchment. The case study will also refer to the development of the security 
environment each regional state directly faced, because this method provides 
circumstantial evidence to make inference of each state’s assessment of security. 
Second, I argued that a regional state’s security concern will lead it to introduce 
domestic drives to promote societal contribution to its autonomous defense posture. It is 
theorized that there is co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security concern 
and the scope of its efforts to increase domestic contribution to an autonomous defense 
capability. To measure the state’s security-promoting domestic drives, the case study will 
examine a change in defense spending as a share of national income because this is a 
straightforward way to measure the scope of a state’s domestic drives to increase the 
societal contribution to an autonomous defense posture. But this study also acknowledges 
that this quantitative indicator may not reflect the precise level of a regional state’s 
security concern under the patron’s retrenchment. In this respect, the present study will 
use other qualitative indicators to measure the security-seeking behaviors. Each case 
study will examine whether there was the state leadership’s initiative to direct domestic 
resources toward autonomous defense capability. It will also examine whether each 
leadership tried to mobilize domestic support under the initiative of national security.  
Third, the present study theorized that a regional state’s pursuit of military policies 
against its patron’s strategic interests is a function of its security assessment during the 
security provider’s retrenchment. According to the theory, it is hypothesized that there is 
co-variation between the level of a regional state’s negative assessment of security and 
the level of its commitment to the pursuit of a military policy that jeopardizes the 
39 
strategic interests of its security provider. Each case study will use the following three 
qualitative indicators to measure the level of each regional state’s commitment to the 
pursuit of a military policy against its patron. First, it will measure the compatibility 
between each of the regional states’ military behaviors and the US’s strategic interests in 
Northeast Asia. Second, the case study will examine the level of internal cohesion within 
the leadership of the regional states when pursuing a military policy against the US 
strategic interests. Third, it will examine how each of the regional states responded to the 
US’s coercive efforts to reverse the military behaviors against its strategic interests. 
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2.1.1. Japan’s Security Assessment in Response to the Nixon Doctrine 
 
During the early stage of the Nixon presidency, the most important issue between 
the US and Japan was the reversion of Okinawa, which had been occupied by the US 
since the end of the Second World War. The Japanese voices to demand the return of 
Okinawa grew louder with the escalation of the Vietnam War. A growing fear of 
entrapment contributed to the movement to oppose the US’s use of military bases in 
Okinawa for its conventional military operations during the Vietnam War. The opposition 
to the Vietnam War also implied that the automatic renewal of the US-Japan Mutual 
Security Treaty would not be guaranteed.1 It was in this domestic context that Prime 
Minister Sato pledged to reclaim Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa.  
The return of Okinawa was also important issue for the Nixon Administration 
because it needed to preserve the effectiveness of the American military bases in 
Okinawa, which was critical to maintaining the US deterrence capability in East Asia. It 
revealed the desire to revert the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan under 
1 Yashiro Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan’s 
Security Policy,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 141. 
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favorable terms so as to retain base functions on Okinawa. Crucial negotiations 
surrounding the issue of the return of Okinawa lasted from June 1969 to June 1971, when 
the two allies signed the negotiated agreement.2  
The U.S.-Japan negotiations suggest two points that help us to discuss the Japanese 
response to the Nixon Administration’s strategic posture in East Asia. First, the 
negotiation process reconfirmed the US security commitment to the regional allies in East 
Asia. The two allies reached an agreement regarding the US use of the military bases in 
Okinawa for regional contingencies in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, as well as 
for the continuation of the US’s conventional military operations for the Vietnam War.3 
Japan referred to this agreement in evaluating the superpower’s security commitment. 
Secondly, Japan was committed to honoring the strategic interests of the United States in 
East Asia to secure the reversion of Okinawa under favorable terms. The Sato 
Administration concluded that Japan should be ready to assume a larger regional role as a 
way of supporting the patron’s strategic posture in Asia. Considering this deferential 
attitude, Japan was shocked by the Nixon administration’s unilateral announcement of the 
Nixon Doctrine and of the normalization of relations with the PRC, which would have 
the potential to negatively affect its security.  
Nixon’s image in Japan was “an inflexible and uncompromising anti-Communist 
ideologue” whose Cold War fundamentalism would not change.4 However, his message 
2 Yukinori Komine, “The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972,” 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009): 497. 
3 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 51; Komine, “The “Japan Card” in the United States 
Rapprochement with China,” 497. 
4 John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar America Alliance System (London; Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press, 1988), 241-42. 
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about the policy of disengagement in Asia led the Japanese to be ambiguous regarding the 
patron’s resolve to defend Japan.5 There was also concern regarding the longer-term 
implications of the Nixon Administration’s vision to extend Japan’s place far beyond the 
role of financially supporting US military activities in East Asia. This concern led to the 
apprehension that the ultimate objective of the Nixon doctrine would be a recasting of the 
security relationship between Japan and the United States.6  
The Nixon administration unilaterally proposed a force rationalization program, 
which reduced total US troop levels to approximately half of their strength in 1960.7 This 
program induced the Japanese fear of US military disengagement from Japan.8 This fear, 
to some extent, is also related with the issue of how the reduction of US forces would 
compromise the operational defense capabilities of the superpower’s allies in Northeast 
Asia.9 However, the anxieties centered on the abrupt and non-consultative manner in 
which the Nixon Administration had proceeded.10 In other words, the anxiety over the 
patron’s military retrenchment was rooted in the erosion of the basis of trust the Japanese 
deemed so important to the security relationship between Japan and the United States. 
The anxiety over the patron’s military retrenchment made the Japanese leadership 
publicly express the fear of abandonment in spite of domestic political incentives that 
5 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 69.  
6 Ibid., 70. 
7 Ibid., 71. 
Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism,” 145. 
9 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 73. 
Cha documents the Japanese concerns regarding the way in which the United States applied the Nixon 
Doctrine to Japan. For example, Armin Meyer, the US ambassador to Japan sent a cable to Washington in 
August 1970 that urgently advised the Department of State of Japanese concerns regarding the Nixon 
Administration’s unilateralism. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Director General of Japan’s Defense Agency, criticized 
the Nixon administration for undertaking the U.S. withdrawals from Japan drastically and “in all out 
fashion without coordination” with Japan. See Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 71.   
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might have prevented it from doing so.11 First, the Sato administration was not supposed 
to publicly voice anxiety over the patron’s retrenchment because it would create public 
suspicion that the state’s leadership would attempt to justify the presence of nuclear 
weapons within the territory of Japan.12 Second, the impending renewal of the US-Japan 
mutual security treaty in 1970 weighed against the overt expression of concern regarding 
US abandonment. Fervent expressions of the abandonment fear would make the Japanese 
public focus on the issues regarding the state’s defense buildup, which would in turn 
ignite antimilitarist forces in Japan. This situation would not be conducive to easing the 
automatic renewal of the security treaty. However, the Japanese leadership overtly 
expressed concern regarding the patron’s abandonment, instead of tempering the 
expression of this fear as a way to preempt domestic antimilitarist forces. 
 
11 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 71-2.  
12 A high priority issue during the negotiations over the return of Okinawa was whether the nuclear 
weapons deployed by the US forces would remain on the island following the reversion. The Japanese 
public was particularly concerned about the reintroduction of nuclear weapons on the island because it 
would make Japan a potential target of nuclear attack by the Soviet Union or Communist China. The public 
thus vehemently opposed the redeployment of nuclear weapons on Okinawa. Regarding the concern 
expressed by the Japanese public, see Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism,” 141-42. 
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2.1.2. The Nixon Shock and Japan’s Assessment of the US Reliability 
 
 Nixon initially adopted a strategy of confrontation with the People’s Republic of 
China because of his Cold War fundamentalism. His commitment to anti-Communist 
ideology also led to the Nixon Administration’s emphasis of the threat posed by China 
until it was confident in the adversary’s intentions to accommodate the US.13 Then it 
suddenly shifted its strategy by announcing the president’s visit to China to launch a 
diplomatic initiative to normalize relations, while assuring Japan that it would not 
contemplate any basic change in its policy toward the PRC.14 This unilateral approach 
reflected the ideas of Kissinger and his NSC staff, who were highly concerned that any 
prior consultation with Japan would undermine the Nixon Administration’s diplomatic 
initiative toward China.15 
The Sato administration followed the US’s hardline posture because it believed that 
a close alliance with the United States would lead the patron to accommodate Japan’s 
national interests.16 Sato overly emphasized the Chinese threats, even though his threat 
perception of the communist China was relatively more modest. This modest level of 
threat perception suggests that there was little fear of the Chinese threat in Japan because 
of the recognition that the economic and technological gap between the two countries 
13 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 242. 
14 Just a week before the announcement of Nixon’s visit to the PRC, Defense Secretary Melvin Laid 
assured Sato that the Nixon Administration was not contemplating any basic change in its policy toward 
China. Regarding the US assurance, see Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan 
since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 228. 
15 Komine, The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 498. 
16 Go Ito, Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 53.; Schaller, Altered State, 229.   
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was so great and would continue to grow for the foreseeable future.17 Nonetheless, he 
emphasized the Chinese threats because he wanted to ensure that Japan would agree with 
the Nixon Administration’s hardline attitudes toward communist China.18 The emphasis 
of the Chinese threat also reflected the ideological hostility toward the adversary as a 
revolutionary power.19  
Thus the sudden shift in the US policy toward China led to the erosion of trust in the 
patron’s reliability. Japan was particularly concerned about how its interests would be 
discussed during negotiations between the United States and China.20 Because of the 
suspicion that Beijing’s fundamental objective would be to “split Japan off from the 
U.S.” and “neutralize” it, Japan was particularly concerned whether the PRC leadership 
would attempt to use the superpower’s new China policy to drive a wedge between Japan 
and the United States.21  
The unilateral manner of the Nixon administration made Japan suspect a lack of 
sympathy on the part of the patron about Japan’s predicament.22 As Reischauer put it, 
“Japanese public … … responds more strongly to the style and mood of our relationship 
Airgram from US Department of State to US Embassy in Tokyo, “U.S.-Japan Consultations on 
Communist China,” 11 April 1969, Japan and the United States 1960-1976. In his interview for the U.S.-
Japan Project, Seiki Nishihiro, a former vice minister of JDA, similarly concluded that China did not 
become a direct threat to Japan, due to the analysis that it did not have enough naval capability. This 
interview is available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/nishihiroohinterview.htm.  
18 Ito, Alliance in Anxiety, 22-5. 
19 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 232-33. 
20 Airgram from US Embassy in Tokyo to US Department of State, “Japanese Foreign Ministry Analysis of 
President Nixon’s Visit to China and the U.S.-China Joint Communique,” 7 April 1972, Japan and the 
United States 1960-1976. 
21 Komine, The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 500. This suspicion also 
led to the accusation that Beijing was using the fear of Japanese militarism to isolate Japan and drive a 
wedge between the allies of the United States. Regarding the Japanese fear, see Schaller, Altered State, 231.  
22 Roger Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 127. 
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than to its actual content … … Japanese feel that by speaking so frankly (harshly they 
might say), and acting so unexpectedly, we have shown ourselves to be unfriendly and 
unreliable.”23 The Japanese assessment was that the patron’s commitment would no 
longer be guaranteed because it might change depending on the superpower’s global 
tactics and strategy.24 Consequently, Japanese faith in the reliability of the security patron 
was shattered.25 As Alexis Johnson assessed, “[after] this ‘Nixon shokku [shock]’ as the 
Japanese called it, there has never again been the same trust and confidence between our 
two governments”26  
The Nixon Administration’s new China policy also raised the issue of whether the 
superpower would maintain its security commitment to Taiwan. Japan suspected that the 
real intent of the Nixon Administration was to admit the communist China into the United 
Nations instead of Taiwan. This suspicion made Japan criticize the patron for “its 
heartless disregard” for its obligations to its allies.27 To stress the patron’s obligation, the 
Japan Government referred to the 1969 Joint Communique, which emphasized the 
importance of the security of Taiwan in the security of Japan.28 Japan’s concern also 
centered on the 1972 communique between the US and the PRC, which for the first time, 
23 This remark was cited from Reischauer’s letter, which was sent to the president Nixon. The letter is 
dated on October 28, 1971. Reischauer served as the US Ambassador to Japan under the Johnson 
administration. I obtained this letter from the search engine of the Declassified Documents Reference 
System, which is available at http://gdc.gale.com/products/declassified-documents-reference-system/ 
(accessed June 15, 2012).    
24 Ito, Alliance in Anxiety, 53-4. 
25 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 295. 
26 Komine, The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 500. 
27 Ito, Alliance in Anxiety, 50. 
28 Sung-chull Kim, “Sino-Japanese Normalization and Japan’s Korean Policy, 1972-75.” in The Koreas 
between China and Japan, eds. Teo Victor, and Geun Lee (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2014), 46. 
47 
included the statement on the withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan.29 The leadership of 
Japan suspected that the communique committed the United States to the ultimate 
removal of her forces from Taiwan.30  
Japan’s concern, however, was not a top policy issue to deal with for Kissinger and 
his NSC Staff, who took the initiative in the foreign policymaking process during the 
Nixon Presidency.31 In contrast, the Department of State was concerned with how the 
Nixon Administration’s unilateral manner would affect the alliance between the United 
States and Japan.32 Thus it argued that the Nixon Administration should calm Japan’s 
increasing anxiety over the possible softening toward communist China.33 This led to the 
suggestion that the US should demonstrate its willingness to maintain its commitment to 
the security of Japan via “a more realistic and forthcoming discussion of US policies and 
plans affecting the security of Japan.”34 However, Kissinger and his NSC staff 
minimized the involvement of the State Department in the process of the rapprochement 
with the PRC.35  
 
29 Ushida, Japan’s Ambassador to the United States, expressed the Japanese concern to Kissinger. The 
response on the part of Kissinger was that the Nixon Administration would link the withdrawal of US 
forces to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question and to a reduction of tension in the area. 
“Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Ushida,” 6 March 1972. Declassified Documents 
Reference System.  
30 Airgram from US Embassy in Tokyo to US Department of State, “Japanese Foreign Ministry Analysis of 
President Nixon’s Visit to China and the U.S.-China Joint Communique,” 7 April 1972. Japan and the 
United States 1960-1976.  
31 Komine, The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China.” 
32 U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of the State, complained that Kissinger and Nixon shoved their most 
important ally in Asia onto the back burner. See Schaller, Altered State, 228.    
It suggested that the Nixon Administration “should be careful not to cross over the line that would cause 
the Japanese to have such doubts about our deterrent capabilities and intentions with respect to Japan and 
the rest of the area.” See FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 185.  
US Department of State, “Policy Analysis Resource Allocation Study,” 6 June 1972, Japan and the 
United States 1960-1976.
35 Komine, The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 498. 
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2.1.3. The Amelioration of Japan’s Security Concern 
 
The anxiety over the superpower’s unilateral manner, however, did not foster a 
rampant security concern. One factor to explain this is Japan’s security assessment in 
response to the US military withdrawal from Vietnam. The Japanese logistical support for 
the US military operations in Vietnam, coupled with the escalation of the Vietnam War, 
led to concerns about the risk of being entrapped in the Vietnam War.36 This anxiety was 
manifested in Japan’s vehement rejection of any clear mention of a security link between 
Japan and Vietnam in the Nixon-Sato joint communique in 1969, which was in contrast to 
the acceptance of a clear security link between Japan and South Korea.37 The heightened 
fear of entrapment was also reflected in public opinion during the 1960s; the majority of 
the Japanese public was concerned about the risk of Japan being entrapped in the 
Vietnam War.38 The US posture of military retrenchment in Vietnam decreased the 
potential for Japan’s entanglement in the Vietnam War, because of which the Japanese 
anxiety regarding the security environment was mitigated.39 Thus the Nixon 
Administration’s Vietnamization program did not make Japan substantially concerned 
about the patron’s reliability, which contrasted with the reaction to the US force reduction 
programs in Japan and South Korea.  
36 The logistic support for the US forces in Vietnam included ammunition depots and fuel in Okinawa for 
B-52 bombing runs originating in Guam, hospitals, and repair facilities. Such operations fell under the 
terms of the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan. Regarding the military support, 
see Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 70. However, they raised concerns that the escalation of the 
Vietnam War would cause Japan to become further entrapped in a large US military strategy in the Vietnam 
War. Regarding the Japanese concern, see Izumikawa, Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism,” 141-42. 
37 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 70. 
38 Izumikawa, Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism,” 140. 
39 Ibid., 148. 
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Japan’s security concerns were ameliorated by the development of détente in the 
Korean peninsula.40 The inter-Korean communique in 1972 made the Japanese 
government confident that a workable détente between the two Koreas would be 
established.41 The Japanese assessment was similar to the expectation of the U.S. 
Department of State indicating that the two Koreas would introduce a step-by-step 
approach to perpetual peace in the Korean peninsula.42 The positive assessment of the 
Korean thaw suggests that the belligerence of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK or aka North Korea) became less of a critical factor in Japan’s assessment of 
threats in Northeast Asia.43  
Japan’s anxiety over the patron’s reliability was also mitigated by the Nixon 
Administration’s assurances that Washington would maintain its commitment to Korea. 
The US forces reduction programs were indeed designed to implement further reduction 
of the US military presence in Korea.44 Furthermore, the Nixon Administration regarded 
the establishment of détente in Northeast Asia as a precondition to implementing further 
reductions of US forces.45 The development of détente, however, made the US decide to 
Regarding the Japanese sensitivity to the security situation of the Korean peninsula, see Cha, Alignment 
Despite Antagonism, 51.   
41 Ibid., 106. 
42 Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), 116.  
43 In this respect, the Japanese threat assessment of the Korean peninsula was similar to the U.S. estimate 
that “the danger of major hostilities [between the two Koreas] is less now than at any time since the 1953 
Armistice.” See FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 437.  
44 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 149. 
45 The United States and China discussed the issue of the US military presence in Korea during the 
negotiations for the normalization of relations between them. The PRC’s concern about the remilitarization 
of Japan led it to propose that the US gradually withdraw its forces from South Korea. Kissinger responded 
to the PRC’s request as follows: “if the relationships between our countries develop as they might, after the 
Indochina war ends and the ROK troops return to Korea, I would think it quite conceivable that before the 
end of the next term of President Nixon, most, if not all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea” 
See FRUS China 1969-1972, 390.   
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continue the presence of its forces in South Korea because it came to acknowledge that 
the US military presence in Korea would be necessary to aid in the development of 
détente in the Korean peninsula.46 This acknowledgement led to the Nixon 
Administration’s numerous assurances to Japan that the US would continue to honor its 
commitment to Korea, which in turn shored up Japanese confidence in its patron’s 
commitment to Korea.47  
Japan’s threat perception was mollified to a substantial degree as it came to regard 
the Sino-American rapprochement as a driving force in establishing stability in Northeast 
Asia. The summit between the Unites States and the PRC in February 1972, which 
affirmed that neither side had any territorial ambitions, led to the Japanese assessment 
that communist China would search for stability in Northeast Asia by normalizing its 
relations with the United States.48  
More important to the mollification of Japan’s security concerns was the agreement 
between the leadership of the United States and the PRC about the role of the US military 
presence in Japan in the stability in Northeast Asia. Throughout the Sino-American 
46 The White House. “Memorandum for Mr. Henry Kissinger,” 12 July 1972. Subject Numeric Files, RG 
59, National Archives. China also came to acknowledge the necessity of the presence of US forces in Korea 
for the sake of maintaining the status quo in Northeast Asia. Regarding this point, see US Department of 
State. Secretary Kissinger's Discussion with President Park", 16 November 1973. Subject Numeric Files, 
RG 59, National Archives. 
47 For example, Secretary of State William P. Rodgers gave a policy statement in 1973 in which he asserted 
that the United States would continue to honor its security commitment to Korea because the US military 
presence there had facilitated the development of détente on the Korean peninsula. This assurance made the 
Defense Agency of Japan conclude that there was very little possibility of additional withdrawals of US 
forces from Korea. The Foreign Ministry of Japan similarly stated that the Nixon Administration’s 
numerous assurances had shored up confidence that the US military commitment to Korea would not be 
lessened in the immediate future. Regarding the Japanese assessment of the US commitment to Korea, see 
Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 107. 
48 US Department of State, “Japanese Defense Alternatives,” 3 August 1973, Japan and the United States 
1960-1976. 
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negotiation process, the Nixon Administration emphasized the danger of the withdrawal 
of US forces from East Asia to justify the US-Japan Security Treaty.49 The leadership of 
China, in response, emphasized the security treaty between the United States and Japan 
as a brake on Japan’s military expansion because it was concerned that the superpower’s 
military retrenchment in Northeast Asia would lead to the reemergence of Japanese 
militarism.50 The leaderships of the two states thus came to an agreement that US 
tutelage would safely prevent the resurrection of Japanese military expansion.51  
Japan’s advancement of relations toward China was another key factor contributing 
to the amelioration of Japan’s security concerns. Japan’s new approach toward China 
began with Sato’s public expression of a personal desire to meet with the leadership of 
China and his implied recognition of the PRC as the sole, legitimate representative of 
China.52 His remark was followed by the 1972 Foreign Ministry white papers that 
explicitly stated that the normalization of relations with the PRC should be the state’s 
most important foreign policy objective.53 This new foreign policy direction also 
reflected the voices of the Japanese business community, who wished to normalize 
economic relations with the PRC.54  
However, Sato’s commitment to maintaining Japan’s security relationship with 
Taiwan constrained the prime minister from leading Japan’s foreign policy in the new 
direction. His reluctance to abrogate Japan’s peace treaty with Taiwan led to China’s 
Komine, “The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 503-4. 
50 Ito, Alliance in Anxiety, 112; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 289-93. 
51 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 332. 
52 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 104. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ito, Alliance in Anxiety, 80. 
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criticism of Japan as a reactionary state.55 Beijing also criticized Japan’s allowing the US 
use of military bases in Japan for the defense of Taiwan.56  
The Tanaka Administration stepped up the pace of these overtures to normalize 
relations with China by shifting the previous commitment to Taiwan. This policy change 
was welcomed by the PRC’s leadership. Then China introduced conciliatory actions 
toward Japan.57 The culmination of the rapprochement process was the summit between 
Japan and the PRC in September 1972, which was hailed as a new historic chapter in 
Japan’s relations with China. The joint communique from the summit affirmed the 
termination of the state of war that had existed between the two states and the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations. It also affirmed the determination of the two 
states to uphold principles of peaceful coexistence on the basis of mutual respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese leadership further made it clear that 
China neither perceived a threat from nor posed a threat to Japan.58 Tanaka’s visit to 






55 Ibid., pp. 97-9. 
Cable from US Embassy in Tokyo to US Department of State, “Talking Paper on Japan PRC 
Normalization,” 15 July 1972, Japan and the United States 1960-1976.
57 For example, the Chinese government relaxed the following five preconditions for launching a dialogue 
with Japan, which it had established in 1953: (1) the abolition of the security treaty between the United 
States and Japan, (2) the recognition of the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, (3) the 
recognition of Taiwan as a part of mainland China, (4) support for the PRC’s entry into the United Nations 
and the expulsion of Taiwan from the international organization, and (5) support for the withdrawal of the 
US forces from Taiwan. Additional conciliatory actions included the cessation of derogatory newspaper and 
radio propaganda against Japan and the assurance of the Chinese leadership to shelve historically sensitive 
territorial disputes with Japan. See Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 105. 
58 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 319. 
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2.2.1. The Rise and Fall of the Independent Defense Concept 
 
The Nixon administration’s military retrenchment allowed Japanese voices 
demanding the state’s establishment of an independent defense capability to rise. The 
concern about the reliability of the patron’s commitment made Arita Kiichi, the director-
general of the Defense Agency of Japan (JDA), argue that “if the arrival of the US help 
were delayed, Japan must be able to prevent any aggressor from achieving a fait 
accompli.”59 This argument led to the suggestion of an autonomous defense posture in a 
draft white paper, which was later called the Arita Paper. In this paper, he urged that 
Japan acquire defense capabilities sufficient for preventing invasion by other states, 
securing the safety of sea transportation, and maintaining air supremacy.60 The Arita 
paper was targeted to enable Japan to resist an invasion without security support of the 
United States. This paper, however, was not formally approved by the Sato Cabinet 
before Arita was replaced by Nakasone Yoshiro in January of 1970.  
The debate on the development of an autonomous defense capability was fueled 
when Yasuhiro Nakasone was appointed as the new director-general of the JDA. Known 
to be a defense hawk, he had publicly espoused the necessity of establishing an 
autonomous defense posture to assume primary responsibility for its defense while 
59 Makato Momoi, “Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies,” in The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, 
ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 347. 
60 Joseph P. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 46. 
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claiming the state’s security dependence upon the United States should be reduced.61 
Upon becoming the director-general of the JDA, he initiated a policy review of the Basic 
Principles of National Defense (BPND), which had defined the state’s defense posture 
since 1957. The 1957 BPND affirmed Japan’s avoidance of major rearmament, the state’s 
dependence on the security commitment of the United States, and the emphasis on a 
gradual defense buildup in accordance with domestic conditions.62 His criticism was that 
the BPND had made the Japanese people lack the will to defend their own country and 
made the state depend on the patron’s commitment to an unacceptable degree.63 Thus, 
Nakasone took the initiative in proposing the revision of the BPND, shifting the priorities 
in the state’s security policy formation “away from the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan 
Security relationship and toward the development of an autonomous defense.”64  
Nakasone’s emphasis on autonomous defense as the guiding principle of the state’s 
security policy was also evident in his taking the initiative in the publication of the state’s 
first defense white paper in October of 1970.65 The white paper started with his criticism 
that there had not been any firm and unified opinion among the Japanese policymaking 
elites about how the security of Japan should be achieved. His idea was that the Defense 
Agency should take the initiative in stimulating greater defense consciousness among the 
Izumikawa, Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism,” 143. 
Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan, 38. 
His criticism was focused on the fourth clause of the 1957 BPND, which declared that Japan would 
“deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective 
functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.” See Michael J. 
Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New 
York: Columbia University Press. 1995), 55.  
Ibid. 
In his interview for the U.S.-Japan Project, Noboru Hoshuyama, who served as officer in the JDA, 
witnessed Nakasone’s initiative within the JDA in preparing for the white paper. This interview is available 
at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/hoshuyamaohinterview.htm. 
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Japanese public.66 His emphasis on the promotion of the defense consciousness was 
similar to the Sato Government’s launching of a comprehensive campaign in 1968 to 
raise the public’s defense consciousness, which stressed national pride, social order, and 
traditional values, and rally support for the state’s negotiation of the return of Okinawa 
from the United States.67  
While defining the notion of autonomous defense as the state’s efforts to increase 
national defense potentials and the state’s determination to deal with aggression primarily 
on its own, the paper proposed that the Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the 
United States should supplement Japan’s own autonomous capabilities for defense. Like 
the Arita Paper, it insisted on the realization of the superiority of the state’s military 
capabilities in the air and at sea.68 As the US Embassy in Tokyo emphasized, the most 
significant aspects of the white paper were “the fact of its publication” and the emphasis 
on “the collective will of the Japanese people to defend their country.”69  
A final point to note is Nakasone’s emphasis of the notion of kokusanka 
(indigenization) in defense production as essential to the state’s autonomous defense 
posture. His policy paper, entitled the Basic Policy on Equipment Production and 
Development, emphasized the importance of kokusanka as follows: “From the standpoint 
of autonomous defense, it is desirable for Japan to be defended with equipment 
developed and produced by Japan alone. From this point on, the development and 
66 Yasuhiro Nakasone, The Making of the New Japan: Reclaiming the Political Mainstream. Trans. Lesley 
Connors (New York: Routledge, 1999), 161.   
Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 96. 
68 Momoi, Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies,” 347. 
Airgram from US Embassy in Tokyo to US Department of State, “The Government of Japan’s White 
Paper on Defense,” 18 December 1970, Japan and the United States 1960-1976.
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production of military equipment will be limited to Japanese industries as a matter of 
principle.”70 The emphasis of the importance of indigenous defense caused the JDA to 
attempt to financially support the state’s fourth five-year defense buildup plan, which ran 
from 1972 to 1977. Under the new defense plan, the JDA proposed to increase the state’s 
R&D budget by 350 percent, a budget increase of 220 percent over the third defense 
buildup plan. This was unprecedented in its scale.71  
Nakasone’s emphasis of the importance of kokusanka was also welcomed by the 
Japanese business community, which had demanded an increase in the domestic 
production of military equipment. The Defense Production Committee of the Keidanren 
(Japan Business Federation) thus attempted to catch up to the enthusiasm of Nakasone, 
releasing a paper that promised to increase its own capital investment in defense 
production and R&D.72 These cases showed that the espousal of the notion of kokusanka 
could lead to the Japanese leadership’s efforts to mobilize domestic resources in the 
establishment of an autonomous defense capability. 
However, there was growing concern that the campaign to prioritize the 
development of an autonomous defense posture would negatively affect Japan’s security 
relationship with the United States. According to these concerns, emphasizing the 
concept of autonomous defense would further encourage the patron’s disengagement 
from Japan and East Asia because it would signal to the patron that Japan would no 
longer need its security commitment.73 In addition, Prime Minister Sato was concerned 
Green, Arming Japan, 57. 
Ibid., 59. 
Ibid., 58. 
Izumikawa, Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism,” 145. 
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that the campaign for autonomous defense would jeopardize the negotiations regarding 
the reversion of Okinawa. Thus, he attempted to restrain Nakasone, though he initially 
supported the quest to augment the state’s defense capabilities.74 Even Nakasone himself 
downplayed the concept of autonomous defense when faced with the possibility of the 
patron’s drastic disengagement.75  
The setback of Nakasone’s campaign became conspicuous as it came to lose 
domestic political support. Most political leaders of the ruling party turned their backs on 
Nakasone because of the concern about the misgivings of neighboring countries and the 
consideration of domestic criticism of Nakasone’s initiative.76 Even the Japanese 
business community came to withdraw its support for Nakasone’s campaign because of 
its expectation that the prospect of normalized relations with the PRC would create 
business possibilities that would far outweigh those of indigenous defense production.77  
In addition, Nakasone’s initiative came to face resistance from the state’s 
policymaking agencies. He attempted to bypass the Japanese decision-making process. 
But this bothered relevant agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Defense Council, which in turn led to their strenuous resistance to the JDA’s initiative in 
Fintan Hoey, “The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful Challenge to Japan’s Defense 
Policy, 1969-1971,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 19, no.1 (2012): 52-74. 
He argued that “it was necessary to send a warning signal [to the United States] in order to keep US 
forces or to encourage their comeback” when a bold US base realignment plan in November of 1970 
spurred concerns about the patron’s disengagement from Japan. Quoted in Izumikawa, Explaining 
Japanese Antimilitarism,” 145-46.  
Liang Pan, “Whither Japan’s Military Potential? The Nixon Administration’s Stance on Japanese 
Defense Power,” Diplomatic History 31, no.1 (2007): 139. The PRC’s leadership indeed criticized the 
JDA’s proposed version of the Fourth Defense Plan for aiming to increase Japan’s offensive operations 
overseas. Regarding the PRC’s criticism, see Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan, 47. 
Green, Arming Japan, 60. 
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the process of preparation.78 In particular, the Finance Ministry criticized the JDA’s 
proposed version of the state’s defense buildup plan for being “fiscally impossible.” 
Thus, it proposed a postponement of the defense buildup plan. Facing such a situation, 
the JDA announced its plan to examine significantly reducing the scope of the fourth 
defense buildup. According to this plan, annual growth in defense expenditure would fall 
from the originally proposed 18.8 percent to the 15 percent level seen in the third defense 
buildup plan.79  
This episode of the rise and fall of the Nakasone campaign shows that the Japanese 
concern about the reliability of the US commitment led to a campaign to prioritize the 
establishment of the state’s autonomous defense capabilities. It reflected the idea that 
Japan’s economic and political power should be significantly directed toward the state’s 
military power.80 The return of Okinawa and the Nixon Administration’s retrenchment 
made a group of political leaders in the ruling party and the Japanese business community 
espouse the state’s assertive posture to security. Nakasone’s campaign was thus supported 
by these domestic groups.81 It was also supported by the Japanese military.82 There was 
a good chance of Japan’s more self-assertive posture to security if Nakasone’s campaign 
had been implemented as it stood.83 However, it could not sustain the political 
momentum it had built. 
Pan, “Whither Japan’s Military Potential?” 139. 
Green, Arming Japan, 60. 
The US Department of State dubbed this idea “big power” psychology. See US Department of State, 
“Japanese Defense Alternatives,” 3 August 1973, Japan and the United States 1960-1976. 
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The episode of the rise and fall of the autonomous defense doctrine suggests that a 
study of Japan’s defense posture should first focus on how the state’s assessment of 
international security environment affects its formulation of a defense posture and then 
examine how the state’s domestic political constraints affect its approach to defense and 
national security. This section applies this two-step approach to the study of how the 
Japanese leadership’s security assessment in response to détente affected the formulation 
of Japan’s defense posture during the 1970s. In doing so, the present study highlights the 
causal connection between the leadership’s security assessment and the establishment of 
Japan’s minimalist approach to security during the 1970s. Two cases that illustrate the 
development of the minimalist approach are the establishment of the Standard Defense 
Force Concept to set limits on the state’s defense capability and the establishment of the 
one percent of GNP limit to defense spending. These two cases suggest that the Japanese 
leadership did not have an incentive to consider increasing the societal contribution 




2.2.2. The Establishment of the Standard Defense Force Concept 
 
The debate over Japan’s defense posture during the 1970s was characterized as 
bureaucratic dominance over politicians in the defense decision-making process. The 
ruling party did not exercise influence over the process of formulating the state’s defense 
posture because it wanted to avoid aggravating tensions over the defense issue.85 This 
Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan, 60
Ibid.
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made it possible for Takuya Kubo and his team of civilian officials in the Defense 
Agency of Japan (JDA) to take the initiative in the formulation of Japan’s defense policy-
making process.86  
As the director of the JDA, Kubo took the initiative in articulating the state’s defense 
posture during the development of détente in Northeast Asia. Referring to the trend 
toward détente, his seminal internal memorandum in 1971 suggested that Japan would be 
unlikely to become embroiled in a large-scale conflict in the near future and that hence, it 
would be unnecessary to decide the scope of the state’s defense posture to cope with a 
large-scale attack that potential adversaries might bring to bear on Japan.87 This led to 
the argument that Japan’s defense posture should be established based on lowering the 
assumed level of threat from a large-scale limited attack to a hypothetical conflict of 
limited scale.88  
Kubo’s threat assessment led to his criticism of the Necessity Defense Force 
Concept, which was the basis for the previous three defense buildup plans. It postulated 
that Japan should maintain defense capability in proportion to the potential military 
capabilities of surrounding countries.89 In contrast, Kubo suggested the Standard 
Defense Force Concept as the general guideline for the state’s defense planning, which 
proposed the creation of a standard defense force, consisting of a relatively small, 
modern, well-equipped, and highly professional military force, which would be 
Ibid., 19.
Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 102.
Takao Sebata, Japan’s Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007 (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, Inc., 2010), 113.  
Ibid., 111.
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appropriate for a peaceful international environment.90 He argued that the creation of 
such a force would be more practicable than vainly seeking to maintain the forces that 
would be needed to deal a full-scale conflict.91  
The notion of the Standard Defense Force Concept was initially deliberated within 
the JDA. Then Kubo tried to win the support of the moderate leaders of the ruling party, 
as well as the political parties and the Japanese public.92 However, the military leaders 
within the SDF and the right-idealists inside the LDP suggested three criticisms.93 First, 
the threat perception rationale behind the new defense concept was criticized because of 
its assumption that there would not be any large-scale attack on Japan.94 Second, there 
was the criticism that it would be impossible to decide the goal of Japan’s defense 
buildup without considering the military capabilities of neighboring countries. Third, the 
no-threat argument was criticized for assuming that there would not be any drastic change 
in the international situation. As the head of the JDA, Michita Sakata supported Kubo and 
civilian officials within the defense agency by persuading the SDF to accept the newly 
suggested concept.95 
The Standard Defense Force Concept provided the intellectual foundations for the 
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976, which was Japan’s first 
Pan, “Whither Japan’s Military Potential?” 140. 
Regarding this criticism, Hoshuyama points out that “Kubo felt as we did that why should we try to 
attain a higher goal when we had yet to achieve the lowest limit level of peacetime defense capability … … 
we should first meet the lowest level requirements … … before we jumped ahead of them to something 
new.” See Hoshuyama’s interview for the U.S.-Japan Project.  
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comprehensive defense strategy since the end of World War II.96 The 1976 NDPO stated 
that the “most appropriate defense goal would seem to be the maintenance of a full 
surveillance posture in peace time and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to 
the point of limited and small-scale aggression.”97 This shows that the new defense 
concept became the core of the state’s defense strategy. The drafters of the NDPO also 
tried to make the Japanese public and the opposition parties accept the new concept by 
emphasizing that it could be used to restrain the quantitative buildup of the SDF.98 
However, the 1976 defense plan also reflected the debate between the proponents 
and critics of the rationale behind the Standard Defense Force Concept. First, the debate 
was about how to set a limit on Japan’s defense capability. The JDA initially envisioned 
the level of defense capability in peacetime as the upper limit of the state’s defense 
maintenance. In this respect, Sakata regarded the 1976 NDPO as a means of curbing 
Japan’s increase in defense capability.99 Subsequently, however, it became the 
predominant opinion that the 1976 defense plan should define the minimum level of the 
state’s defense maintenance.100 This change was the outcome of Kubo’s compromise 
with the existing criticisms of the new defense concept.101 Second, the drafters of the 
1976 defense plan came to emphasize the role of the security commitment of the United 
States as a means of coping with a hypothetical large or even full-scale conflict.102 This 
emphasis suggests that the 1976 NDPO accepted the criticism that the formulation of 
Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 102.
http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html.  






Japan’s defense posture should consider the possibility of a drastic change in the 




2.2.3. The Establishment of the One Percent of GNP Limit to Defense Spending 
 
Throughout the creation of the 1976 NDPO, conflicts between the proponents and 
opponents of the Standard Defense Force Concept were resolved through an incremental 
process. Given the absence of political leadership in the formulation of the state’s defense 
posture, the Japanese decision-making bureaucrats introduced incremental measures to 
manage political conflicts because of their willingness to develop a prior consensus on 
defense issues instead of risking a bruising political battle.103 One may want to refer to 
this distinctive process of defense policy formation to explain the establishment of the 
minimalist approach to Japan’s defense posture.104 To explain why this approach initially 
emerged as the dominant strategic doctrine, however, the present study argues that one 
should examine how the Japanese leadership’s threat assessment affected the decision to 
set the scope of the state’s defense posture. 
This argument also applies to a study of Japan’s low level of defense spending. 
Existing scholarship explains the relatively low expenditure of national wealth on defense 
by referring to Japan’s structural features. This perspective focuses on the following two 
features to explain the establishment of the longstanding 1 percent of GNP limit on 
Sun-Ki Chai, “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization,” 
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defense spending: the existence of strong counter-pressures from the industrial and 
societal sectors regarding the state’s establishment of a defense posture, and the relatively 
subordinate status of the JDA and other pro-defense forces within the Japanese 
policymaking structure.105 The emphasis of these features led to the characterization of 
Japan’s defense spending decision-making process as “residual” in the sense that 
bureaucratic influence restricts changes in defense spending to an incremental pace.106 
This budgetary incrementalism helps to manage conflicts among relevant bureaucrats by 
relegating disputes to the budgetary process, enabling the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to 
exert a substantial influence on defense spending.107 It also makes it difficult for the 
Japanese government to make substantial increases in defense spending, even in the face 
of external pressure to increase the state’s security.108  
While acknowledging the existing scholarship, the present case study criticizes it for 
disregarding the question of why the Japanese government came to establish the one 
percent of GNP limit on defense expenditure during the mid-1970s, when Northeast Asia 
witnessed the development of détente. Japan’s defense expenditure had remained under 
one percent of GNP since it first dipped under that ratio in 1967.109 Then, the ruling party 
came to decide, in November of 1976, to limit the state’s defense expenditure to one 
percent of GNP.110 The present study argues that the introduction of the principle of the  
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one percent limit reflected the Japanese leadership’s security assessment in the face of the 
development of détente in the Northeast Asia.  
To begin with, Prime Minister Tanaka emphasized the one percent limitation 
framework based on Kubo’s assessment that the development of the détente substantially 
decreased the security threat to Japan.111 He referred to the framework to deal with the 
external and internal concerns regarding the military implications of the rapid economic 
growth of Japan. In his talks with the PRC’s premier Zhou Enlai in September of 1972, 
which was the first meeting between the two states’ leaders to establish diplomatic 
relations, he informed Chou that the limit of Japan’s defense spending would be one 
percent of GNP. Chou gave his tacit consent to Tanaka’s commitment to limit the scope 
of Japan’s defense buildup. The one percent limit framework was thus used to relieve the 
PRC’s concern about the resurgence of Japanese militarism.112 The ruling party also 
moved to place a quantitative constraint on the state’s defense spending to offset domestic 
criticisms regarding the absence of a clear limit on the state’s defense spending. This led 
to the decision on the part of the ruling party, in November of 1976, to limit the state’s 
defense expenditure to within one percent of GNP.113 
Kubo’s security assessment also affected the JDA’s position regarding the level of 
defense spending within the framework of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, which 
would run from 1972 through 1976. He argued that the state’s defense budget should 
remain less than one percent of GNP. This argument was acknowledged within the JDA. 
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However, he had to compromise, considering that the increased costs associated with a 
qualitative improvement of the state’s defense capability and the possibility of an 
economic downturn could cause defense expenditures to exceed the one percent 
ceiling.114 In addition, the JDA contended that setting a limit on the state’s defense 
budget of less than one percent of the GNP would be undesirable because Japan would 
need to show its intent to increase the security burden to the United States. This led to the 
argument that the state’s defense expenditure should be limited to around one percent of 
GNP. In comparison, the MOF insisted that the defense budget should remain strictly 
within one percent of GNP.115 This suggests that the two agencies reached a consensus 
about the necessity of setting a limit on the level of defense expenditure, regardless of 
their different approaches.116  
It should be noted that the JDA’s position above was substantially different from its 
previous position on the level of defense spending. The JDA appealed for an increase in 
defense spending to two percent of GNP within the framework of the Third Defense Plan, 
which ran from 1967 through 1971. This proposal was opposed by the MOF, the 
Economic Planning Agency, and the MITI, which jointly argued that such a high rate of 
defense spending would interfere with economic growth and squeeze other budgets.117 
114 Ibid., 57. This argument made the JDA oppose the proposal of the MOF, which linked the 1976 NDPO 
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The MOF also opposed Nakasone’s 1970 proposal that defense expenditure should 
increase by over 18 percent a year.118 These intergovernmental controversies show that 
there was no consensus about how to set a limit on the level of defense spending.  
The establishment of the principle of the one percent of GNP limit on defense 
spending, coupled with the introduction of the Standard Defense Force Concept, 
prevented any attempt to bring about a major change in the state’s defense posture. The 
leadership of Japan did not have an incentive to introduce large-scale domestic drives to 
direct national resources toward defense capability build-ups. Consequently, Japan did 
not witness any substantial efforts on the part of the government to increase the societal 
contribution to national military preparedness during the 1970s, when the development of 
détente in Northeast Asia substantially ameliorated the Japanese government’s security 
concerns. This was the context in which the US Department of State suggested the 
following conclusion: “Since there is no prospect under foreseeable circumstances of 
getting through the Diet a substantially larger defense program, the real question is 
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2.3.1. Japan’s Disengagement from Nuclear Weapons Development 
 
The examination of Japan’s security assessment during the 1970s finds that this 
regional state’s security concern was not serious. According to the theory of this research, 
Japan was supposed to be unwilling to pursue a military policy that would jeopardize the 
strategic interests of United States. The present study discusses the Japanese leadership’s 
decision to disengage from nuclear weapons development as a case to illustrate the 
regional state’s unwillingness to pursue military behaviors against the patron’s strategic 
interests.  
The foreign policymaking agencies within the Nixon Administration were divided 
regarding the scope of Japan’s security efforts in response to the US retrenchment. This 
interagency debate became unproductive because of the uncommitted stance shown by 
Nixon and Kissinger.120 This situation led to the Nixon Administration’s dilemma 
regarding how much it should ask the Japanese government to do in terms of increasing 
its military capabilities.121 It was also divided regarding how to prevent Japan from being 
remilitarized. The Defense and State Departments commonly emphasized the necessity of 
security reassurance to constrain the resurrection of the remilitarization, while Kissinger 
and his NSC team sought to balance a resurgent Japan in the balance-of-power system 
among the great powers.122  
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The internal division regarding how to guide the development of Japan’s defense 
posture led to the superpower’s ambiguity toward Japan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
This ambiguity came from the conflict between the necessity of constraining the 
resurgence of Japan as a great military power and the Nixon administration’s 
encouragement of Japan’s nuclear weapons development. On the one hand, the Nixon 
Administration reached the conclusion that Japan’s reemergence as a great military power 
was not in America’s interests.123 This conclusion led to the suggestion that the US 
policy stance should be “to encourage and support moderate increase and qualitative 
improvements in Japan’s defense forces but to avoid pressure for substantially larger 
forces or a larger regional security role for Japan.”124 On the other hand, the Nixon 
Administration indeed encouraged Japan’s nuclear weapons development because of its 
belief that nuclear capability would make Japan assume greater responsibility for its own 
and regional defense.125 Throughout the negotiation over the reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan, Nixon broadly hinted that the US would understand if Japan decided to go 
nuclear.126 In addition, the impending SALT 1 agreement was a chance to include Japan’s 
nuclear role in the US strategy in East Asia because the treaty could lead to a reduced US 
nuclear posture in East Asia.127  
Policy,” 54-6. 
123 Komine, “The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 498. 
124 US Department of State, “Japanese Defense Alternatives,” 3 August 1973, Japan and the United States 
1960-1976. 
Schaller, Altered States, 213. 
Ibid., 218. 
Selig S. Harrison, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons.” in Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate 
and East Asian Security, ed. Selig Harrison S (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1996), 14-6. 
70 
The ambiguous stance toward Japan’s nuclear weapons development was coupled 
with the controversy within Japan regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Because of its human resources and financial and technical capability to develop nuclear 
weapons, Japan was one of the main targets for control by the NPT, which was concluded 
in June of 1968.128 There also was the emergence of the pacifist opposition to the 
presence of the US nuclear weapons on the island of Okinawa. The pacifists’ tactics were 
successful in mobilizing the Japanese public opposition to the presence of nuclear 
weapons within its territory. It was in a political context in which Premier Sato decided to 
participate in the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. The Sato Cabinet signed the NPT in 
1970, but this was followed by a domestic controversy over whether Japan should ratify 
the NPT. This controversy mainly occurred because the Japanese government found it 
difficult to secure a national consensus; all key players in the Japanese political system 
were reluctant to tie Japan to the treaty’s restrictions without having a clear idea of its 
implications for the security of Japan.129 
The controversy over the ratification of the NPT suggested that there was a claim to 
keep the option of developing nuclear weapons capability open. This claim was driven by 
skepticism regarding the patron’s reliability as a security provider. As the US Department 
of State assessed, there was skepticism regarding the credibility of the US nuclear shield 
and its overall level of security commitment.130 It stimulated the nationalist claim that 
Japan should develop its own nuclear weapons because the patron’s nuclear umbrella 
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would not fully guarantee the security of Japan.131 Prime Minister Sato himself 
demonstrated a personal interest in the state’s possession of nuclear force in response to 
China’s atomic and thermonuclear weapons tests in 1964 and 1966.132 This suggested 
that Japan’s ambitions for nuclear weapons arose from its fear of China’s nuclear 
capabilities. The fear of China’s nuclear threats, however, did not lead to the development 
of Japan’s nuclear weapons capability, because the Johnson Administration made a 
repeated commitment to extended deterrence.133 Still, the Nixon Administration’s 
retrenchment revitalized the Japanese leadership’s passion for the development of nuclear 
weapons capability. It kept the nuclear option alive by emphasizing the necessity of 
possessing tactical nuclear weapons for defense purposes. The white paper published in 
1971, for example, declared as follows: “As for defensive nuclear weapons, it would be 
possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive nuclear 
weapons without violating the Constitution.” Prime Minister Tanaka’s remark in March 
of 1973 similarly suggested that “while we are not able to have offensive nuclear 
weapons, it is not a question of saying that we will have no nuclear weapons at all.”134 
Even Kubo, the architect of Japan’s minimalist defense posture during the 1970s, 
underscored his regard for Japan’s latent capability to develop nuclear weapons as 
leverage with which to persuade the United States to maintain its commitment to the 
defense of Japan.135  
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Despite its capability and the existence of a motive to go nuclear, the Japanese 
government finally ratified the NPT in April of 1976 to ensure that Japan would avoid 
nuclear armament. To be sure, this decision served to honor the US strategy to sustain 
détente in Northeast Asia. Japan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons had the potential to trigger 
an indefinite arms race between Japan and the PRC, resulting in the deterioration of the 
stability in Northeast Asia.136 Furthermore, a nuclear Japan would be perceived as a 
serious threat by other neighboring states in East Asia.137 Acknowledging that China 
would not tolerate Japan’s development of nuclear weapons, the Nixon Administration 
came to emphasize that the presence of US forces in Japan would contain Japan’s nuclear 
weapons development.138 Japan’s ratification of the NPT also reaffirmed its dependence 
on the extended deterrence of the United States. As a US Congressional report in 1977 
pointed out, Japan’s avoidance of nuclear weapons development was “consistent with the 
fundamental U.S. policy premise that major Japanese rearmament, such as the acquisition 
of independent nuclear capability, would not be in the best interests of either Japan or the 




2.3.2. Enhancement of Security Cooperation between the US and Japan 
 
The rationale behind the establishment of Japan’s minimalist defense posture was 
that the state’s Self-Defense Force could cope with a small-scale limited conventional 
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attack, whereas the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty could cope with a larger scale 
attack.140 In other words, Japan would need the US’s military assistance, and Japan 
would only maintain a minimum force appropriate for the peaceful situation of the 
détente. This suggests that the Japanese government needed to prevent the patron from 
weakening its security commitment. In addition, there was the Japanese leadership’s 
belief that the US military presence in Japan itself could be reduced as détente would 
proceed and succeed.141 Furthermore, there was the concern about the reliability of its 
patron’s commitment, even though Japan’s overall security concerns came to be 
substantially lessened by the development of détente in Northeast Asia.142 In this respect, 
Japan needed to prevent the patron from weakening its security assistance by developing 
the state’s defense posture in its favored direction. The present study discusses the 
Japanese government’s movement to institutionalize defense cooperation with the United 
States as the regional ally’s deferential behavior to maintain its security ties to the United 
States. 
The core idea of the National Defense Program Outline in 1976 was to articulate 
Japan’s military role in the alliance with the United States and to develop the desired 
level of Japan’s indigenous defense capabilities to maintain and enhance the credibility of 
the alliance.143 The two allies also reached an agreement, in 1975, to create a task-force 
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to discuss their joint military operations. This agreement ultimately led to the adoption of 
the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the two allies in November of 1978. The 
Defense Guidelines went further than the 1976 NDPO in emphasizing Japan’s military 
role in the alliance, articulating in detail the division of missions and roles between the 
SDF and the US military.144 Thus military cooperation with the United States became 
central to Japan’s stance on its defense policy.  
The movement to formalize defense cooperation with the United States reaffirmed 
Japan’s dependence on the patron’s security commitment.145 To be sure, it was consistent 
with the necessity of the United States articulating the roles of the forces of the two allies. 
A group of policymakers in Washington had suggested that the two allies should establish 
the principle of shared responsibilities in the defense of Japan, encouraging Japan to 
assume a greater degree of defense burden.146 This led to the articulation of the principle 
of complementarity and a functional division of responsibilities between the two allies’ 
military forces.147 Washington expected that the establishment of this principle would 
serve to maintain the long-term stability of the US-Japan alliance because it would reduce 
the feelings of resentment toward the US military presence in Japan and help to reassure 
other nations in East Asia that Japan would not intend to develop a destabilizing long-
range military capability.148  
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One may characterize the Japanese government’s movement as the regional ally’s 
strategy to buck-pass to the United States. According to this perspective, the low-level 
security concerns led Japan to prefer relying on its patron’s military support as opposed to 
other costly alternatives to enhance the state’s security.149 The absence of domestic 
antimilitarist sentiment during the 1970s may be another factor to explain the Japanese 
government’s movement.150 These perspectives, however, do not discuss the strategic 
motive behind the Japanese leadership’s movement. This case study argues for the 
existence of a causal link between Japan’s security assessment and its movement to 
institutionalize defense cooperation with the United States.151 This argument helps to 
explain why Japan came to articulate its military role in the alliance, which had the 




2.4. Realism, Constructivism and Japan’s Security-Seeking Behaviors 
 
Japan’s posture to security has been a puzzle, which is not well explained by 
exclusively relying on any single theory. This suggests that Japan’s security-seeking 
behaviors are not shaped solely by its relative power, interest, normative structure, or 
state structure but by their combination.152 In dealing with this complexity, Katzenstein 
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and Okawara introduce the notion of “analytical eclecticism” into the study of Japan’s 
security policy. This research strategy “aims to construct original causal modules that 
reflect the complexity and messiness of particular problems in international life. It does 
so by lifting analytical elements from multiple research traditions and allowing for the 
recognition of causal mechanism not anticipated in the analytical frameworks of those 
traditions.”153    
The notion of analytical eclecticism helps the discussion of the present case study of 
Japan against the existing scholarship of Japan’s security policy. In doing so, this section 
draws on three groups of existing scholarship: namely, offensive realist, defensive realist, 
and constructivist schools. This leads to the determination of the relative strength and 
weakness of each approach in the explanation of Japan’s security-seeking international 
and domestic behaviors during the 1970s.  
To begin with, offensive realism posits that the severity of the security dilemma 
under anarchy causes a state to seek maximization of relative power as a default 
strategy.154 The offensive realist school claims that Japan will inevitably emerge as a 
great power, acquiring massive military capabilities, including nuclear arsenals, as any 
other economic superpowers are likely to do.155 Accordingly, this approach suggests 
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Japan was supposed to introduce a huge-scale security-promoting domestic drive in order 
to establish an assertive security policy in response to the US strategic posture in East 
Asia.  
This chapter finds that offensive realism does not explain Japan’s security-seeking 
behaviors during the 1970s. There was a good chance of Japan’s more self-assertive 
posture to security if Nakasone’s campaign had been implemented as it stood. However, 
it could not sustain the political momentum it had built. Rather, the Japanese leadership 
established a minimalist defense posture. In addition, the Japanese leadership voluntarily 
disengaged from nuclear weapons development even under domestic and international 
incentives to go nuclear.   
Rather the case study supports the constructive school that has established “an 
invincible case that Japan is in fact an anomaly to realism.”156 The constructivist studies 
emphasize the following two factors at the domestic level: antimilitarism and the 
structure of decision-making process surrounding Japan’s security policy. On the one 
hand, the constructivist approach argues that Japan’s security policy is formulated within 
decision-making process that “bias policy strongly against a forceful articulation of 
military security objectives.”157 Accordingly, the state structure has made it virtually 
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impossible “for an autonomous and powerful military establishment to emerge in 
Japan.”158 On the one hand, another group of studies emphasizes the normative context 
in which the Japanese leadership has developed the state’s security policy. According to 
this group, Japan’s military policy “has been – will continue to be – highly constrained by 
antimilitarist norms,” which have been established legally and socially.159  
The present case study lends support to the constructive argument that the 
institutional features of Japan’s decision-making process have shaped Japan’s minimalist 
defense posture. The establishment of the one percent of GNP limit on defense 
expenditure was done through an informal interministerial coordination, which was an 
“institutional expression of the notion that any important defense policy proposal must go 
through an especially cautious consensus-building process in which virtually all relevant 
ministries participate.”160 The case study finds that what was inherent in interministerial 
coordination process was “a strong bias against any military interpretation of Japan’s 
national security requirements.”161 The institutional feature made it virtually impossible 
for the Japanese leadership to make substantial increases in defense spending.  
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But the case study does not support the constructive school’s argument that the 
development of Japan’s security policy has been not so much for coping with external 
threats as for domestic institutional constraints. Rather, it suggests that a study of Japan’s 
security policy should first consider how the Japanese leadership’s security assessment 
affects the policy preference of the state.162 In addition, the case study identifies the 
primary role of the Prime Minister and JDA in the formulation of Japan’s defense posture 
during the 1970s. In this respect, the case study finds evidence that challenges the 
constructivist characterization of the Japanese decision-making structure as the absence 
of centralized decision-making process.163   
According to the constructive school, the formulation of Japan’s defense posture in 
the 1970s was highly constrained by anti-militarist norms. To be sure, the Japanese 
leadership’s security assessment was similar to the mass public’s belief that “the status 
quo of minimal SDF armament combined with perceptions of low external threat and the 
U.S. alliance had worked well for Japan’s defense.”164 Thus it did not introduce any 
dramatic departure from the mass public’s favor of a passive stance on security policy, 
the status quo of minimal armament of the SDF, and minimal defense spending.165 But 
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the establishment of the minimalist defense posture was not so much a result of the 
constraining effect of the anti-militarist norms as a result of the leadership’s perception of 
security.  
Public opinion on the enhancement of the security cooperation between Japan and 
the United States is another case to test the constructivist argument that the formulation 
of Japan’s defense posture has been highly constrained by anti-militarist norms. Japan 
articulated its military role in the US-Japan alliance, which had the potential to provoke 
domestic antimilitaristic sentiment. But the case study does not find the existence of 
domestic opposition to the government’s movement. Rather, consideration of the fear of 
entrapment, which is a realist factor, helps to explain this anomaly to constructivism.166  
Criticism of the offensive realist and the constructivist schools has led a group of 
studies to suggest a defensive realist approach to Japan’s security policy. On the one 
hand, this approach criticizes the constructivist school for glossing over the security 
dilemma which Japan directly faces and for painting “a distorted picture of Japanese 
security policy as if this core area of national interest hardly existed.” On the other hand, 
the defensive realist school criticizes the offensive realist argument about the inevitability 
of Japan’s reemergence as a great military power under the severity of security 
dilemma.167 These criticisms lead the defensive realist studies to take a relatively 
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167 Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 225-26. 
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optimistic view of the security dilemma Japan faces in the Northeast Asia. This leads to 
the prediction that Japan will make a moderate attempt to secure itself.168 
The case study lends support to the defensive realist argument about Japan’s security 
dilemma.169 Throughout the Sino-American rapprochement process, Washington and 
Beijing came to an agreement about the US military presence in Japan as a brake on the 
resurrection of Japan’s military expansion. This suggests that Beijing was less concerned 
about the reemergence of Japanese militarism. In addition, Beijing’s agreement to the US 
military presence in Japan suggests that the Japanese leadership recognized the PRC as a 
status-quo power in the Northeast Asia. As a result, the security dilemma between Japan 
and the PRC was substantially mitigated.170  
The case study also supports the defensive realist argument that the Japanese 
government has tried to mitigate the misgiving of its Asian neighbors about Japan’s 
assertive military posture.171 First, the case study finds that most political leaders of the 
ruling party did not support Nakasone’s campaign for autonomous defense posture 
because of the concern about misgivings of neighboring countries. Second, the Japanese 
leadership believed that the creation of a standard defense force “would lessen to a degree 
168 Christopher P. Twomey, “Japan, A Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make 
Predictions about East Asian Security,” Security Studies 9, no. 4 (2000): 171-72.  
169 For a comprehensive review of the defensive realist’s discussion of security dilemma, see Taliaferro, 
“Security Seeking under Anarchy.” 
170 In this respect, Christensen argues that the chance for spirals of tension between China and Japan is 
likely to be great in the absence of a U.S. military presence in the Northeast Asia. See Thomas J. 
Christensen, “China, the U.S-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International 
Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 49-80.  
171 Midford argues that the Japanese leadership has formulated the state’s security policy in such a way to 
dissuade other states from balancing against Japan. Similarly, Twomey characterizes Japan’s security policy 
as a circumscribed balancing, defined as “a propensity to avoid strong counter-vailing alliance, to ignore an 
opponent’s growth in peripheral geographic and issue area, and to avoid offensive strategies.” See Paul 
Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grant Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (2002): 1-43; 
Twomey, “Japan, A Circumscribed Balancer,” 168. 
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the concern in the rest of Asia that Japan [would] again become militaristic.”172 Third, 
the Japanese government enhanced its security cooperation with the United States instead 
of establishing an assertive defense posture.  
The case study also finds that the Japanese government moved to institutionalize 
defense cooperation with the United States. From a defensive realist perspective, the 
movement can be characterized as the strategy to buck-pass to the United States.173 But 
the case study alternatively focuses on the security motive behind the movement. It 
argues that Japan needed to prevent the patron from weakening its security assistance. In 
this respect, the Japanese government’s movement can be characterized as the regional 
ally’s deferential behavior to maintain its security ties to the United States. This argument 
helps to explain why Japan came to articulate its military role in the alliance, which had 




2.5. Chapter Conclusion 
 
This research theorizes that there is co-variation between the level of a state’s 
security concern and the scope of its drives to increase domestic contribution to an 
autonomous defense capability. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the less negatively a 
regional state estimates the security implications of the security guarantor’s strategic 
172 Michita Sakata’s interview for the U.S.-Japan Project, which is available at 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/sakataohinterview.htm.   
Based upon Christensen and Snyder’s discussion of alliance behaviors under multipolarity, Lind 
suggests that the existence of a powerful ally, coupled with the absence of immediate threats makes the 
Japanese leadership to choose the buck-passing as the state’s default strategy. See Thomas J. Christensen 
and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” 
International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990): 137-68; Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” 104.     
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posture, the less it will be willing to increase the security burden on domestic society. The 
present research also theorizes that there exists co-variation between the level the level of 
a regional state’s security concerns and the level of its willingness to pursue a military 
policy against the patron’s strategic interests. This leads to the hypothesis that the less 
negatively a regional state estimates the patron’s retrenchment, the less willing it is to 
engage in a military policy that is against the security guarantor’s strategic interests. The 
present chapter tests the two hypotheses against Japan’s security-seeking behaviors 
during the 1970s.  
Regarding Japan’s security concerns, the case study finds that the Japanese 
leadership was indeed anxious over the US reliability as a result of the Nixon 
administration’s abrupt and non-consultative manner in the military retrenchment. In 
addition, Washington’s sudden shift in the US policy toward China led to the erosion of 
the patron’s reliability. Japan was particularly concerned about how its interests would be 
discussed during negotiations between the United States and China. The Nixon 
administration’s new China policy also made Japan criticize the patron for its disregard 
for its obligations to its allies.     
The anxiety over US reliability, however, did not foster rampant security concern. 
Rather Japan’s security concerns were substantially ameliorated because of the following 
factors. To begin with, the US military retrenchment in Vietnam decreased the potential 
for Japan’s entrapment in the Vietnam War. This mitigated the Japanese anxiety regarding 
the security environment. Second, the development of détente in the Korean peninsula 
ameliorated Japan’s security concern. Japan’s anxiety over the US reliability was also 
mitigated by Washington’s assurances that it would maintain its security commitment to 
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Korea. Fourth, Japan’s threat perception was substantially mollified as it came to regard 
the Sino-American rapprochement as a cornerstone in establishing stability in Northeast 
Asia. More important to the mollification of Japan’s security concerns was the agreement 
between Washington and Beijing about the role of the US military presence in Japan in 
the stability in Northeast Asia. Japan’s advancement of relations toward China was a final 
factor contributing to the amelioration of Japan’s security concerns.  
The case study finds that the Japanese concern about the reliability of the US 
reliability led to a campaign to prioritize the establishment of the state’s autonomous 
defense capabilities. Then the Japanese leadership came to the conclusion that Japan was 
virtually secure under the development of détente in the Northeast Asia. According to the 
theory of this research, Japan was hypothesized to restrain itself from introducing 
domestic drives to promote societal contribution to an autonomous defense capability. 
The case study suggests two findings to support this hypothesis.  
First, the development of détente made Japanese policymakers conclude that Japan’s 
defense posture should be established based upon lowering the assumed level of threat 
from a large-scale limited attack to a hypothetical conflict of limited scale. This led to the 
establishment of the Standard Defense Force Concept, which proposed the creation of a 
standard defense force, consisting of a relatively small, modern, well-equipped, and 
highly professional military force. This concept represents the Japanese leadership’s 
decision to set a limit on the state’s defense capability. Second, the Japanese leadership’s 
security assessment led to the establishment of the one percent of GNP limit to the state’s 
defense spending. Prime Minister Tanaka took the initiative based upon the assessment 
that the development of détente had substantially decreased the security threat to Japan. 
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Then the ruling party moved to place a quantitative constraint upon the state’s defense 
spending. In addition, the case study finds that there was inter-agency consensus about 
the necessity of setting a limit on the level of defense expenditure.  
These two movements to set a limit on the state’s defense capability prevented the 
Japanese government from attempting to bring about a major change in the state’s 
defense posture. This suggests that the Japanese leadership was not committed to 
introducing a large-scale domestic drives to promote domestic contribution to an 
autonomous defense capability.  The leadership’s unwillingness was coupled with the 
US policy stance to avoid pressure for a substantially large military capability or a larger 
regional security role for Japan. As a result, the Japanese leadership established a 
minimalist defense posture.  
According to the theory of this research, it is also hypothesized that Japan was not 
committed to the pursuit of military policies against the US strategic interests. This 
suggests that Japan was supposed to maintain a deferential military policy toward the US 
as a default strategy. The case study suggests two findings to support this argument. First, 
the Japanese government voluntarily ratified the NPT to ensure that Japan would avoid 
nuclear armament, despite its capability and the existence of a motive to go nuclear. This 
served to honor the US strategy to sustain détente in Northeast Asia. Second, Japan 
institutionalized defense cooperation with the United States to maintain its security ties to 
the patron. This movement was consistent with the necessity of the United States 
articulating the roles of the forces of the two allies.  
To conclude, what was behind Japan security-seeking behaviors was the Japanese 
leadership’s belief that Japan was virtually secure in the international environment. 
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During the period of détente, the Japanese leadership came to be confident of the US 
security commitment and, at the same time, was confident that the communist China 
would not introduce revisionist behaviors. In this respect, Japan was at one end of the 
spectrum, if we discuss the level of a state’s security concern as a continuous variable. 
The next chapter studies South Korea, which was at the other end of the spectrum. 
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3.1.1. Nixon Administration’s Force Withdrawal from South Korea 
 
 The Nixon administration’s overall alliance policy was based on the strategy of 
Vietnamization. This overarching strategy affected the United States (US) alliance with 
the Republic of Korea.1 The background for this study was the conflict between the US 
and South Korea in dealing with military provocation by North Korea during January 
1968.2 The ROK wanted military retaliation but Washington decided on negotiations 
with North Korea, due to concern about the ineffectiveness of military retaliation and the 
possibility of escalation into a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.3  
The gap between the US and ROK caused the relationship between the allies to 
deteriorate. Thus, US president Johnson dispatched former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
1 US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird suggested the term, Koreanization, which he derived from the 
policy of Vietnamization during the Vietnam War. See Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 63.  
First, a band of 31 commandos from North Korea attempted to raid the Blue House, the presidential 
mansion in Seoul, intending to kill ROK President Park Chung Hee. This incident occurred on January 21, 
1968. Two days later, North Korean forces seized the USS Pueblo and arrested its crew. In Washington, the 
Pueblo incident quickly overshadowed the Blue House raid, and led the Johnson administration to respond 
with urgency.  
3 Seuk-Ryule Hong, “1968nyŏn Pueblo Sageongwa Namhan, Bukan, Migugui Samgakgwangye”  
["The Pueblo Crisis in 1968 and the Triangular Relations among South Korea, North Korea, and the United 
States,"] Hanguksayeongu 133 (2001): 179-208. 
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Cyrus Vance to the ROK in February 1968 to speak with ROK President Park.4 Vance 
assured Park of America’s security commitment and promised US assistance to 
modernize ROK’s counter-infiltration and counter-insurgency forces. In return, Park 
confirmed that the ROK would not retaliate against North Korea.5 The ROK also urged 
the Johnson administration to document its obligation to retaliate against any prospective 
provocation by North Korea but Vance opposed the demand, stating that the US would 
not officially accept such an obligation.6 Consequently, the two allies announced a joint 
communiqué that omitted the US obligation to retaliate against the DPRK.  
After his visit to South Korea, Vance recommended a comprehensive review of the 
US policy toward the ROK. Accordingly, the US Department of State (DOS) compiled a 
study entitled, US Policy toward Korea.7 This study suggested that the new US policy 
should follow two strategic alternatives: “Reduce the present degree of US involvement” 
and “Temporarily increase our resources input to Korea, helping the ROK to gain as soon 
as possible the ability to defend itself successfully against an all-out attack by North 
Korean forces alone, with only US logistic support.”8 
Based upon this suggestion, Washington discussed how the US would implement the 
strengthening and restructuring of the ROK regular forces and a gradual reduction of US 
forces from Korea. It needs to be noted that this was the first formal recommendation for 
a gradual phased reduction of US ground forces from South Korea. The State Department 
4 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 57.    
DPRK and North Korea will be used interchangeably for stylistic purposes.  
6 Hong, "The Pueblo Crisis in 1968,” 201. 
7 Dated June 15, 1968, this study was prepared in the DOS with the extensive assistance of specialists in 
the Agency for International Development, Bureau of the Budget, Central Intelligence Agency, DOD, and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
8 US Policy toward Korea, 14-26. 
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study served as a guideline for the formation of a more formal study group within the 
National Security Council (NSC), which was to consider presidential options on 
American policy toward the ROK. This NSC study group, however, did not finish its task 
by the end of the Johnson administration.9  
With the change of administrations, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s Assistant for National 
Security, reorganized the NSC. The newly organized NSC included an office conducting 
integrated studies of US alliance policy with her regional allies. In February 1969, this 
office issued the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 27, which called for the 
continuation of the Johnson administration’s Korean study in 1968.10 After the issuance 
of the NSSM 27 in February 1969, Kissinger’s NSC team took about a year to decide the 
level of US military presence in South Korea. The outcome of this NSC project was the 
issuance of the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 48 on March 20, 
1970, according to which the Nixon administration decided to withdraw one division 
from South Korea – a reduction of 20,000 men.11  
According to NSDM 48, the Nixon administration consulted with the ROK 
government a number of times after it informed ROK president Park of the decision to 
reduce the US military presence in Korea by 20,000 personnel by the end of Fiscal Year 
(FY) 1971. On February 6, 1971, the two allies finally gave a joint statement to the press 
about withdrawing the US 7th Division from South Korea by the middle of 1971 and the 
redeployment of the 2nd Division stationed at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The troop 
9 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 62. 
10 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 67-8. 
As a result of the withdrawal, about 41000 US troops remained in South Korea by the end of 1971.  
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reduction was completed on March 27, 1971. The joint statement, however, does not 
suggest that the Nixon administration was able to create “a situation in which US 
withdrawals result from President Park’s initiative in view of present ROK strength and 




3.1.2. ROK’s Security Assessment in Response to the US Force Withdrawal 
 
While the Johnson administration was reassessing its overall alliance policy toward 
South Korea, the South Korean government concluded that the US policy toward North 
Korea would negatively affect ROK security. This concern came from two factors. First, 
the disparity between the US tepid response to the Blue House raid and its immediate 
response to the Pueblo Crisis, and the Johnson administration’s negotiations with the 
DPRK led the ROK government to believe that US security commitment would be weak 
in the face of aggressive North Korean military campaigns.13 Second, the ROK was 
concerned that the US appeasement policy would lead North Korea to continue its 
military provocation,14 perceiving the prior two incidents of military provocation as part 
of the adversary’s larger plan to conquer the ROK.15 The ROK’s response to the Nixon 
12 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 148. 
Hong, "The Pueblo Crisis in 1968.” Similarly, the Johnson administration’s policy toward Vietnam after 
the Tet Offensive led ROK President Park Chung Hee to conclude that the US security commitment would 
be fragile in the face of aggressive military campaigns by communist powers. Regarding the ROK’s 
conclusion, see Wookhee Shin, Suneunggwa Jeohangeul Neomeoseo: Iseungmangwa Pakchŏnghŭiui 
Daemijeongchaeg [Beyond Compliance and Resistance: The Policies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung 
Hee toward the United States] (Seoul: Seouldaehakgyo Chulpanmunhwawon, 2010), 92-3.  
14 ROK President Park insisted that North Korea would “not alter their policy of deliberate humiliation of” 
the US if they did “not sense determination on our side.” See FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 325. 
From December 1967 on, Park continued to argue that the ROK would face a massive military offensive 
from the DPRK in 1968 if the US and ROK alliance would not retaliate. This threat perception is clearly 
expressed in a letter from ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Sung-Eun, who estimated that the DPRK 
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administration’s reduction plan was similar to its response to the Johnson administration’s 
appeasement toward North Korea. 
To begin with, South Korea regarded the Nixon administration’s force reduction 
plan as weakening the superpower’s security commitment. ROK President Park took the 
reduction as a message that the US would not rescue the ROK if North Korea invaded 
again.16 In his meeting with Kissinger on December 2, 1970, ROK Prime Minister Kim 
Jong Pil similarly argued that “everyone in Korea understood [US force reductions in 
Korea] meant a detachment of the US commitment to support [South] Korea and in effect 
the re-establishment of an Asian defense system.”17  
The Nixon administration’s decision to redeploy the 2nd Division away from the 
DMZ also led South Korea government to believe that the US would weaken its security 
commitment. The redeployment meant losing the “trip wire” that would initiate automatic 
US involvement in the Korean peninsula.18 The ROK government insisted that it would 
simply refuse to deploy ROK forces to replace the 2nd Division along the DMZ, leaving 
the most vulnerable route for North Korean attack unprotected. The Nixon 
administration, however, regarded the ROK’s resistance as a ploy and paid it little 
attention.19 
had focused on offensive military operation since 1965 and had planned to conquer the ROK in the early 
1970s, first with guerilla attacks, and then with a conventional assault. Regarding the ROK’s threat 
perception, see Hong, "The Pueblo Crisis in 1968,” 197-99. 
16 Don Oberdorfer. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 13. 
17 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 215-16. 
The notion of the “trip wire” refers to the concept that the US would automatically engage in the Korean 
peninsula if its forces stationed at the DMZ were attacked by North Korea. For the discussion of this 
notion, see Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Washington, 
D.C.: Cato Institute, 1996). 
19 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 64. 
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In addition, the ROK’s lack of confidence in the patron’s commitment stemmed 
from the Nixon administration’s mixed signals about the reduction plan. Seoul’s initial 
reaction to the Nixon doctrine was that the level of US troops in the ROK would not be 
reduced pursuant to the doctrine.20 The ROK government also believed that its military 
contribution to the Vietnam War would prevent the Nixon administration from 
withdrawing the US forces stationed in South Korea.21 Furthermore, in the summit 
between the two allies held in San Francisco on August 21, 1969, Nixon confirmed that 
the US would not apply the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea, stating that he rejected the 
US domestic proposal to decrease the number of the US forces in the ROK.22 This led to 
the general belief in Seoul that the ROK would be exempted from the doctrine.  
Nixon’s remark at the San Francisco Summit, however, was followed by mixed 
signals from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In his meeting on January 20, 1972 with 
ROK ambassador Kim Dong Jo, Laird noted to Kim that “pressures for reduction of our 
forces in Korea are increasing,” adding that “[ROK] forces should be modernized before 
we withdraw any of our forces.” This remark led the ROK government to prepare for 
negotiation with the Nixon administration even though Laird did not say that “any USG 
decisions [about the withdrawal of US forces] had been made or that there would be any 
immediate US troop withdrawals.”23 
20 Ibid., 59-60. 
21 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 66. 
22 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 101. 
23 Ibid., 121. Laird’s remark about the withdrawal of the U.S. forces was immediately reported to ROK 
government. This led ROK to recognize the Nixon administration’s plan of reducing the U.S. forces from 
South Korea. Regarding the ROK’s concern, see Sang-Yoon Ma, “Anbowa Minjujuui Geuligo 
Pakchŏnghŭiui Gil: Yusincheje Sulibwonin Jego” [“Security, Democracy and Park Chung Hee’s Road: The 
Origins of the Yushin System Revisited,”] Gukjejeongchinonchong 43, no. 4 (2003): 178. 
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The Nixon administration’s ambiguity and mixed signals about its military 
assistance for the modernization of the South Korean forces also led Seoul to be skeptical 
of America’s security commitment. The ROK government often explicitly linked the 
timing of the withdrawal of US forces to US assistance for the modernization program, 
arguing that the level of American military deployment in South Korea should remain 
unchanged until the ROK military could be sufficiently modernized to offset the 
reduction of US forces.24 Due to the difficulty in obtaining congressional approval for 
the desired level of assistance, however, the Nixon administration did not provide the 
ROK government with details about the modernization program. It initially planned to 
inform the ROK of the limited nature of the modernization program and the necessity to 
seek a supplemental plan to meet the ultimate objective of ROK military self-sufficiency. 
Kissinger, however, suggested that the US should not inform South Korea, leading the 
Nixon administration to express support for the modernization of ROK forces in general 
terms, “subject to approval of the Congress to provide a balanced military assistance 
program capable of meeting ROK needs.”25 Nixon personally promised to obtain 
Congressional approval for providing substantially higher military assistance to 
modernize ROK forces from 1971 through 1975. At the same time, however, he also 
mentioned significant domestic pressure from the Congress and the public to require US 
allies to assume a greater share of the responsibility for their own defense.26  
For example, FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 159-161; 170-73; 174-79.
25 Ibid., 182. 
26 Ibid., 153. 
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These mixed signals and the Nixon administration’s ambiguity about the 
modernization program led ROK President Park to ask Ambassador Porter for greater 
clarification regarding the “nature and extent of modernization” of ROK military forces.27 
Park threatened non-cooperation by stating that no joint planning about the reduction 
would be possible “until “a degree of satisfaction” would be achieved in modernization 
talks” and the US assurance concerning “[ROK’s] security could be given to Korean 
people.”28 The desire for a stronger assurance for security and US clarification of the 
modernization program suggests that the ROK became skeptical of the US commitment. 
ROK skepticism about US reliability was further deepened by the concern that the 
Nixon administration would reduce the US forces in Korea even further.29 This concern 
was behind the conflict between the US Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and the ROK 
President Park in their meeting in August 1970 to finalize negotiations about the planned 
reduction.  Agnew suggested the US and ROK publicly announce that they would 
negotiate the troop reduction and the modernization of the ROK forces at the same time. 
To Park, Agnew’s suggestion implied that the Nixon administration would implement a 
further reduction of US forces in the ROK. Thus, he refused this suggestion, requesting 
27 Ibid., 154. 
28 Ibid., 174-75. 
29 The US Embassy reported ROK leadership concerns as follows: “At the innermost ring of [ROK] 
concern is that the announced American plan to reduce some troops from the ROK will lead to a total 
withdrawal, despite US reassurances that a strong force will remain … these early moves at troop reduction 
by the United States procure [sic] an eventual American desire to retreat from the terms of the defense 
security pact between the two countries, on which the Koreans have based nearly everything.” This report 
is quoted in Investigation of Korean-American Relations 1978, 66. Similarly, the CIA’s report on South 
Korea, which was dated on December 2, 1970, estimated ROK concerns as follows: “South Korean 
estimates of the impact of the proposed US troop withdrawal on the actual military balance largely parallel 
our own. But their frequently expressed concern that North Korea might miscalculate the withdrawals, as a 
sign of diminished US commitment, reflects their own fears that indeed this may be just the beginning of a 
general disengagement policy.” The CIA’s report is quoted in FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 208. 
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the Nixon administration’s commitment to announce there would be no further reduction 
of the level of remaining US forces. He also made it clear that any future reduction would 
be subject to ROK’s veto.30  
Because of Park’s resistance, the negotiation in August 1970 ended without any 
agreement. As US Secretary of State Rogers had predicted, the ROK request for full prior 
consultation was the most controversial point during the US-ROK negotiation of 
American troop reduction.31 The US disregard of this request, however, led the ROK 
government to set aside its request for the Nixon administration’s assurance against 
further military reductions in Korea. 
The Nixon administration indeed regarded the modernization of ROK forces as a 
precondition to implement further reduction of the US military. According to the NSDM 
48, “Further withdrawals of substantial numbers of US personnel beyond the 20,000 
personnel decided upon are not now planned, though they may be considered when 
substantial ROK forces return from Vietnam or compensating improvements in ROK 
forces are well underway.”32 Nixon also directed the DOD to evaluate the feasibility and 
timing of further troop reductions in Korea.33 Accordingly, Laird called for the phased 
withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea, with the first cut of 20,000 troops to be 
followed by another cut several years later.34 The US Embassy in the ROK also 
internally studied the possibility of reducing US ground combat forces in the ROK in FY 
The ROK Department of Foreign Affairs, “Summary Memorandum of Conversation between ROK 
President Park Chung Hee and US Vice President Agnew, Spiro T. August 24, 1970 to August 26, 1970,” 
Microfilm Number C-0042, File Number 10, Frame Number 185-253. 
31 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 197. 
32 Ibid., 149. 
33 Ibid., 150. 
34 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 63. 
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1974, and even complete withdrawal of ground combat forces from South Korea in FY 
1975-1976.35 
However, the Nixon administration did not carry out the phased reduction plan 
beyond the reduction in 1971 because neither the US Congress nor the administration 
favored further reductions until the US-sponsored program to modernize ROK forces was 
completed.36 The notion of a phased reduction, however, was revived with Jimmy 
Carter’s campaigning in June 1976, which called for the withdrawal of all of US ground 
forces in South Korea “on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after 
consultations with both South Korea and Japan.”37 Carter’s plan was not realized 
because of outright opposition from the ROK, Japan, and even the US military and 
executive branch.38 For the ROK government, however, Carter’s plan was recognized as 
the legacy of the Nixon Doctrine.39  
The Nixon administration disliked the ROK’s hardline stand against the reduction 
plan and its lack of sensitivity to American domestic situations affecting the program to 
modernize ROK forces.40 Washington was also frustrated by the ROK government’s 
delaying tactic in deploying ROK forces to replace the 2nd Division along the DMZ.41 
The ROK government further threatened to replace the 7th Division with ROK troops 
from Vietnam, and unilaterally implemented the withdrawal of ROK forces from 
35 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 441. 
36 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 71. 
37 Frank Gibney, “The Ripple Effect in Korea,” Foreign Affairs 56, no.1 (1977): 160. 
38 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 85-94; 101-8. 
39 Joo-Hong Nam, America’s Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 139-174. 
40 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 158. 
41 Ibid., 224-26. 
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Vietnam.42 Frustrated by this unilateral action, the Nixon administration requested that 
South Korea not move suddenly with any announcement or decisions of further 
withdrawals from Vietnam.43 
The conflict between the two allies suggests that Washington expressed a lack of 
understanding of the ROK position. As US ambassador to the ROK William J. Porter put 
it, “From our point of view, the Korean [government] seems to lack confidence in US 
intentions and our statements, and we do not understand why.”44 The Nixon 
administration’s assessment of North Korea’s military threats needs to be discussed to 
explain its lack of concern for ROK security.  
There was a generally agreed estimate in Washington that North Korea would not 
deliberately launch a full-scale military provocation. The CIA, for example, estimated 
that “North Korea has no intention of initiating conventional operations against South 
Korea in the foreseeable future,” and that “neither the Soviets nor the Chinese 
Communists are encouraging such operations.”45 Similarly, the DOS consistently 
estimated that “under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South 
Korea; nor do we believe that Pyongyang is deliberately trying to provoke the Republic 
of Korea into a resumption of major hostilities.”46  
42 Shin, “Beyond Compliance and Resistance,” 77. As for the ROK’s unilateral withdrawal of ROK forces 
from Vietnam, the US Embassy in Seoul filed the following account of the Korean press report of an 
interview with ROK Ambassador to the United States Kim Dong Jo, “Ambassador indicated that the quick 
withdrawal of US forces might require reappraisal of ROK troops in Vietnam. Said ROK had never been 
informed or consulted either formally or informally about a reduction of US forces in Korea. Said as long 
as Vietnam war being fought he did not think US had seriously thought of reducing forces in Korea” This 
account is quoted in Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 65. 
43 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 290-93. 
44 Ibid., 176. 
45 Ibid., 143. 
46 Ibid., 1. 
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To be sure, the Nixon administration acknowledged that North Korea would 
continue its campaign of revolutionary war in South Korea, including “harassment of 
ROK and US forces in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and armed infiltration of rear 
areas.”47 The CIA, however, estimated that North Korea’s campaign, which was targeted 
to create dissonance in South Korea and to discourage US support by generating pressure 
on the US to withdraw from South Korea, had not been successful.48 Rather, the US 
agency estimated that North Korea’s campaign of revolutionary war in South Korea 
ironically solidified South Korean support for President Park and acceptance of his strong 
rule.49  
CIA also estimated that the military capability of South Korea would be able to 
counter North Korea’s provocations. It estimated, for example, “[ROK] has developed a 
sophisticated counterinfiltration system, which includes a national coordinating 
committee and ancillary operational control centers. The coastal surveillance capabilities 
have been markedly improved and they have constituted 20 counter infiltration battalions 
backed up by efficient ROK militia. Perhaps the major factor in the ROK effectiveness 
has been the dislike of the South Koreans for North Korean regime and the establishment 
of strong anti-subversion laws.”50 In addition, it suggested the estimate that the overall 
political stability of South Korea, its booming economy and its military strength would 
pose “a substantial deterrent to North Korean invasion.”51  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 24; 143. 
49 Ibid., 206. 
50 Ibid., 143. 
51 Ibid., 200. 
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The overall estimate of North Korea’s intentions and military capabilities, coupled 
with the US estimate of the ROK’s overall capability vis-à-vis North Korea, led the 
Nixon administration to conclude that its reduction policy would not affect the overall 
balance of power in the Korean peninsula. As the CIA estimated, “[the] planned 
withdrawal of one US Army division from South Korea will not of itself significantly 
alter” the military balance between the two Koreas.52 Similarly, the Department of State 
suggested the following conclusion: “If the modernization plan for ROK forces is 
essentially achieved in terms of equipment, we have no doubt that the bilateral military 
stand-off can be maintained.”53  
The Nixon administration’s estimate of the North Korean threat, however, was 
substantially different from that of South Korean leadership. This made the ROK 
government persistently emphasize North Korea’s revisionist purpose in the Korean 
peninsula. In his conversation with US Secretary of State William P. Rogers, ROK Prime 
Minister Kim Jong Pil emphasized the North Korea’s revisionist purpose as, “[North 
Korea] retains the hope of establishing bases, of damaging South Korean industry, of 
harassing communication lines, and of compelling the ROKG [ROK government] to thin 
out its defenses along the front line. Then, if they are successful in this, the North 
Koreans will launch a general attack.”54 To put it simply, the ROK regarded North 
Korea’s strategy as “liberating South Korea by Force.”55 President Park, in his 
conversation with Nixon in August 1969, emphasized North Korea’s military 
52 Ibid., 200. 
53 Ibid., 438. 
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 Ibid., 79.
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preparedness to unify the two Koreas by force.56 The ROK government justified its 
perception of North Korea by emphasizing the impetuosity and fanaticism of North 
Korean leader Kim Il Sung.57  
Because of its threat perception of North Korea, the ROK was concerned that the US 
reduction policy would inevitably lead to North Korea initiating a revisionist war against 
South Korea. President Park expressed this concern in his conversation with Nixon in 
August 1969, saying “[North Korea] during the past 10 years or so has almost completed 
war preparations to unify the country by force. He is looking for an opportunity to invade 
the South. He has not done so because of US commitments to the ROK and the presence 
of American troops in our country. Kim will provoke a war if he believes that this 




3.1.3. ROK’s Security Assessment under Détente in Northeast Asia 
 
While the Nixon administration believed the military balance between the two 
Koreas would prevent them from launching deliberate military action against each other, 
it came to be concerned that a miscalculation by the two Koreas could lead to a major 
military conflict in the area.59 This concern led Washington to discuss how the US would 
56 Ibid., 98. 
After his visit to the ROK in July 1971, Secretary of Defense Laird reported to Nixon, “The theme of 
Kim Il Sung’s impetuosity and fanaticism as the key element in the threat was persistent throughout all 
ROK discussions.” See ibid., 256. 
58 Ibid., 98. 
The DOS expressed its concern in this manner, “Thus, the danger over the next year or two is not that 
war will arise from a deliberate decision of one side or the other, but that it might result from 
miscalculation—for example, in the process of probing for weaknesses and testing ROK and US resolve, 
North Korea may overplay its hand and lead the South Koreans to retaliate heavily.” See ibid., 2. 
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stop an independent retaliation by the ROK against a North Korean military 
provocation.60  
The US concern about possible military conflict in the Korean peninsula suggests 
that the military balance between the two Koreas itself was not enough to guarantee 
stability. In this respect, the Nixon administration needed to explore how it could ease 
tensions between the two Koreas. As the US East Asian Interdepartmental Group’s study 
of Korea estimated, détente in the Korean peninsula would prevent military 
confrontation, thus decreasing the risk of US entrapment in a Korean war.61 The 
establishment of détente between the two Koreas was also considered important to 
maintaining the status quo in Northeast Asia, and led the Nixon administration to 
recommend that the ROK government establish direct contact with North Korea. 
Accordingly, Ambassador Porter recommended the ROK government to establish direct 
negotiations with the North Korea on non-political issues, such as postal exchange and 
the problem of divided families.62 He also recommended that the Nixon administration 
needed “a little more leverage” to lead the ROK government to launch direct negotiations 
with North Korea.63  
The ROK government showed its own initiative to seek direct negotiation with 
North Korea when President Park suggested talks on August 15, 1970. This presidential 
speech was followed by the ROK government’s suggestion of Red Cross Talks with 
60 Ibid., 59-63. 
61 US Department of State, “Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) Korea: FY 1973,” 14 March 
1972, Subject-Numeric Files, RG 59, National Archive. 
62 Woo, Race to the Swift, 99-100. 
63 US Embassy in Seoul, “Proposal for Increased Display of US Interest in Dialogue between ROK and 
North Korea,” 18 February 1971, Subject-Numeric Files, RG 59, National Archives.   
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North Korea. The direct negotiation between the two Koreas began on August 20, 1971 
when representatives of the Red Cross societies of the two Koreas met in Panmunjom for 
the first exploratory discussions, which finally led to the public joint statement of the 
South-North Communique on July 4, 1972. This statement declared that the two Koreas 
had reached full agreement that “Unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, 
and not through use of force against one another,” and that “a great national unity, as a 
homogenous people, shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies 
and systems.” As part of the joint statement, representatives of the two Koreas agreed to 
take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military provocations.64 Through closed 
prior consultations with the Nixon administration, the ROK government also issued the 
6.23 Declaration, which supported the idea of joint membership of the two Koreas in the 
United Nations.65 
The ROK government’s initiative to launch the inter-Korean dialogues satisfied the 
Nixon administration’s goal to ease tension in the Korean peninsula. President Nixon sent 
President Park a personal letter with a positive assessment of the ROK’s initiative for the 
Red Cross Talks. He expected that these inter-Korean dialogues would lead “in due 
course to the development of further communication and exchange with [North 
Korea].”66 The development of the inter-Korean dialogue, coupled with the US 
rapprochement, also led the US Embassy in Seoul to estimate “the danger of major 
hostilities [between the two Koreas] is less now than at any time since the 1953 
64 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 24-5. 
65 Woo, Race to the Swift, 116-19. 
66 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 294. 
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Armistice.”67 Similarly, the DOS welcomed the ROK’s 6.23 Declaration in 1973, 
expecting that this declaration would lead the two Koreas to introduce a step-by-step 
approach toward perpetual peace in the Korean peninsula.68  
The development of the inter-Korean dialogues, however, did not change the ROK’s 
threat perception of North Korea. Rather, South Korea persistently expressed its concern 
about North Korea’s revisionist purpose, even during the détente period for the Korean 
peninsula. President Park expressed his concern, saying, “[T]here are no indications of an 
imminent attack on the ROK. However, we must always be aware of the Communist 
capacity to commit aggression at any time. There may be no indications today but [North 
Korea] has the capacity to attack and can pick the time to do so.”69 Similarly, ROK 
Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil argued, “North Korea was at a peak in terms of its strength 
and preparations for war” and that “[T]he North Koreans were already at a maximum 
state of readiness and all they would do would be to redeploy some of their forces in a 
more aggressive stance.”70  
It should be inevitable that such concern about North Korea’s revisionist strategy led 
to ROK’s belief that North Korea would make use of the inter-Korean dialogue for its 
revisionist purpose. In this respect, President Park argued that North Korea’s intention 
was to make use of the inter-Korean dialogues to realize its “long-term demand that US 
forces should withdraw from [South] Korea” and to “try and influence US public opinion 
to call for an end of US military aid to South Korea.”71 Similarly, he argued that “North 
67 Ibid., 437. 
68 Woo, Race to the Swift, 116. 
69 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 304. 
70 Ibid., 310. 
71 Ibid., 373. 
104 
Korea is trying to mislead the American public through a false peace offensive, thus 
promoting demand for early withdrawal of US forces from Korea and an end to the 
(ROK) military modernization program.”72  
The Nixon administration criticized ROK’s argument about North Korea’s intention. 
Secretary of Defense Laird expressed his criticism, saying, “The existing North Korean 
threat is typified on the one hand as large and imminent and on the other hand as 
quiescent as long as the ROK displays political and military stability. The ROK contends 
that despite existing and prospective political and military stability, the threat is still high. 
If the threat is as immediate and intense as the ROK frequently indicates, they could 
surely sacrifice more in their behalf.”73 The Department of State agreed, stating, “We 
have no knowledge of any immediate plans or preparations by North Korea for any 
unusual military operations except exercises. Accordingly … we will have no choice 
other than to make clear publicly we do not share [the] ROKG estimate … we find [the] 
ROK campaign out of step with efforts to relax tensions in Asia, and a possible invitation 
to Pyongyang for adventurism or miscalculation.”74  
South Korea’s concern about North Korea’s revisionist purpose was coupled with its 
belief that the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) would negatively affect ROK security. The news of Nixon’s opening to the PRC 
inevitably raised new doubts about the reliability of America’s security commitment, 
because the rapprochement implied “US acceptance of a hostile, powerful and 
72 Ibid., 359-60. 
73 Ibid., 262. 
74 Ibid., 296. 
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revolutionary country in South Korea’s immediate neighborhood, tied by a military 
alliance to North Korea.”75 The ROK government was worried that the Nixon 
administration’s China policy would adversely affect the security of South Korea.76 
Thus, the ROK leaders insisted that there should be neither discussion nor decision taken 
regarding South Korea by the Nixon administration without consultation with the ROK 
government.77 
In particular, the ROK was worried that the rapprochement between the US and 
PRC would lead to further removal of US forces from Korea, since the PRC had already 
spoken to Western reporters about “the US getting out of Korea and the abrogation of the 
US–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.”78 The PRC’s concern about the remilitarization of 
Japan led it to propose that the US should gradually withdraw its forces from South 
Korea. Kissinger responded to the PRC’s request, saying, “If the relationships between 
our countries develop as they might, after the Indochina war ends and the ROK troops 
return to Korea, I would think it quite conceivable that before the end of the next term of 
President Nixon, most, if not all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea.”79 
Kissinger’s response suggests that the Nixon administration regarded the détente between 
75 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 13. 
76 According to the US Embassy in Seoul, “Some Korean and foreign observers seemed to doubt the 
situation on the Korean Peninsula had become so serious. This is understandable given the general trend in 
the international community toward peace and détente—particularly when relations between the US and 
Red China are thawing. But when the big powers make an effort to ease tensions, then perhaps some of the 
weak nations become prey to unexpected incidents. For example, as the US and Red China moved toward 
each other, the Republic of China suffered from these moves. The Republic of Korea was concerned that it 
too could become a victim like the Republic of China.” See FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 302-3. 
77 Ibid., 279-85. 
78 Ibid., 282. 
79 Ibid., 390. 
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3.2.1. The ROK Initiatives to Increase Indigenous Military Capabilities 
 
 The documentation of the nature of the ROK leadership’s security concern shows 
that the leadership’s assessment of North Korea’s threats was filtered through its 
perception of the US reliability as a security provider. The leadership experienced high 
levels of threat from the adversary and this threat perception was magnified by its 
skepticism of the superpower’s security commitment to South Korea. Consequently, the 
level of the leadership’s security concern was substantially high. This made the ROK 
leadership prioritize the state’s military capability for self-defense.  
President Park introduced the notion of self-defense after the US withdrew the 7th 
Division from South Korea. In his January 1970 New Year’s address, for example, he 
argued that the ROK should maintain the military capability to defend itself alone against 
an all-out attack by North Korean forces. Similarly, in his 1971 New Year’s address, Park 
emphasized the ROK’s preparedness for self-defense as the only way to deal with the 
security crisis caused by the US strategic posture in Northeast Asia. He argued that the 
state’s self-defense capability would be contingent upon the South Korean people’s 
willingness to achieve a great national unity. In addition, the president’s New Year’s 
address in 1972 emphasized the necessity of promoting the state’s industrial base to 
107 
support military capability and self-defense.80 The rapprochement between the US and 
PRC also evidently led Park to emphasize the necessity of self-defense, stating, “We 
cannot let our vigilance down at the reemergence of Big Power politics. Just as an 
individual must protect himself, so a nation must consider security and survival as 
indispensable. When a nation’s survival is at stake, politics, economy, culture, everything 
should be organized and mobilized for that single purpose.”81 
The ROK government’s efforts to develop weapons production began with the 
president’s direction in August 1970 to establish the Agency for Defense Development 
(ADD) and the Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC), around the time when the US 
and ROK negotiated the reduction of the US Forces in South Korea.82 The ADD openly 
developed military weapons, equipment and materials and assisted in the development of 
defense-related technology. On the other hand, the WEC was a covert governmental 
committee responsible for weapons production and procurement.83 These two 
governmental agencies took the primary role in developing weapons production 
capability during the 1970s. Park also appointed Oh Wŏnch'ŏl as the head of the Second 
Economic Secretariat (SES) and assigned him the task of creating a blueprint for 
developing the state’s weapons production capacity. As chief of the SES, Oh’s tasks 
included developing skilled manpower, missile capability and nuclear weapons, as well 
as re-planning the development of national land and modernizing the ROK military.84  
80 The president’s addresses are available online at http://www.pa.go.kr/ . 
81 Chung Hee Park, Korea Reborn: A Model for Development (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 
130. 
82 Hyung-A Kim, Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-1979 (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 166. 
83 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 79. 
84 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 168. 
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On November 11, 1971, Park directed Oh to immediately organize weapons 
production to arm 20 divisions of the ROK Homeland Guard with light weapons. He 
planned the light weapons development program, which the ADD began to implement 
under the code name, “Lightening Operation.” On December 16, 1971, the ADD 
completed the production of eight types of light weapons, including M1 carbines, M19 
guns, A4 machine guns and 60mm trench mortars. The trial demonstration of these 
weapons was conducted on April 3, 1972, only five months after the president’s 
direction.85 A presidential directive to produce 105mm cannons for the armament of 
Korean regular forces immediately followed the demonstration, so the ADD developed 
and demonstrated a trial version of the cannon.86 
The presidential guidance was apparently the driving force behind establishing an 
indigenous capacity to produce various required conventional weapons. Park directed his 
chief of staff, Kim Chŏngnyŏm, to deliver his order to both the chief of the ADD and the 
Minister of Defense so they would begin the production of light weapons immediately, 
ordering Kim to tell the two agencies, “It’s a Presidential Direction.”87 The president’s 
initiative led the ADD to make all-out efforts for weapons production. Park also needed 
to deal with skepticism from the Department of Defense about the ROK’s indigenous 
weapons production capacity. The DOD did not believe the ROK had the capacity to 
produce high-quality weapons for immediate use, and suggested that the ROK should 
depend on US military assistance for the production of required weapons.88 To overcome 
85 Won Chul Oh, Naega Jeonjaengeul Hajaneun Geotdo Aniji Anhneunya [I am not Planning a War] 
(Seoul: HanGukhyeong Gyeongjejeongchaek Yeonguso, 1999), 393-402. 
86 Ibid., 402-12. 
87 Ibid., 391. 
88 Ibid., 391-92. 
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this skepticism, Park assigned Oh and his Blue House secretaries in the Second Economic 
Secretariat primary responsibility for planning the weapons production program and 
allowed the DOD only a secondary role in developing the state’s weapons production 
capability during the 1970s.89  
Despite the efforts to produce Korean-made conventional weapons, technological 
hurdles made it difficult for the ADD to produce the required light weapons and 105mm 
cannons. The ADD did not secure enough engineers and skilled workers to produce these 
weapons by the time Park decided to launch the weapons production programs. Neither 
did it have enough data and information to implement the weapons production. 
Furthermore, South Korean industry could only precisely manufacture items to one-tenth 
of a millimeter, which was not sufficient to manufacture weapons.90  
This suggests that the ROK government needed US military assistance to develop 
her indigenous capacity for large-scale weapons production. Through the trial 
demonstration of its Korean-made weapons, the ROK was able to convince the Nixon 
administration to assist the ROK’s weapons production. The US consequently provided 
the ROK with technological advisers and technical plans for conventional weapons 
production.91  
But it should be noted that the US also sought to control the development of the 
ROK’s indigenous weapons production capacity in return for its assistance in the process. 
The Department of State and US Embassy in Seoul were concerned that the ROK’s 
89 Sang Hui Koo, Hanguk Bangwisaneob [Defense Industry of South Korea] (Sejong Yeonguso Yeongu 
Nonmun 98-09, 1998), 29-30. 
90 Ibid., 30. 
91 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 171-72. 
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initiative for weapons production may have the potential to provoke North Korea, thus 
negatively affecting the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with the PRC.92 In this 
respect, the DOS and DOD suggested that US military assistance should focus on 
promoting the ROK’s capacity to produce defensive weapons.93 The Nixon 
administration also tried to secure leverage to control the development of the ROK’s 
weapons production program. Accordingly, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense William 
P. Clement, in the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in September 1973, urged the 
ROK to “consider the desirability of developing joint endeavors which bring together 
American industrial technology with Korean industry to develop an industrial base 




3.2.2. Military Expenditure and Taxation for Autonomous Defense Capability 
 
Identification of the nature and patterns of ROK defense spending during the 1970s 
helps to determine how the leadership of South Korea secured financial support from 
domestic society for the state’s military preparedness. According to Table 3-1, the relative 
weight of ROK defense spending to the state’s Gross National Product (GNP) from 1970 
through 1979 is 4.75% on average, with the lowest level being 3.2% in 1974 and the 
highest level being 6.6% in 1979. Intuitively speaking, this indicates that ROK defense 
spending constituted an important portion of the national economy of South Korea. The 
92 Oh, I am not Planning a War, 410-11. 
93 Ibid., 399.
94 US Embassy in Seoul, “ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting – Joint Statement,” 13 September 1973, 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973SEOUL06209_b.html (accessed April 16, 2016).  
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relative weight of defense spending to the state’s public expenditure shows a steady 
increase during the 1970s, from 23.2% in 1970 to 30.8% in 1979. This shows the ROK 
government’s commitment to secure a financial base for the for the state’s military 
capability overall. 
 
Table 3-1. Defense Spending in South Korea, 1969-198095 
Year GNP 
 




1969 7.4 0.298 4.0 22.8 
1970 8.2 0.333 3.9 23.2 
1971 10.0 0.411 4.1 24.6 
1972 9.7 0.428 4.4 24.8 
1973 12.6 0.475 3.8 28.0 
1974 17.5 0.558 3.2 29.3 
1975 18.4 0.719 3.9 28.8 
1976 24.0 1.500 6.3 32.9 
1977 31.5 1.800 5.7 34.7 
1978 46.0 2.600 5.6 37.0 
1979 48.3 3.181 6.6 30.8 
1980 69.3 3.460 5.7 35.6 
 
The pattern of South Korea’s defense spending during the 1970s was related to 
declining US military aid.96 The ratio of US aid to the ROK’s total defense spending 
dropped from 56.2% to 14.3% from 1969 to 1974. Beginning in 1972, US military 
assistance was replaced by military loans, but the amount of the loans accounted for less 
than 10 percent of the total defense expenditure of South Korea. The US completely 
Chung-In Moon and In-Taek Hyun, “Muddling through Security, Growth, and Welfare: The Political 
Economy of Defense Spending,” in Defense, Welfare and Growth: Perspectives and Evidence, eds. Steve 
Chan and Alex Mintz (New York: Routledge, 1992), 140. The unit of GNP and defense spending is in 
billions of US dollars and the amount of the GNP and defense spending for each year is adjusted to 1992 
prices. 
96 Ibid., 147. 
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phased out its military assistance by 1978 and continued to decrease the amount of the 
military loans. This fostered the ROK leadership to establish a domestic financial base to 
support the state’s military capability. 
South Korea’s defense spending doubled from $719 million in 1975 to $1.5 billion 
in 1976, and its share of the state’s GNP rose from 3.9 percent to 6.3 percent. This sharp 
increase can be explained by the ROK government’s efforts to secure a revenue base for 
its Force Improvement Plan. To finance this plan, the ROK government initially raised a 
total of 16.13 billion South Korean won (approximately $32 million in US dollars) 
between 1974 and 1975 through mass media campaign. In July 1975, the government 
introduced a compulsory National Defense Tax as the new revenue base for the plan.97 
This enabled the ROK government to spend about six percent of the state’s GNP annually 
on the Force Improvement Plan since 1976. With the introduction of the National 
Defense Tax, the ROK government set the goal of surpassing North Korea’s defense 
expenditure by 1976.98 The gap began to considerably narrow as South Korea sharply 
increased its defense expenditure, and South Korea has surpassed North Korea on 
defense expenditure since 1977.99 
It is clear that the ROK government’s commitment to financially support the Force 
Improvement Plan was the result of declining financial assistance from the United States 
from 1971 through 1975. The two allies’ approaches toward this program show the 
“continuing discrepancy between United States and Korean perceptions of the military 
97 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 29.   
98 Sung Gul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The 
Transformation of South Korea, eds. Kim, Byung-Kook and Ezra E. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 488.  
99 Correlates of War, National Material Capabilities (Version 4.0). 
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needs of the Republic of Korea.”100 The ROK indicated that $200 million of military 
assistance per year from 1971 through 1975 would be required to bring its forces to a 
state “at which genuine modernization could begin,” and that substantial help from the 
Nixon administration is required in establishing ROK’s defense industries.101 In addition, 
the ROK demanded that the modernization program should increase its capability to deal 
with North Korea’s infiltration and guerilla strategy.102 In the end, the ROK government 
suggested that $3-4 million would be required to modernize ROK forces from 1971 
through 1975.103 The Nixon administration, however, planned to spend only $1.5 Billion 
for the modernization plan, far less than requested.104   
For the following two reasons, the Nixon administration even found it hard to obtain 
congressional approval of the $1.5 billion for modernizing ROK forces. First, the 
congress was demanding that US allies assume a greater share of responsibility for their 
own defense, so there was no guarantee that the congress would approve the requested 
funds.105 Considering this pressure, the Nixon administration estimated that the ROK’s 
modernization program “would be limited largely to [ROK] ground forces,” thus 
requiring additional money to provide a reasonable level of modernization of ROK naval 
and air forces.106 Second, the congress regarded the program as part of the US annual 
security assistance program, not as a five-year package.107 This meant that congressional 
100 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 87. 
101 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 170. 
102 Ibid., 159. 
103 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 69. 
104 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 182. 
105 Ibid., 153. 
106 Ibid., 181. 
107 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 69. 
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approval would be affected by US domestic political currents in any given year. From 
1972 through 1975, the actual amounts of modernization funds approved by the congress 
were indeed less than the amounts requested by the Nixon administration. Consequently, 
the US fulfilled the modernization program two years after the scheduled completion 
year.108  
Table 3-2 presents the structure of South Korea’s military expenditures during the 
1970s by appropriation categories. This table shows that expenditures related to the 
purchase of military equipment accounted for only 10.1 percent of the total defense 
spending in 1970. That percentage increased significantly to 18.1 percent in 1975, and 
28.1 percent in 1976. The phase-out of US military assistance and the ROK government’s 
efforts to catch up with North Korea’s military capability were largely responsible for the 
heavy investment in this category since the mid-1970s. In addition, the ROK government 
allocated a noticeable share of the defense budget to investment in research and 
development since 1971 to increase the state’s self-reliant military capability through 
defense industrialization.109  
  
108 Ibid., 70. 
109 Moon and Hyun, “The Political Economy of Defense Spending,” 144. 
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Table 3-2. ROK Military Expenditure by Appropriation Category, 1970-1979110 
Year Military 
Personnel 
Maintenance R&D Purchase of 
Military Equipment 
Total 




 10,295  
(10.1) 
102,336 




















































































3.2.3. The Development of Heavy Industrialization in South Korea 
 
The ROK leadership’s all-out efforts to establish the military industrial base began 
immediately after North Korea’s abduction of a South Korean patrol boat in early June 
1970.111 President Park issued a directive to build the defense industry, and Deputy 
Prime Minister Kim Hakryŏl proposed constructing core industries to establish the 
required industrial base.112 The Economic Planning Board (EPB) was tasked with 
financially supporting this project, and conducted negotiations over 15 months with 
Ibid., 143. The unit is million KRW (South Korean Won) in current price of 1992. 
111 Oh, I am not Planning a War, 344. 
112 They included the ally-steel machine-building, plat-iron, and shipbuilding industries.      
116 
Japan, the United States and various European countries to secure foreign loans. All of 
these nations, however, were skeptical of the ROK government’s ability to implement the 
industrialization project, so the EPB was not able to raise the required capital.113  
This desperate situation ironically led to the most extraordinary development of the 
ROK’s military industrial infrastructure during the 1970s. After the project to construct 
the four core industries became bogged down, the ROK government needed to find 
alternatives. Oh Wŏnch'ŏl, then assistant vice minister in the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, proposed to Kim Chŏngnyŏm, President Park’s chief of staff, his ideas about the 
state’s defense industry.114 Impressed by Oh’s idea, Kim immediately let Oh meet with 
the president. In the meeting on November 10, 1971, Oh explained to Park his ideas of 
“choosing the most prominent private manufacturing companies currently available, and 
assigning them to manufacture either weapon parts or specified quantities,” and that 
development of the state’s defense industry should be “managed within the framework of 
heavy and chemical industry development.”115 
His idea was so persuasive that Park appointed him as his senior economic secretary 
in the Second Economic Secretariat (SES) in the Blue House. Park’s appointment of Oh 
as head of the SES was the beginning of what was to become the ROK’s heavy and 
economic industry (HCI) triumvirate, which referred to the combined roles of President 
Park, Kim Chŏngnyŏm, and Oh Wŏnch'ŏl in the management of the HCI program. This 
combined role was crucial to providing the three ingredients essential for developing the 
113 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 166.  
114 Oh, I am not Planning a War, 388. 
115 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 167. 
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defense industry and implementing the HCI program: Park’s strong leadership, Kim’s 
expertise in economic management, and Oh’s industrial vision.116 The HCI triumvirate 
was the driving force behind promoting the state’s industrial base for defense capability.      
The defense industry program took a giant leap forward when Park declared the HCI 
Plan as the top priority of the state. This declaration was based upon the HCI 
triumvirate’s conclusion that the state’s defense industry should be based upon the 
production systems of big business, and promotion of the ROK defense industry would 
be managed as an “integral part of heavy and chemical industrialization.”117 To put it 
simply, the triumvirate recognized that development of the state’s defense industry would 
be impossible without the infrastructure of heavy and chemical industries. The 
inseparability of the defense industry from the HCI plan was emphasized during the 
meeting on January 31, 1973, in which President Park maneuvered his cabinet minister to 
approve the plan.118 
Oh’s industrial vision brought a fundamental shift from Park’s reliance on the 
economists of the EPB to a reliance on technocrats of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (MCI), as well as the Presidential Economic Secretariat.119 The Economic 
Secretariat at the Blue House became firmly ensconced as a critical decision-making 
body for the formulation and implementation of policies relating to the HCI plan, 
bypassing and sometimes dictating to the EPB and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).120 
The presidential initiative helped to overcome EPB objections to the state’s intrusive 
116 Ibid., 168. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., 176. 
119 Ibid., 168. 
120 Woo, Race to the Swift, 129. 
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control over the development of industry and the MOF’s concern about the loss of 
monetary policy as a result of the big-push for the HCI plan.121 This suggests that Park 
was willing to push for the HCI plan even at the cost of losing monetary policy 
discipline.122 At the same time, however, Park was fully aware of the importance of 
winning bureaucratic support from the EPB and MOF, which commanded indispensable 
economic resources, controlled the strategic policy network, and possessed the ROK’s 
best bureaucrats. Thus, he continued “showering” the two bureaucratic bodies with 
organizational privileges instead of simply “silencing” their voices.123 
Park also established the interministerial Council for Promoting Heavy and 
Chemical Industries (CPHCI) to prevent the HCI project from getting lost in bureaucratic 
bickering, and to introduce efficient operational channels for the formulation and 
implementation of the HCI plan. The CPHCI, chaired by Park himself, was given the 
mission of “setting the agenda, designing a concerted effort of resource mobilization and 
allocation, and laying out a division of labor among the economic ministries.”124   
According to the HCI plan, six industries (chemical, electronics, machine-building, 
metal, ship-building, and steel) were designated as objects of the state’s intense scrutiny 
and development. The ROK government created one large industrial complex with state 
of the art production facilities for each of the strategic industries by procuring properties 
from farmers, bulldozing the land and installing the required industrial infrastructures.125 
121 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 179; Byung-Kook Kim, “The Leviathan: Economic 
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Kook Kim and Ezra E. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 225. 
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The ROK leadership also offered the targeted industries various policy supports, such as 
no pressure for repayment, and the removal of administrative obstacles.126 In addition, 
the South Korean government committed an enormous amount of financial support to 
ensure the success of the HCI drive.127 
The ROK government established the National Investment Fund (NIF) in 1973, 
which was funded by issuing national investment bonds and pension funds. In principle, 
the projected capital for the HCI project would come from this fund. But the South 
Korean government also secured external capital, putting priority on foreign loans over 
direct investment or joint ventures. The targeted industrial enterprises were the first to 
receive financial support from the government and to receive available foreign capital. 
These governmental efforts enabled the development of strategic industries “completely 
insulated from commercial pressures and insured from failure by government 
subsides.”128 Additionally, the ROK government tried to take advantage of all available 
intellectual input from both Korea and abroad.129  
 
Table 3-3. Chaebŏl Participation in Heavy and Chemical Industries.130 
Chaebŏl Number of Affiliates Acquisitions in the Heavy and Chemical Industries 
1974 1978 
Hyundai 9 31 aluminum, automobile*, machinery*, heavy 
electrical, heavy machinery, iron & steel, oil 
refining, shipbuilding 
Samsung 24 33 electric switching system, general machinery,  
petrochemicals, shipbuilding 
Daewoo 10 35 automobile, machinery, shipbuilding 
126 Kohli, State-Directed Development, 112, 
127 Woo, Race to the Swift, 129-31. 
128 Janne E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea (London: Macmillan, 1986), 63. 
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Table 3-3 continued 
Lucky 17 43 electronics*, oil refining*, petrochemicals* 
Hyosŏng 8 24 auto parts, heavy electrical machinery, 
petrochemicals 
Kukje 7 22 iron & steel, machinery 
Sunkyung 8 23 chemical, machinery 
Samhwa 10 30 electrical, machinery 
Ssangyong 17 20 cement*, heavy electrical, heavy machinery 
Kŭmho 15 22 iron & steel, petrochemicals 
Kolon 6 22 heavy electrical, petrochemicals 
 
The state’s initiative led to phenomenal success, despite skepticism from 
international economic development agencies such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the World 
Bank.131 As presented in Table 3-3, the governmental initiative led ROK’s big business, 




3.2.4. Establishment of the Societal Base of Autonomous Defense Posture 
 
The main goal of the financial system of South Korea during the 1970s was to 
“hemorrhage as much capital as possible” into the growth of strategic industries required 
for the development of the state’s military capability.132 A negative consequence of the 
favoritism toward these targeted strategic industries, however, was the “bifurcation of the 
financial market,” which led the ROK government to allocate relatively few resources to 
other socio-economic sectors.133 Consequently, the top-down drive for the HCI project 
131 Ibid., 131-32. 
132 Woo, Race to the Swift, 159. 
133 Ibid. 
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proceeded “in tandem with society’s deepening sense of alienation.”134 This suggests that 
the ROK needed to silence any plausible social tensions inherent in the state’s drive for 
the HCI project.  
For this purpose, the ROK leadership launched the Saemaŭl Movement in April 
1970, a social campaign to justify the state’s big push for heavy and chemical 
industrialization. It initially began as a top-down campaign for the development of rural 
areas that largely depended on agricultural sectors. Despite the rhetoric and aims of this 
movement, however, the ROK’s emphasis on the HCI drive led the state to pay very little 
attention to the development of the agricultural sector. Rather, the Park administration 
transformed the Saemaŭl Movement into a community mobilization campaign to promote 
the renewal of the Korean people’s spirit of independence, self-reliance and 
determination to strive for national development.135 In this regard, the ROK’s campaign 
for the Saemaŭl Movement represented “nationwide spiritual mobilization for state-led 
heavy industrialization.”136 
This ideological mobilization was also evident in the ROK government’s 
introduction of political measures to secure societal support of the HCI project. The Park 
administration estimated that the dialogue between the two Koreas would potentially 
weaken the South Korean public perception of North Korea as a military threat.137 
Similarly, it estimated that the peace offensive of North Korea during the course of the 
134 Hyuk Baeg Im “The Origin of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: 
The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra E. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 256. 
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dialogue was targeted to create a loss of cohesion in ROK’s national opinion about North 
Korean threats.138 It seemed inevitable that the state’s rationale for maximizing national 
security to deal with the adversary would be also weakened. Such concern led Park to 
declare an emergency situation on December 6, 1971, exhorting “all people to knuckle 
down and prepare for [the] worst in [the] name of patriotism and national security.”139 
This suggests that the ROK intended to establish “a one voice system to prevent a split in 
national opinion.”140 
In addition, the Park regime surprisingly announced the establishment of the Yushin 
system in October 1972,141 accompanied by the state’s declaration of martial law, 
abandonment of the existing constitution, disbandment of the National Assembly, and 
preparation of a plan for the indirect election of the president. The ROK government also 
introduced coercive measures to silence domestic opposition toward the Yushin 
system.142  
With the establishment of the Yushin system, the ROK government maximized its 
capacity to penetrate into domestic society. In doing so, it transformed the Saemaŭl 
Movement into a mass mobilization campaign for the Yushin reform.143 President Park 
publicly stated that the Saemaŭl Movement was the same as the Yushin reform and vice 
versa, the objective of both being to lead every Korean to work hard to build a prosperous 
welfare state. Following the presidential statement, the ROK government transformed the 
138 FRUS Korea 1969-1972, 370. 
139 Ibid., 297. 
140 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 139. 
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Saemaŭl Movement to leave no room for any loose ends in the state’s organization of the 
mass public. The ROK government systemically organized the entire nation under four 
categories: school, residential areas, social institutions, and workplaces. Even the armed 
forces were affiliated under the Armed Forces’ Saemaŭl Movement. In each of the 
categories, the ROK government established “a strictly top-down, pyramidal cellular 
structure.”144 Thus, the establishment of the Yushin system ultimately transformed the 
entire nation into “a vast, densely woven web, from the tiniest family unit to the Saemaŭl 
Movement Headquarters in the Blue House.”145  
The establishment of the Yushin system enabled the ROK leadership to restructure 
the apparatus of the government into a garrison state or a quasi-wartime state.146 With 
centralized and concentrated power, the ROK government was able to effectively 
mobilize resources for heavy and chemical industrialization. In this respect, the Yushin 
system can be characterized as a political success.147 In addition, the ROK government’s 
maximized capacity to penetrate into the domestic society of South Korea enabled it to 
silence social tension inherent in the state’s rapid industrialization.148 Thus, the state-led 
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3.3.1. ROK’s Development of Missile Capability 
 
From the perspective of South Korea, the US forces stationed in her territory 
signified the projection of military capability to deter North Korea.149 The Nixon 
administration’s reduction plan thus meant not only a weakening of the US commitment, 
but also a weakening of the American commitment to deter North Korea. In this respect, 
the leadership of South Korea needed to establish not only the state’s ability to defend 
against a North Korean first strike, but also the ability to deter a North Korean attack.  
South Korea tried to secure a deterrence capability by developing missile and 
nuclear capabilities throughout the 1970s. Washington pressured the ROK leadership to 
limit the scope of its missile capability, while providing technological assistance. The 
ROK’s nuclear project during the 1970s was evidently not favored by the United States. 
The US made all-out efforts to dissuade the ROK from producing nuclear weapons, and 
succeeded in containing the ROK’s independent steps toward nuclear weapons 
production. However, it was not able to completely dissuade the ROK from developing 
independent nuclear weapons capability.     
The president’s direction in December 1971 began the development of an 
independent missile system. Park was particularly concerned about the dangers of the 
DPRK’s Frog missiles, which were forward-deployed near the DMZ. His concern was 
149 Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institute, 1976), 5-19. 
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that South Korea did not have any effective means to immediately counterattack 
Pyongyang. This led to the conclusion that the ROK had to acquire an independent 
capability to counterattack the capital of North Korea. He judged that South Korea could 
deter North Korea’s initiation of war by establishing an independent missile capability to 
strike Pyongyang.150 
According to the president’s direction, the goal was to produce a surface-to-surface 
ballistic missile with a range of 200 kilometers (roughly 125 miles) at the initial stage, 
and to progressively expand the range in later stages. By September 1972, a group of 
scientists and engineers from several governmental agencies assembled a missile 
development plan that called for the successful testing of mid-range surface-to-surface 
missiles by the end of 1976 and long-range missiles by the end of 1979.151 To virtually 
guarantee the state’s financial support, Park designated the missile project as part of the 
Yulgok Operation to modernize ROK forces.152 The ADD was the designated primary 
agency for the missile program. The missile development project started with a six-
member study group within the ADD, which reviewed the feasibility of the project, and 
was expanded during the late 1970s to an ambitious project with 600 researchers.153 The 
ADD concentrated its resources and actively sought to purchase required parts and 
components, propellant and guidance technologies from the international market, as well 
as to recruit a group of South Korean engineers and scientists from the United States.154  
150 Oh, I am not Planning a War, 418-19. 
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To be sure, the development of surface-to-surface missile capability was made 
possible by US technology transfer.155 This technological assistance, however, does not 
suggest that the US was fully supportive of the ROK’s missile capability development. 
The US initially turned down the ROK government’s request for an alternative missile 
system to develop surface-to-surface missile capability. Facing such opposition, Lee Hu 
Rak, director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), instructed the WEC to 
begin procurement of the Israeli-made Gabriel surface-to-surface missile, despite the 
Pentagon’s objection that the missile system would endanger portions of the US military 
assistance program. The ROK military was also concerned that Washington would react 
negatively to the procurement plan.156  
As the US Department of State concluded, the development of ROK’s independent 
missile capability itself could destabilize the status quo in the Korean peninsula. 
Furthermore, Washington also came to regard the ROK’s independent missile program as 
an integral part of South Korea’s nuclear weapons programs during the 1970s.157 
Consequently, the US began to exercise direct pressure to control the ROK’s missile 
155 During the initial stage, ADD learned basic missile design skills from MacDonnell-Douglas, which had 
manufactured the Nike-Hercules missile. The ADD was also able to acquire the required propellant 
technology through negotiation with Lockheed. See Hong, “The Search for Deterrence,” 495. The US 
military also transferred conventional warheads, electronics and conversion to surface-to-surface operation 
technology to South Korea during the 1970s. Regarding the US assistance, see Kim, “Security, Nationalism 
and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” 63. 
156 Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 79. 
157 The Department of State suggested the following conclusion: “We believe that [ROK’s surface-surface 
missile capability] … … could be destabilizing in the hands of the present ROK leadership and would risk 
serious and rapid escalation arising from the low-level naval and other incidents that are chronic between 
North and South Korea.” In addition, it estimated that the linkage of the ROK’s advanced missile capability 
with nuclear weapon development would have “the most serious strategic implications” in the Korean 
peninsula and Northeast Asia. See US Department of State, “Sale of Rocket Propulsion Technology to 
South Korea," 4 February 1975, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114634 (accessed April 25, 
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capability development as part of its all-out efforts to stop the nuclear weapons 
programs.158 ADD’s successful experiment with more advanced propulsion materials in 
1976 led the US to pressure South Korea to cease its missile program.159 The US also 
increased surveillance of South Korea as the ROK government continued its unilateral 
efforts to seek other international sources of assistance in developing missile capability 
and other conventional weapons.160 In spite of this watchful observance however, the US 
did not have clear information on how advanced the ROK was in developing its missile 
capability until South Korea succeeded in its open test launch of the first Korean-
produced surface-to-surface K-1 missile on September 26, 1978.161 This new 
development led Washington to implement a chain of inspection tours in South Korea 
from November 1978 to June 1979, until US President Carter’s visit to South Korea.  
The ROK’s leadership responded to the US pressure in two ways. On the one hand, 
the ROK government agreed to American demands to restrict its missile capability. The 
agreement between the US and ROK allowed the range of the Korean-made missiles to 
be 180 kilometers (112 miles) and the weight of warhead to be 1,000 pounds, while the 
Missile Technology Control Regime allowed the development of missiles with a range of 
158 The US Department of State suggested that the US should inhibit “to the fullest possible extent” any 
ROK development of a nuclear delivery system. See US National Security Council, “ROK Plans to 
Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” 3 March 1975, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114628 (accessed April 25, 2016).   
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300 kilometers (187 miles) for military use.162 South Korea agreed to the US demand to 
secure the US guiding technology and equipment, which were required to complete the 
surface-to-surface missile development.163 On the other hand, President Park, after the 
open test launch of the Korean-made missile, encouraged the ADD to set up a long-term 
project to develop ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 km, suggesting that Washington 
was not able to dissuade the ROK from developing an independent missile capability 
beyond the US-allowed scope.164 
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3.3.2. ROK’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons during the 1970s 
 
As the DOS estimated, the ROK’s nuclear weapon program during the 1970s was 
the reflection of lessened confidence of the ROK government in US security 
commitment, and consequent desire on the part of South Korea to reduce its military 
dependence on the patron.165 The ultimate goal of South Korea was to secure the state’s 
future. ROK military leaders went through reviews of the state’s security situation under 
the Nixon Doctrine and raised the option of the nuclear weapon development to deal with 
the North Korean military threats and US withdrawal of forces stationed in ROK. 
President Park made the final decision to go nuclear and inaugurated the WEC in the 
Blue House.166 Park’s commitment to the development of nuclear weapons capability 
stemmed from his awareness of ROK strategic vulnerability in the Korean peninsula that 
could not be reduced simply by increasing conventional military capabilities.167 The 
WEC adopted by consensus the president’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons 
capability.168  
Following the president’ decision, the ROK government expedited the acquisition of 
nuclear weapon-related technology. Because of its limited access to the sensitive 
materials needed to produce a nuclear weapon and the expected US opposition, the ROK 
tried to find the supplier of a facility to reprocess nuclear fuel other than the United 
States. For this purpose, Minister of Science and Technology Ch'oe Hyŏngsŏp visited 
165 US Department of State, Cable to the US Embassy in Seoul, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons 
and Missiles,” 4 March 1975, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114616 (accessed April 25, 
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France and Britain in 1972 to seek technological cooperation in building a reprocessing 
facility. In addition, members of the WEC visited other nuclear-capable countries such as 
Israel, Norway, and Switzerland in 1972. Additionally, the ROK sent a group of Korean 
scientists to India and Taiwan to consult on technical issues about the operation of the 
National Research Experimental (NRX) experimental reactor. These efforts were 
successful in procuring foreign assistance for ROK’s nuclear project. By 1974, the ROK 
signed a contract with the French company, Saint Gobain Technique Nouvelle, for the 
purpose of acquiring the design of a nuclear reprocessing facility. In addition, ROK 
scientists secured the import of the NRX experimental reactor from France and Canada, 
which would enable South Korea to produce weapons-grade plutonium.169  
The top-secret nuclear weapons program proceeded uninterrupted until the middle of 
1974, when India’s successful nuclear test led the United States to tighten monitoring on 
other potential challengers of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. It was against 
this background that the US embassy in Seoul learned of the ROK’s nuclear weapons 
development.170 In March 1975, Washington concluded that the ROK was proceeding 
with the initial phase of nuclear weapon development. From the US perspective, the 
ROK’s nuclear weapons program had the potential to destabilize Northeast Asia and the 
Non-Proliferation system. The US Department of State emphasized the gravity of the 
issue as follows:  
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In the case of Korea, our general concerns [of nonproliferation] are intensified by its 
strategic location and by the impact which any Korean effort to establish nuclear 
capability would have on its neighbors, particularly North Korea and Japan. ROK 
possession of nuclear weapons would have [a] major destabilizing effect in an area in 
which not only Japan but USSR, PRC and ourselves are directly involved. It could lead to 
Soviet or Chinese assurances of nuclear weapons support to North Korea in the event of 
conflict. Further, ROK efforts to secure a nuclear weapon capability will inevitably 
impact on our bilateral security relationship.171  
 
Washington was particularly concerned about South Korea potentially acquiring its 
own reprocessing capability. Once the ROK had direct access to separated plutonium, it 
would be widely regarded as either having nuclear weapons or acquiring them in a short 
period. This perception would potentially destabilize all of Northeast Asia. This concern 
led the Ford administration to conclude that “no special safeguards short of a complete 
prohibition on reprocessing and storage of plutonium in South Korea are likely to provide 
adequate protection against the most troublesome contingency.”172  
Despite the serious concern, Washington initially decided to tread gently to avoid a 
serious rift in the security relationship between the US and ROK. Kissinger instructed the 
US embassy in Seoul to have the ROK government ratify the NPT as a credible 
commitment to eschew the acquisition of nuclear weapons.173 The Ford administration 
also introduced economic leverage to persuade South Korea to ratify the NPT. In March 
1975, the US Congress suspended Export-Import Bank loans totaling $236 million to the 
nuclear energy industry of South Korea, stating that the ROK’s timely ratification of the 
NPT would be an important factor in the Export-Import Bank eventually gaining 
171 US Department of State, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles.”  
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congressional approval to finance South Korea’s civilian nuclear industry.174 The veiled 
threat to block financial support convinced the ROK government to ratify the NPT in 
March 1975. The ratification of the NPT, however, did not reflect any real change in the 
ROK’s nuclear behavior. 
Washington’s next step was to confront the ROK leadership about the reprocessing 
deal with France.175 In July 1975, US Ambassador to the ROK Richard Sneider was 
instructed to deliver US opposition to the purchase of the reprocessing facility. Sneider 
took the case against the reprocessing deal “methodically up the chain of command” in 
order “not to confront [ROK president] Park and to allow him to save face.”176 The 
ambassador’s efforts were closely coordinated with Washington. A series of increasing 
intense conversations were held between Philip Habib, the assistant secretary of state for 
East Asian and Pacific affairs, and Hahm Pyong Choon, the ROK ambassador to the 
United States. Washington also created a number of incentives to offer in return for the 
ROK’s cancellation of the French deal, including guaranteed access to reprocessing under 
US auspices for the civilian nuclear industry of South Korea, and access to additional US 
technology under a formal science and technology agreement.177 The introduction of 
these positive inducements reflected the US expectation that the ROK government would 
seek positive gains in exchange for suspending its reprocessing deal with France.178 
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The introduction of carrots and sticks, however, was unable to stop the ROK’s 
movement toward acquiring its own reprocessing capability.179 This situation led 
Washington to employ “the heaviest threat ever wielded by the United States against 
South Korea.”180 It broadly threatened that the nuclear behavior would directly endanger 
the security relationship between the US and ROK. Ambassador Sneider delivered the US 
warning that the ROK’s unwillingness to change its nuclear behavior would only 
“jeopardize availability of technology and largest financing capability which only the US 
could offer, as well as vital partnership with US, not only in nuclear and scientific areas 
but in broad political and security areas.”181 In his face-to-face talk with ROK President 
Park, Habib delivered Kissinger’s message that the Washington would recalculate the 
entire alliance, including the withdrawal of the US commitment to nuclear umbrella.182 
The Ford administration also threatened to cut off $275 million in US annual military 
assistance to South Korea and cease its cooperation with the ROK in developing the 
civilian nuclear program.183  
The threats from Washington led the ROK government to reverse its position on 
purchasing the French reprocessing facility.184 A group of US officials then visited Seoul 
to negotiate the cancellation of the ROK reprocessing deal with France.185 Following this 
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visit, the ROK government reluctantly agreed to cancel the reprocessing deal in January 
1976.186   
The Ford Administration also persuaded Canada and France to revoke their offers of 
nuclear cooperation with South Korea. The Canadian government was willing to 
coordinate its policy with the US nonproliferation effort because it was already sensitive 
to the risk of nuclear proliferation following the success of India’s nuclear test, and was 
facing domestic criticism for supplying the authoritarian South Korea with nuclear 
technology. France also agreed to suspend its assistance to the ROK government. In 
addition, the Belgonucleaire Company of Belgium cancelled its contract to introduce a 
plutonium reprocessing facility to the ROK. This series of blocks effectively frustrated 
the ROK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, because securing a facility to reprocess nuclear 
fuel was the greatest technological hurdle for South Korea.187  
Despite the pressure from Washington, the ROK leadership’s commitment to 
develop an independent nuclear capability continued. From the perspective of South 
Korea, the US-ROK agreement in January 1976 meant only the renunciation of its efforts 
to secure nuclear weapons technology through foreign assistance, not the renunciation of 
its right to develop nuclear weapons technologies through its own efforts.188 The ROK’s 
efforts to develop indigenous nuclear weapons reemerged as the notion of a phased 
reduction of US forces was revived in Jimmy Carter’s campaign in June 1976. In the year 
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after he entered office, Carter announced plans to withdraw almost all US troops and 
approximately 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.189 
The ROK’s renewed effort followed the Japanese model to become a potential 
nuclear developer.190 In this respect, the nuclear project during the late 1970s focused 
more on the acquisition of nuclear materials and the development of indigenous nuclear 
technologies that would enable the future production of nuclear weapons, rather than an 
outright revival of the covert nuclear weapons program.191 However, President Park also 
confidentially expressed the possibility of completing the development of a nuclear bomb 
by the first half of 1981, which indicates the military intention of the nuclear project.192 
In December 1976, the ROK government established the Korean Nuclear Fuel 
Development Corporation (KNFDI), whose main task was to acquire reprocessing 
technology “indirectly through learning civilian nuclear technologies.”193 By October 
1978, this government’s agency constructed a nuclear fuel fabrication facility, which 
could be used to acquire spent nuclear fuel for producing weapons-grade plutonium.194 
Washington continued its surveillance of the ROK’s nuclear project during the late 1970s, 
but could not find convincing evidence of a military intent for the project.195  
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The ROK’s nuclear project entirely changed after the assassination of President Park 
in October 1979. Park’s successor Chun Doohwan suspended the weapons-related 
nuclear project and took definitive steps “to dismantle the ROK’s nuclear weapons 
potential” to win US support for the new regime of South Korea, which was inaugurated 
in 1980.196 In return, the Reagan administration promised to increase the US security and 
economic commitment to South Korea. At the same time, it threatened removing these 
benefits if the nuclear weapons project would continue.197 With an eye to winning US 
support, the new regime also made a conspicuous effort to cripple the missile 
development program by carrying out two sharp reductions in the number the ADD 
researchers by 1982, which profoundly damaged the ROK’s capability to develop long-
range missiles.198  
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3.4. Chapter Conclusion 
 
The theory of this research expects to find co-variation between the level of a 
regional state’s security concern and the scope of its efforts to increase domestic 
contribution to an autonomous defense capability. Accordingly, a regional state is 
hypothesized to introduce huge-scale security-promoting drives when it is highly 
concerned about security in response to its patron’s retrenchment. This research also 
suggests the existence of co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security 
concern and the level of its commitment to the pursuit of military policies against the 
patron’s strategic interests. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that a regional state is strongly 
committed to the pursuit of military policies against the patron’s strategic interests when 
it is highly concerned about security.  
This chapter finds that the Nixon administration’s force withdrawal made the ROK 
leadership highly skeptical of the US security commitment. First, South Korea regarded 
the US force reduction plan as the weakening of the superpower’s commitment to Korea. 
Second, the Nixon administration’s redeployment of the 2nd Division away from the 
DMZ led to the leadership’s belief that US would not rescue the ROK if North Korea 
invaded again. Third, Washington’s mixed signals about the force reduction plan led to 
the leadership’s loss of confidence in the patron’s reliability. Fourth, South Korea came to 
be skeptical of the US reliability as a result of the Nixon administration’s ambiguity and 
mixed signals about its military assistance for the modernization of the ROK forces. Last, 
the ROK’s skepticism was deepened by the suspicion that Washington would reduce the 
US forces in Korea even further.  
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South Korea was also concerned about North Korea’s revisionist behaviors. A series 
of the adversary’s provocations in 1968 and the Johnson administration’s conciliatory 
policy made the ROC leadership believe that the superpower’s policy would lead North 
Korea to continue its revisionist behaviors. This belief led to the notion that the US force 
reduction policy would inevitably lead to the adversary’s initiating a revisionist war.  
The case study also finds that the ROK’s threat perception of North Korea as a 
revisionist power did not change even under the development of détente in the Korean 
peninsula. Because of this threat perception, the ROK leadership believed that North 
Korea would even make use of the détente for its revisionist purpose. In addition, South 
Korea believed that the Sino-American rapprochement would negatively affect the ROK 
security. It was also concerned that the rapprochement would lead to further reduction of 
the US forces from Korea.  
To summarize, the ROK leadership’s assessment of threats was filtered through its 
perception of the US reliability. The leadership experienced high levels of threat from 
North Korea and this threat perception was magnified by its skepticism of the patron’s 
commitment. Consequently, the level of the ROK’s security concern was substantially 
high. According to the theory of this research, South Korea was hypothesized to make all-
out efforts to promote domestic contribution to autonomous defense capability. The case 
study supports this hypothesis.  
To begin with, the case study finds that the existence of strong leadership was 
behind the ROK government’s efforts to promote domestic contribution to autonomous 
defense capability. President Park’s guidance was apparently the driving force behind the 
development of defense industry. Park and his core policymakers also took initiative in 
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placing the heavy industrialization, which was the state’s mobilization strategy to produce 
required defense materials through the development of targeted strategic industries. They 
decided which industries should be developed and introduced various policy instruments 
to financially support the development of the targeted strategic industries.  
The imperative of security also made the ROK leadership introduce policy 
instruments to gain rapid access to domestic resources. For this purpose, the ROK 
government introduced the strategy of extraction to directly convert domestic financial 
resources into the state’s defense capability. This included the compulsory National 
Defense Tax in 1975 and the National Investment Fund in 1973. These policy instruments 
facilitated South Korea’s development of heavy industrialization projects as well as the 
increase in the overall defense capabilities of the ROK regular forces. In addition, the 
ROK’s defense spending focused on increase in the state’s defense capability. 
 The imperative of establishing autonomous defense capability required that the 
ROK leadership rapidly increase the development of the state’s defense industry. This 
explains why the ROK government depended not only upon state-owned enterprises but 
also on big business in domestic market to increase in increasing defense capabilities. 
The urgency of security made ROK leadership prioritize security over economic 
rationale. Thus the ROK policymakers constrained market rationality in favor of 
promoting the targeted strategic industries, harnessing domestic and international market 
forces where necessary for security purposes. As a result, during the 1970s, the state’s 
defense industry and was almost completely insulated from market pressure and even 
insured from failure through government subsides. 
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Finally, the ROK leadership established a societal base of autonomous defense 
capability. This began with the introduction of the Saemaŭl Movement, which justified 
the state’s push for the heavy industrialization. It also introduced a series of political 
measures to secure societal support for the industrialization project. Furthermore, the 
establishment of the Yushin system made it possible for the ROK regime to maximize its 
capacity to penetrate into domestic society. Thus the ROK leadership was able to silence 
social tension inherent in the state’s rapid industrialization. As a result of these domestic 
drives, the ROK regime established a garrison state in South Korea, strengthening 
government control over domestic society. 
It is also hypothesized that South Korea was strongly committed to the pursuit of 
military policies against the strategic interests of the United States. This hypothesis is 
supported by this case study. The ROK government tried to develop a missile capability, 
even beyond the scope allowed by the United State. This military behavior was against 
the US strategic interests to establish the status-quo in the Korean peninsula. The ROK 
leadership also developed an independent nuclear weapon capability, which evidently 
jeopardized the superpower’s interests of nonproliferation. The imperative of security 
was the driving force of the ROK’s military behaviors against the patron’s strategic 
interests. According to the theory of this research, they can be characterized as the ROK 
leadership’s strategy to pressure upon the United States to reverse its objectionable 
strategic posture in East Asia. The leadership was so much committed to the pursuit of 
missile and nuclear weapons programs that it was unwilling to abandon them even under 
Washington’s pressure.
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4.1.1. The Taiwan Issue between Washington and Beijing 
 
After losing the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalist 
Party Kuomintang retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949 and established the Republic 
of China (ROC).1 In his stead, Mao Zedong and his Chinese Community Party (CCP) 
seized power over mainland China and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
October 1949. Following the experience that the US military retrenchment from South 
Korea led to the communist invasion of South Korea in 1950, Washington decided to 
secure Taiwan from invasion by communist China. This led to the signing of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China in 1954.  
US could have improved relations with the PRC during the 1950s, as the American 
public had more or less accepted the CCP’s control over mainland China.2 But a central 
problem was that Washington could not weaken the US commitment to Taiwan. 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” Doctrine, which emphasized the notion of nuclear deterrence, 
In this case study, the term the ROC and Taiwan are used interchangeably for stylistic purposes. But the 
present study also uses the term Taiwan to refer to the island of Taiwan, if necessary. 
Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 194.  
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made the US’s reputation for resolve even more central to its strategy. Accordingly, 
Taiwan became important to the US’s grand strategy during the early stages of the Cold 
War confrontation in East Asia. The US commitment to Taiwan, coupled with communist 
China’s strategy of confrontation, led to a constant dispute between Washington and 
Beijing until the Nixon administration changed the direction of US policy toward 
communist China.3 
Nixon built his career as a politician by advocating the US security commitment to 
Taiwan.4 However, this commitment dampened as he gained more foreign policy 
experience. He came to disagree with Chiang Kai-shek when the ROC president argued 
that the only way to defeat the Communist threats was with bullets. Indeed, Nixon 
remarked, “Chiang was a friend and unquestionably one of the giants of the twentieth 
century. I wondered whether he might be right, but my pragmatic analysis told me he was 
wrong.”5 He also reoriented his commitment to the Cold War confrontation. This laid the 
basis for Nixon’s Foreign Affairs article in 1967 calling for an end to China’s isolation.6  
Nixon’s strategy in East Asia was to minimize conflict with Beijing in order to better 
exploit Sino-Soviet tensions. However, he was not prepared to sacrifice Taiwan because 
Ibid., 195.
4 He began his career in the late 1940s attacking Truman’s abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek and his anti-
Communist Nationalists. In addition, while serving as the vice president, Nixon had frequent contact with 
the Nationalist leaders, communicating with them on both ideological and strategic levels. During his 
presidential campaign against John F. Kennedy, he also expressed commitment to the protection of the 
ROC’s seat in the United Nations. See John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and 
American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 266; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 
“Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China,” The Journal of American History 92, no.1 
(2005): 116-17. 
Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 282. 
Richard M. Nixon, “Asia after Vietnam.” Foreign Affairs 46, no.1 (1967): 111-25. 
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US credibility as a security guarantee weighed heavily in his China policy.7 He was 
convinced that the abandoning Taiwan would deeply damage the United States’ 
credibility in the eyes of its regional allies in East Asia. In addition, he believed that 
sacrificing Taiwan was not necessary to achieve the normalization of relations with the 
PRC, because he was convinced that Beijing was not deeply concerned with Taiwan. 
Nixon acknowledged that Beijing would push Washington to recognize the PRC’s 
sovereignty over Taiwan and withdraw US military protection from the island. But he 
also believed that the US-PRC cooperation in dealing with the Soviet Union could lead to 
agreement on the Taiwan issues that would be acceptable to the United States.8  
Following the president’s initiative in reorienting US policy toward China, Kissinger 
introduced the notion of the strategic triangle among the US, the USSR, and the PRC. As 
a national security advisor to the president, he thought that the United States could play 
the PRC and the Soviet Union each against the other.9 By giving importance to Beijing 
in the US global strategy, however, Kissinger simply dismissed Taiwan as 
inconsequential.10 Thus, Kissinger’s approach raised the question of whether Taiwan 
would be sacrificed on the altar of great-power politics. 
Nixon and Kissinger did not realize the importance the PRC leadership attached to 
the issue of Taiwan. Rather they regarded Taiwan as merely one of several impediments 
in the relationship between China and the United States.11 However, the communist 
 Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 265. 
Ibid.
Lowell Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics 3, 
no. 4 (1981): 485-515.
Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable,” 117. 
11 Nixon and Kissinger believed that the main issues between the US and the PRC were the following. 
First, the Nixon administration assumed that the main challenge for both sides would be to manage and 
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leadership made it known from the first tentative contacts in 1970 that the recovery of its 
sovereignty over Taiwan should be a precondition for any improvement of relations 
between Washington and Beijing.12 Nixon believed that Beijing’s claim over Taiwan was 
simply ritual, targeted at protecting the policy of opening relationship with America from 
criticism within the Chinese leadership.13  
When Kissinger paid a secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, he realized that the PRC 
leadership was still preoccupied with Taiwan.14 Zhou En-lai, the PRC premier, indicated 
that there would be no reconciliation without settlement on Taiwan. He asserted without 
hesitation that “The U.S. must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government 
in China and that Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must 
be restored to the motherland.” Zhou also demanded withdrawal of the US military forces 
and facilities from Taiwan within a limited period.15 To justify such demands, he referred 
to Dean Acheson’s White Paper, which mentioned that “It was the Chinese people 
themselves who won their own liberation, who liberated our motherland, and drove away 
the reactionary rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique.” He also referred to the Truman 
administration’s statement that “It had no territorial ambitions regarding Taiwan or any 
improve their relationship within the context of their mutual fear of the Soviet Union. Second, Nixon and 
Kissinger regarded Vietnam as an obstacle to a better relationship between the US and China but as one that 
was in the process of being removed. See Margaret Macmillan. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed 
the World (New York: Random House, 2007), 245-47. 
Ibid, 256. 
Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 270.
For Beijing, the Taiwan issue involved the completion of China’s “national liberation.” It is also 
significant in terms of communist China’s domestic politics because Taiwan was a core issue that had 
fueled Chinese patriotism. In this respect, the communist leadership feared that Washington would ask 
Beijing to make concessions on the Taiwan issue. See Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 269. 
FRUS China 1969-1972, 368-69.  
145 
other Chinese territories,” and that “It wouldn’t interfere in China’s internal affairs and 
would leave the Chinese people to settle internal questions.”16 
In response, Kissinger promised that the US would set a firm timetable to remove 
two-thirds of its forces from Taiwan, which were there only because of the Vietnam War, 
once the US had found a way to make peace in Vietnam. He also indicated that the other 
third of the forces would be removed as relations between US and China improved.17 On 
the other hand, he rejected Zhou’s demand that US renounce ties with Taiwan. He also 
rejected the premier’s assertion that the purpose of Nixon’s visit to China should be to 
discuss the Taiwan issue as a prelude to normalization of relations.18  
As Kissinger recalled, the series of meetings during his visit to Beijing was 
dominated by “the tension between the Chinese thrust for clarity and ours for ambiguity” 
regarding Taiwan.19 Chou sought clarity, while Kissinger tried to remain ambiguous 
regarding the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.20 Kissinger was vague about 
the fate of the US-Taiwan defense treaty, remaining tied to the formalities of a decaying 
US-Taiwan mutual security treaty, which was still indispensable to Taiwan.21  
Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 was a chance for Washington and Beijing to 
confirm the understanding reached by Kissinger and Zhou during the previous year. As 
the president put it, “Taiwan was the touchstone for both sides” during his meetings with 
the Chinese leaders. Nixon was “committed to Taiwan’s right to exist as an independent 
Ibid., 366.
Ibid., 369.
Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 270-71.
FRUS China 1969-1972, 536.
Macmillan, Nixon and Mao, 259.
Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable,” 134.
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nation,” while the Chinese leaders “were equally determined to use the communique to 
assert their unequivocal claim to the island.”22 Beijing pushed for U.S. commitment to 
total and unconditional withdrawal of its forces from the island. In response, Nixon 
insisted on linking the withdrawal of forces to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
problem.23  
The two sides issued the Shanghai Communique, in which they agreed that “The 
United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain 
there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States 
Government does not challenge that position; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan 
question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and 
states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U.S. troops and 
military installations from Taiwan.”24 This statement suggests that Washington promised 
not to challenge Beijing’s position that Taiwan was a part of China and not to support 
Taiwan’s independence. From Washington’s perspective, the key compromise on Taiwan 
was the US promise to withdraw all of its military forces and installations from the island 
in return for Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. But the 
compromise was formulated in such a way that both sides avoided addressing in specific 
terms the termination of the US security commitment to Taiwan. Beijing did not press 
Washington on the termination of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and the US did 
Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 570.
Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 272-73.
FRUS China 1969-1972, 569.
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4.1.2. Taiwan’s Assessment of US Reliability 
 
The ROC leadership expressed doubts about the reliability of the US security 
commitment to Taiwan. In his memoir, James Shen, who served as the ROC’s last 
ambassador to the United States, mentioned three points to support his argument that 
Washington betrayed Taiwan during the 1970s.26 First, he maintained that Washington 
did not consult with Taiwan in advance regarding the reorientation in US policy toward 
communist China. Second, he pointed out that the US gave up its security commitment to 
Taiwan and decided to terminate the mutual defense treaty between the US and Taiwan. 
Third, he maintained that Washington did not do all it could do, or all it had promised to 
do, to keep the ROC’s representation in the UN. The three points help to interpret how 
the ROC leadership evaluated the patron reliability.  
Washington did have reasons not to inform the ROC of the intentions and plans in its 
new China policy. As Kissinger remarked, “It is a tragedy that it has to happen to Chiang 
[Kai-shek] at the end of his life. But we have to be cold about it.”27 An internal 
document explained the US position in detail: “Telling the ROC frankly about our long-
term plans has both advantages and disadvantages. By informing Premier Chiang Ching-
Normalization of U.S.-PRC Relations and the Future of Taiwan,” Undated, China and the United States 
1960-1998.
James C. H. Shen, The U.S. & Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis 
Books, 1984). 
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kuo [son and successor of Chiang Kai-shek] we could give him time to make internal 
adjustments on Taiwan so that his own position is not endangered, and stability is not 
undermined, when we make our move. Also, we would have an opportunity to influence 
the ROC’s reaction. On the other hand, this would be risky because the ROC could 
decide to take countermeasures to try to forestall what we plan to do. They could leak our 
intentions publicly to try to stimulate a debate within the U.S. Government and public.”28 
Washington’s ambiguity, however, led the ROC to suspect that questions related to 
Taiwan were being discussed behind its back.29  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek and his core policy advisers 
believed that the United States had no alternative but to support the ROC. At the same 
time, they came to fear that Washington might abandon Taiwan or compel its leadership 
to adopt conciliatory policies toward China.30 Taiwan reiterated its opposition to all 
official contact between Washington and Beijing, by way of official statements and 
diplomatic protest. In particular, Taiwan criticized the voices calling for the US to 
reorient its policy of containing communist China.31  
In this respect, it was no wonder that Taipei was alarmed by the first tentative 
contact between the US and the PRC, the February 1970 Warsaw meeting. In particular, 
what concerned the ROC leadership about the meeting was the fact that Washington did 
not inform Taipei in advance of what the US planned to discuss at its talks with the PRC. 
Moreover, Washington gave only evasive replies when ROC representatives subsequently 
People’s Republic of China,” Undated, China and the United States 1960-1998.  




asked for a briefing on the talks. The ROC response suggests that what concerned Taiwan 
about US reliability as a security provider was the secrecy in the Nixon administration’s 
policy toward China. This secrecy resulted in lack of prior consultation between 
Washington and Taipei, thus depriving the ROC leadership of a clear sense of the US 
commitment to Taiwan.32  
After the Warsaw meeting, Taiwan’s primary concern was whether Washington was 
prepared to make any concessions to Beijing on Taiwan in order to improve relations 
with China. To gauge Nixon’s intentions on Taiwan in the context of the new China 
policy, Chiang Ching-kuo visited Washington in April 1970. He asked whether 
Washington intended to reach some sort of nonaggression agreement or peaceful 
coexistence with Beijing. Such an agreement, he believed, would be tantamount to 
Washington’s recognizing Beijing as the legitimate government of the Chinese mainland. 
He also wanted to know whether Washington still intended to support Taiwan in the event 
of another attack from the PRC.33  
After the trip to Washington, however, Chiang came to believe that relations 
between the United States and Taiwan would soon change decisively. He was certain that 
Nixon would undermine the US’s commitment to recognizing the ROC as the only 
legitimate government of China, fatally challenging its international status, and thereby 
drastically weakening the legitimacy of the Chinese Nationalist Party in Taiwan.34  
 
As Ralph Clough recalled, “We kept Chiang Kai-shek generally informed, but, of course, he wasn’t 
confident that we were telling him everything.” Quoted in Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable,” 118.
Shen, The U.S. & Free China, 48-54,
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(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 296-300.
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Taiwan’s concern about US reliability was also expressed in James Shen’s 
conversations with US policymakers. In his first meeting with Nixon, Shen was told that 
the US would continue to honor its obligation under the mutual defense treaty and would 
continue to support the ROC’s membership in the UN.35 But he soon learned of 
Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, shortly after assuming his post as the 
ROC ambassador to the United States. He lodged a strong protest and expressed profound 
regret, describing the US approach toward the PRC as “hardly be described as a friendly 
act.”36 He also stressed how “indignant,” “bewildered, and “shocked” Taiwan was by the 
US’s opening to Communist China. Then he asked, “Where is all this going to end?”37 
This statement pointed to Taiwan’s underlying fear of abandonment by the US.  
After Nixon’s visit to Beijing, Shen raised three points about the Shanghai 
Communique to the US president.38 First, he criticized the Communique for omitting any 
reference to the US defense commitment to Taiwan. Second, he asked why the US said 
that it would not challenge Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Third, he asked 
about the Communique’s reference to the withdrawal of US forces and military 
installations from Taiwan. Later, Shen also raised the question of how the US would 
maintain the defense treaty with Taiwan once it recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate 
government of China.39 Behind the question lay the fear that recognition of the PRC as 
the sole legal government of China would lead to the withdrawal of legal recognition of 
the ROC government in Taiwan, which would eventually lead to the automatic lapse of 
Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 268.
FRUS China 1969-1972, 456.
Shen, The U.S. & Free China, 72.
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the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.40 These question altogether show that the ROC 
leadership was deeply suspicious that Nixon and Kissinger had sacrificed Taiwan on the 




4.1.3. Taiwan’s Expulsion from the United Nations 
 
 The ROC’s representation of China in the UN was another issue that Washington 
needed to deal with, even though it was not a key matter of contention between 
Washington and Beijing. Throughout the 1950s, the US had been able to mobilize a 
majority in the UN General Assembly to prevent any challenge of the ROC’s membership 
in the UN. But the entry of several newly independent nations into the UN during the 
1960s resulted in a steady increase in pressure for the UN to admit the PRC. In dealing 
with this situation, the Nixon administration suggested a dual-representation formula that 
would place both the PRC and the ROC in the UN.41 But Washington also feared that the 
dual representation plan might induce Beijing to abort the incipient Sino-American 
rapprochement.42 
As a founding member of the United Nations, the ROC clung to the doctrine that its 
presence in the General Assembly and the Security Council must remain inseparable and 
indivisible. Thus, it could not accommodate the realities of the PRC’s growing 
international prominence. Nor did Taipei cooperate with Washington on the outcome of 
Normalization of U.S.-PRC Relations and the Future of Taiwan,” Undated, China and the United States 
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the 1971 debate in the General Assembly on who should represent China in the United 
Nation.43 The UN General Assembly ended up passing the Albanian resolution, which 
recognized the PRC as the only lawful representative of China to the UN. As a result of 
this decision in October 1971, the PRC took over Taiwan’s membership in the UN, 
expelling it from the organization. 
In his memoir, Shen referred to the April 1971 talks between Chiang Kai-shek and 
Robert D. Murphy, a personal representative to President Nixon, to support his argument 
that Washington did not do all it had promised to keep the ROC in the UN.44 Murphy 
proposed that both the PRC and the ROC have seats in the UN General Assembly and 
that the latter maintain China’s seat in the Security Council. Chiang agreed to the 
proposal on the condition that the US promise not to sponsor the PRC’s admittance to the 
UN and that it attempt to rally a majority against admitting the PRC to the UN.45 Shen 
reiterated Chiang’s demand when he traveled to Washington to become the ROC’s 
ambassador to the United States. During the 1971 UN debate, however, Washington did 
not explicitly suggest whether the ROC or the PRC should hold China’s permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council. Rather, the Nixon administration gave the impression that it 
was prepared to allow this question to be decided by the UN General Assembly. Taipei 
regarded this position as a betrayal of the US pledge conveyed during the Murphy-
Chiang talks.46  
Ibid., 259-62.
Shen, The U.S. & Free China, 64. 
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To be sure, the imperative of normalizing relations with the PRC caused Washington 
to abstain from using all leverage to influence the 1971 UN debate on the membership of 
the two Chinas.47 Faced with US hesitance, Taiwan came to believe that the US-PRC 
rapprochement severely undermined the ROC’s battle to maintain its membership in the 
UN. In this respect, Shen criticized Kissinger’s presence in Beijing in October 1971 for a 
second round of discussions with the communist leadership, just when the UN General 
Assembly was debating the ROC’s membership in the UN.48 Taipei believed that 
Washington defaulted on its promise to use US veto power to fight communist China’s 
representation in the UN. It also believed that Washington did not try enough to modify 
the process of US-PRC rapprochement to gain an advantage for the ROC in the debate 




4.1.4. Taiwan’s Assessment of the PRC’s Threats 
 
This study argues that a state’s security concern is a function of its assessment of its 
patron’s reliability and of military threats from its adversaries. The previous section 
suggests that ROC leadership, faced with the developing rapprochement between 
Washington and Beijing and the ROC’s possible expulsion from the United Nations, 
came to be skeptical of US reliability. So the next question is how Taiwan assessed the 
PRC’s threats during the 1970s.  
Regarding this point, see Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, Remaking China Policy: U.S.-
China Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
15-6. 
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Ibid., 248-63.
154 
The development of Sino-American rapprochement caused concern among the ROC 
leadership that Beijing “would aim its major efforts at extracting U.S. concessions on 
Taiwan.”50 In addition, the declining US support for South Vietnam caused Taiwan to 
believe that it would be compromised next. As Shen remarked, “The betrayal of South 
Vietnam gave the Republic of China a breathing spell. People high in [the] U.S. 
government were overheard to say that ‘Selling one ally down the river was quite enough 
for one year without abandoning another – the Republic of China.’”51 The declining 
belief in US reliability led to the widespread fear that the US intended to achieve a 
“decent interval” between the termination of the US-Taiwan defense treaty and the 
eventual conquest of Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China.52 Behind 
the fear was the threat that communist China would use the Sino-American 
rapprochement as an opportunity to realize its revisionist purpose. 
The development of Sino-American rapprochement led the PRC leadership to 
advance the notion of Taiwan’s “liberation” by mainland China. As Washington assessed, 
it was Beijing’s anticipation of rapid Sino-US normalization that caused the PRC to 
launch a peace offensive toward Taiwan. Beijing tried to induce talks with Taipei and 
initiate a process whereby peaceful reunification could be achieved. However, the 
communist leadership was pessimistic about the prospects for normalization, leading the 
PRC to overtly express its readiness to liberate Taiwan militarily from the ruling 
Kuomintang regime. As a result, Beijing introduced a harder line toward Taiwan.53 
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US Department of State. “Peking’s Hard Line on Taiwan,” 4 October 1976, China and the United States 
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Thus, a remaining issue was whether Beijing would try to incorporate Taiwan using 
military force. Washington’s assessment was that PRC leadership would not try to 
achieve its aspiration for political dominance in Asia by military conquest. While 
recognizing the PRC’s ability to launch a major arms attack against any of its neighbors, 
US policymakers did not find any evidence of the PRC’s intent to expand its borders or 
pursue it objectives by military might.54 Rather, Washington concluded that Beijing 
would find it difficult to introduce an offensive military strategy because of the PRC 
leadership’s awareness of the state’s vulnerability, the presence of a defense-oriented 
doctrine, and the limited technical basis for the development of offensive military 
capabilities.55 Furthermore, US policymakers advanced the argument that the Sino-
Soviet confrontation would make it difficult for the PRC leadership to allocate resources 
toward offensive capabilities.56 The US assessment suggests that Washington was 
skeptical that the PRC would introduce an offensive strategy to take over Taiwan 
militarily.  
It should be noted that ROC leadership came to agree with Washington’s assessment 
that Sino-Soviet confrontation would constrain China from pursuing an offensive military 
campaign against Taiwan. For example, Shen said that he did not find the absence of the 
PRC’s military operation against Taiwan “unduly surprising, with the Chinese 
Communists having the Russians on their back.”57 He reiterated this agreement by 
saying that “Peking would not be able to pull off such a military campaign, particularly in 
FRUS China 1969-1972, 58.
Ibid., 1017-23.
FRUS China 1973-1976, Document. 88. 
FRUS China 1969-1972, 590. 
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[the] light of Soviet pressure from the north.”58 In addition, the ROC leadership, while 
accepting the inevitability of a growing superiority of the PRC’s military capability and 
the reduction in the level of US military presence in Taiwan, concluded that the PRC 
would expend its efforts in maintaining détente with the US rather than pursuing the 
assimilation of the ROC.59  
The ROC leadership’s concern about the PRC’s strategy to isolate Taiwan led it to 
emphasize the importance of establishing its viability for survival. Considering the 
psychological importance the ROC leadership attached to UN membership, it was no 
wonder Taiwan believed that its expulsion from the organization undermined its 
international status and prospects for survival.60 As the ROC’s Vice Foreign Minister 
Yang Hsi-kun pointed out, withdrawal from UN would mean “eventual political suicide” 
for Taiwan, because “The increasing isolation that the Chinese Communists can force on 
the GRC from their improved position within the UN will mean the rapidly increasing 
besiegement and eventual strangulation of the GROC [Government of the Republic of 
China] unless drastic change is undertaken immediately.”61  
The examination of the ROC’s threat assessment suggests that Taiwan’ security 
arrangement was of a different nature from that of South Korea. The case study of South 
Korea shows that the South Korean leadership continued to be concerned about the 
revisionist military strategy of North Korea as well as the reliability of the US security 
commitment. This explains why the level of the ROC’s security concern was 
Ibid., 830.
US National Security Council, NSSM 212: U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China,” 12 
November 1974, China and the United States 1960-1998.
FRUS China 1969-1972, 351.
Ibid., 599.
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substantially high. In comparison, Taiwan’s assessment of the PRC’s threats shows that it 
was not concerned about military threats from mainland China, but it still doubted the 
reliability of the US security commitment to Taiwan. In this respect, it can be said that the 
ROC was relatively less concerned about security than South Korea.  
The comparison between South Korea and Taiwan suggests that the two states differ 
in terms of their respective state leaderships’ preference for short-term military 
preparedness over relatively longer-term objectives, such as economic growth and 
political stability.62 In the case of South Korea, the leadership’s belief about the 
imminence of military threats from North Korea led it to first maximize the state’s 
military security in the short term, even though doing so had negative long-term 
repercussion for the state’s other objectives. In comparison, the absence of direct military 
threats from communist China suggests that the ROC leadership was not under pressure 
to prioritize short-term military preparedness over the state’s relatively longer-term 
objectives. Rather, it can be argued that the emphasis on sustainability led the ROC 
leadership to try to achieve Taiwan’s military preparedness and other state objectives in a 
balanced way.63  
This point refers to Brooks’ criticism of the neorealism regarding the “degree to which states favor 
immediate military preparedness over” their relatively longer-term objectives. While criticizing this 
neorealist viewpoint that military preparedness always trumps other, longer-term objectives, he suggests 
that one needs to examine the nature of a state’s preference in studying its decision to choose short-term 
military preparedness over other objectives. This leads to the suggestion that, given the absence of 
immediate security competition, rational policymakers may try to balance between immediate military 
preparedness and longer-term objectives. See Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” 446-53. 
63 In this respect, US policymakers assessed that Taiwan’s economic growth and political stability made it 
extremely difficult for Beijing to assimilate Taiwan by political means. See US Department of State, 
“Preparation for Secretary’s Visit,” 6 October 1973, China and the United States 1960-1998; US 
Department of State, “Taiwan in US-PRC Relations,” 23 October 1973, China and the United States 1960-
1998.
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4.2.1. Development of the Defense Industry in Taiwan 
 
The Nixon administration’s military retrenchment in the periphery of China, coupled 
with the decline in US military equipment grants to Taiwan, posed a question of national 
security for the ROC leadership. The Nixon administration continued to provide Taiwan 
with a reliable and adequate supply of military assistance for its security.64 But the Sino-
American rapprochement led Taiwan to feel “apprehension about what the future might 
hold that led to the search for alternatives” to the US military protection of Taiwan.65 
This was the background against which the ROC leadership introduced domestic drives 
for an autonomous defensive capability.  
The ROC leadership’s motive behind the development of Taiwan’s defense industry 
was providing for its own security. During the 1950s, the ROC government was left with 
only limited weapon production capabilities. Thus Taiwan largely depended upon the US 
air and naval forces for defense.66 Following the termination of US economic assistance 
in 1965, the ROC government started to establish its own defense-industrial base.67 
However, the ROC leadership did not make a serious attempt to expand the state’s 
defense industry until the late 1960s, because of the financial burdens and the reluctance 
of the Kuomintang leadership to believe that their stay on the island was permanent.68  
US National Security Council, NSSM 212: U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China,” 12 
November 1974, China and the United States 1960-1998.
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In particular, the Kuomintang’s commitment to keeping a large contingent of ground 
forces prevented Taiwan from developing a viable defense industry. The presence of a 
large ground force represented the ROC leadership’s ambition to retake the Chinese 
mainland militarily.69 President Chiang Kai-shek was at the core of the group that 
championed the dream of a triumphant return to mainland China.70 As the Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces, Chiang was the only apparent link between the state and the 
military. This meant that the government lacked any authority for determining 
expenditure on the ground forces.71   
The absence of institutional constraint led the ROC government to unnecessarily 
allocate a huge portion of national budget to the maintenance of ground forces. For 
example, more than 90 percent of the central government’s budget was consumed by 
military expenditure in 1950. This declined by only ten per cent during the early 1950s. 
As a result, by the end of the decade, Taiwan’s military burden became one of the largest 
outside the Communist bloc. The Kuomintang regime tried to increase military 
expenditure even further during the 1960s.72  
However, the offensive strategy could no longer be sustained after the Kuomintang 
regime’s last unsuccessful attempt in 1967 to enlist Washington’s support for an attack 
against the mainland. The ROC leadership did not have any choice but to accept the 
inevitable budgetary realities of financing a large conventional ground force with 
University, 1993), 358. 
Clough, Island China, 105.
Cha, “Powerplay,” 169. 
Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects (New York: Routledge, 2006), 91.  
Phillips, The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies, 92-5.
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diminishing resources.73 In addition, US retrenchment posed a question of national 
security and demanded an alternative to the US military protection. As a result, the ROC 
government increased an indigenous capacity for defense material production. Taiwan’s 
defense industry matured to such an extent that, by 1980, it was estimated to be able to 
produce most defense materials, which included ammunition, combat aircraft, military 
vehicles, modern fighter aircraft, overhauling warships, tactical communication 
equipment, air-to-air missiles, and surface-to-surface missiles.74 
To begin with, US licensing arrangements helped Taiwan develop the capability for 
weapons production for ground forces.75 With US sponsorship, the ROC government 
developed the capability to produce M-14 and M-16 rifles, M-60 machines guns, four 
calibers of mortars, and two types of recoilless rifles. Taiwan also developed capacity for 
artillery production, which led to the production of 125 mm multiple-tube rocket 
launchers, 3.5 inch and 66mm rocket launchers, and 100mm and 155 mm howitzers.  
The ROC government also made efforts to increase indigenous capacity for naval 
production.76 In the early 1970s, Taiwan built 30-ton patron boats, which were the first 
navel craft produced indigenously. Then, in 1975, the ROC government signed a contract 
with Tacoma Boat, a US defense industry, to produce a series of Multi-Mission Patrol 
Ships under the aegis of China Shipbuilding, a state-owned enterprise of Taiwan. Taiwan 
also contracted with Westinghouse to produce frigates.  
Ibid., 278.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI 
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The development of ROC’s capacity for aircraft production was also done primarily 
through the government’s licensed production arrangement with US defense industries. 
For example, Taiwan signed a licensed agreement with Bell Helicopter Company in 1969 
to jointly manufacture military helicopters. According to this offset agreement, Taiwan 
built a factory to co-produce the military helicopters.77 Offset arrangements between the 
ROC government and US defense industries grew so rapidly throughout the 1970s that, 
by the mid-1970s, Taiwan was able to shift from direct import of defense materials to 
licensed production of much of its military equipment.78 Furthermore, Taiwan produced 
two-thirds of its defense materials by the end of the 1970s, as a result of the government’s 
efforts to accelerate import substitution.79 
The ROC’s efforts to produce aircraft should be noted. According to the Nixon 
administration’s military retrenchment in Taiwan, Washington decided to withdraw two 
squadrons of F-4 fighters, the most significant part of the US forces on Taiwan, by the 
end of 1974.80 This stimulated the ROC government to sign an agreement with Northrup 
Grumman for a joint venture production of the F-5E Tiger II fighter.81 The F-5E program 
was the “centerpiece of Taiwan’s defense industrialization efforts,” and was “certainly its 
most significant military project,” because it provided an important edge of superiority to 
the PRC fighters, at least from a qualitative standpoint.82 
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1985), 99.  
SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook (Taylor & Francis, 1975), 197. 
James A. Gregor, "Republic of China." in Arms Production in Developing Countries, ed. James E. Katz 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), 312.
FRUS China 1973-1976, 466-67. 
Gregor, “Republic of China,” 307.
Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, 54.
162 
4.2.2. Establishment of a Centralized Decision-Making Process 
 
The ROC government’s efforts to promote a domestic contribution to an 
autonomous defensive capability began with the state’s establishment of a highly 
centralized decision-making process to orchestrate the process. The ROC government 
came to recognize that economic and security policy were becoming increasingly 
interdependent. As a result, the decision-making process was arranged according to the 
following line of reasoning:  
 
Decisions in matters of economic development must … … be analyzed 
simultaneously for their contribution to the military security of the state. At the same 
time, military decisions whether or not to produce a given weapon system 
indigenously, to purchase it ready-made, or to forgo it altogether must be looked at 
from the point of view of their contribution to the economic health of the state.83  
 
Taiwan established the state’s decision-making structure in such a way as to 
encompass an economic or even social agenda in establishing defensive capability. The 
National Security Council (NSC), which was established in 1967, took the primary role 
in orchestrating the overall process. The NSC was a consultative body made up of the 
Kuomintang regime’s military, political, and administrative elites and became the de 
facto governing body, subordinating the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches 
along with other state bodies. Under President Chiang’s initiative, the NSC was able to 
circumvent bureaucratic and sectoral rivalries within the decision process and achieve an 
integrated agenda for the development of defense capabilities. As a result, any policy 
 Ibid., 87.
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objectives related to developing the state’s indigenous defense capabilities fell within the 
NSC’s purview.84  
In addition, between 1969 and 1972, the ROC government created a series of ad hoc 
committees to formulate and execute policy according to the NSC’s guidelines. These 
committees included the Budget Inquiry Committee; the Commission on Taxation 
Reform; the Financial, Economic and Monetary Conference (FEMC); and the Council of 
International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD). The committees were 
responsible for directing domestic resources toward the establishment of Taiwan’s 
autonomous defensive capability during the 1970s. In particular, the FEMC became the 
state’s highest economic policymaking agency, whose task was to unify economic and 
financial policy to coordinate state-led projects to develop strategic industries.85  
Chiang Kai-shek took the initiative in organizing the national security apparatus. In 
June 1969, he appointed his son Chiang Ching-kuo to the office of Vice-Premier in 
charge of the CIECD, the FEMC, and the Budget Inquiry Committee. Then he promoted 
Chiang Ching-kuo to the position of state Premier in 1971, giving him formal authority to 
run the government. Chiang Ching-kuo immediately directed the cabinet to prepare a 
plan for massive investments to strengthen the country both economically and militarily. 
This resulted in the creation of Ten Major Construction Projects, which became the 
centerpiece of the government’s drive for heavy industrialization, which was targeted to 
establish an industrial basis of the state’s defensive capability.86 
Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 109-10. 
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4.2.3. Military Expenditure and Taxation 
 
During the 1970s, Taiwan had the greatest share of its budget allocated to defense of 
any country, second only to Israel. It was also surpassed only by Israel and Iraq in the 
ratio of GNP allocated to military expenditure.87 As Table 4-1 shows, the level of the 
ROC’s defense expenditure as a share of the state’s GDP during the 1970s was notably 
higher than those of South Korea and Japan. But it should be noted that a huge portion of 
Taiwan’s defense expenditure was allocated to the maintenance of a large ground force, 
which represented the Kuomintang regime’s commitment to offensive strategy toward 
mainland China. In this respect, the level of Taiwan’s military expenditure itself may not 
represent the state’s willingness to direct national resources toward the establishment of 
its own defensive capability.88  
Ibid., 285-86.  
88 Another problem is the limited availability of the primary source data, which helps to examine the 
ROC’s military expenditure according to appropriation category.  
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Table 4-1. Military Expenditure of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as a Percentage of 
GDP, 1967-1978.89 
 
Year 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 
Japan 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Korea 4.1 4.2 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.4 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.7 6.4 5.4 
Taiwan 11.2 11.1 9.7 8.8 9.6 9.3 8.4 7.0 6.8 6.6 7.5 7.5 
 
To illustrate the domestic dimension of Taiwan’s security-promoting drives, the 
present study examines how the nature of Taiwan’s threat assessment affected the scope 
of its extraction of domestic resources under the initiative of national security. Extraction 
enables political leaders to gain rapid access to funds from the country’s people; the more 
the state’s leadership assesses that external threats are immediate, the more likely it is to 
depend on extraction of its domestic resources in developing autonomous defense 
capabilities.  
As mentioned in the chapter on Korea, the ROK government introduced several 
policies of extraction to secure a revenue base for the state’s projects for defense 
capabilities, including a compulsory National Defense Tax in 1975 and a National 
Investment Fund in 1973. These policy instruments facilitated South Korea’s 
development of heavy industrialization projects as well the increase in the overall defense 
capabilities of its regular forces. In contrast, given the absence of direct military threats 
from the PRC, Taiwan did not introduce a policy of extraction directly targeted at 
increasing the state’s defense capabilities.  
SIPRI Yearbook, Various Issues. 
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To be sure, the ROK government was able to increase its tax revenue during the 
1970s. This was the result of the state’s tax reform in 1968. The ROC government did 
institute a similar policy in response to the decline of the US military grants during the 
1960s.90 Facing the decrease in US assistance, the government formed the Commission 
on Taxation Reform in March 1968. Empowered with President Chiang’s full authority, 
the commission was authorized to look for measures to improve tax administration, raise 
revenues, and increase the responsiveness of tax collection to increases in private income. 
The Commission’s proposals called for an increase in revenue through an enlargement of 
the tax base, improvements in tax administration, and higher tax rates.  
The tax reform, however, was not targeted primarily at financing the development of 
the ROC’s defensive capability. Rather, as Table 4-2 shows, Taiwan decreased the portion 
of the government’s budget allocated to defense while increasing the portion allocated to 
economic development projects and to the state’s educational sector.91 This suggests that 
the absence of direct military threats from communist China did not put the ROC 
leadership under pressure to prioritize short-term military preparedness over the state’s 
longer-term objectives. Rather, it can be argued that the emphasis on sustainability 
focused the Taiwan government on the education and economic development sectors, 
which represented the state’s long-term objectives.92 
Phillips, The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies, 319-20. 
In comparison, South Korea increased the portion of the government’s budget going to defense 
expenditure during the 1970s.  
92 In this respect, Greene shows that the notion of international economic competitiveness led the 
leadership to emphasize the importance of technical competence and a better-educated labor force. See 
Megan J. Greene, The Origins of Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for 
Modernization (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2008). 
167 
Table 4-2. Allocation of the ROC Government’s Net Expenditures, 1968-1979
 Government 
Budget Total 





































































































4.2.4. The Development of Heavy Industrialization in Taiwan 
 
The establishment of a vigorous economy through the development of heavy 
industry was an important goal of the ROC leadership as early as the late 1950s. Taiwan 
introduced planning measures to initiate heavy industrialization to support long-term 
economic growth. However, the ROC government did not pursue mass-scale heavy 
Phillips, The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies, 324. The unit is millions of New Taiwan 
Dollars. Percentage in each parenthesis is calculated by this author. 
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industrialization at that time because it was reluctant to allocate the necessary resources. 
Opposition also came from the Ministry of Finance, which was concerned about the costs 
involved in heavy industrialization. As a result, the push for heavy industrialization was 
largely shelved until the 1970s.94 At that point, the decline in the US military and 
diplomatic commitment caused the ROC leadership to push for heavy industrialization as 
an alternative to the US industrial base that it had relied upon for Taiwan’s defense.95 
The state’s establishment of an industrial foundation for autonomous defensive 
capability began with the issuance of the Long Range Plan in 1971. The plan called for 
the development of strategic industries with a decisive importance to Taiwan’s defense 
capability. They included shipbuilding, machinery, electrical equipment and steel, and 
plastics and resins.96 This policy response differed somewhat from the state’s response to 
reduced US financial support during the late 1950s. In the latter case, the ROC leadership 
did not emphasize the necessity for becoming independent from the US security 
commitment. In contrast, the decline in the US military and diplomatic commitment 
during the 1970s led the ROC leadership to push for heavy industrialization as an 
alternative to US military protection.97   
As in the case of South Korea, the ROC government introduced several policies to 
financially support the heavy-industrialization project. In doing so, the government 
tightly controlled the state banks dominating Taiwan’s financial system.98 This allowed 
Phillips, The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies, 306.
95 Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, 49. 
96 Kristen Nordhaug, “Development through Want of Security: The Case of Taiwan,” Pacific Focus 7, no.1 
(1997): 144. 
Phillips, The Origins of Taiwan’s Trade and Industrial Policies, 306. 
98 Ibid., 328-32. 
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ROC policymakers to direct the banks toward investing in the targeted strategic 
industries. As a result, Taiwan was able to integrate the state’s industrial and financial 
policies. For example, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) coordinated with the Central Bank 
to look for means to increase capital accumulation, encourage private saving, and funnel 
available financial resources into strategic industries.99 The MOF also introduced a series 
of policies to transform commercial banks into industrial and investment banks, which 
specialized in lending to targeted industries.100  
The ROC government also introduced policy instruments to raise national savings. 
Since both private and public savings were placed into state banks, the government was 
able to directly access these resources to use according to the state’s needs. This suggests 
that the state needed to raise the saving rate, which would lead to an increase in the 
available financial resources allocated toward industrial development. The government’s 
policy, combined with other factors, contributed to Taiwan’s high savings rate, which in 
turn led to an increase in national savings and investment during the 1970s. As a result, 
the ROC’s large-scale investment plan gained momentum from the mid-1970s.101 As 
Table 4-3 shows, the targeted strategic industries gained momentum during the 1970s.  
  
99 Ibid., 341. 
100 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 168. 
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Table 4-3. Output of Products from Strategic Heavy Industries in Taiwan, 1969-1979102 
 










1969 512,116 68,085  117,329 797 
1970 607,016 106,624  217,421 911 
1971 722,215 127,153 19,591 279,711 1,023 
1972 862,161 171,781 22,012 305,405 1,153 
1973 1,072,498 162,399 23,759 341,249 1,284 
1974 1,029,022 137,078 28,915 355,743 1,308 
1975 1,173,540 179,646 31,278 315,089 1,432 
1976 1,733,622 206,843 31,013 456,284 1,650 
1977 1,976,696 297,100 44,272 703,550 1,785 
1978 2,901,398 388,683 77,177 431,130 2,028 
1979 3,449,539 406,997 116,103 382,051 2,189 
 
As in the case of South Korea, the existence of strong leadership facilitated the 
placement of heavy industrialization under the initiative of national security. Thus, the 
success of industrialization in the two states depended to a great extent upon the 
leadership of strongmen, President Park Chung Hee in South Korea and Chiang Ching-
kuo in Taiwan. They decided which industries should be developed and introduced 
various policy instruments to promote the targeted industries, as well as barriers to 
protect them.  
But a different pattern between the states should be also noted. Taiwan did not allow 
privately held conglomerates to partake in the industrialization projects. Instead, ROC 
leadership largely depended upon state-owned enterprise.103 In contrast, the ROK 
government directed domestic big businesses to participate in the development of 
strategic industries during the 1970s. As a result, industrialization in South Korea was 
characterized by a conglomerate-dominated pattern.  
Ibid., 350-351. Unit is in each parenthesis.  
 Ibid., 352. 
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It can be argued that state-society relationships affected the different patterns 
adopted by Taiwan and South Korea in their industrialization policies.104 According to 
this argument, the nature of the "émigré regime" encouraged the Kuomintang government 
to minimize the influence of social forces and to dominate the native Taiwanese. This 
caused the ROC leadership to remain watchful of private businesses, the majority of 
which were owned by Taiwanese natives. This explains why the ROC government did not 
allow them to partake in industrialization projects. In contrast, South Korean leadership 
fostered a few large conglomerates in the domestic market and allied with them after the 
launch of its economic development project in 1961. The existing affiliation led to the 
ROK government’s encouragement of big business to partake in developing strategic 
industries during the 1970s.  
The aforementioned argument, however, disregards the fact that the two states 
commonly introduced their heavy industrialization projects as a security-promoting 
strategy. In this respect, one should consider each state’s assessment of its own security as 
the primary factor explaining its development of heavy industrialization. Thus, while 
acknowledging the state-business relationship as important, the present study focuses on 
security assessment to explain the differences between Taiwan and South Korea.  
As mentioned earlier, the ROC leadership concluded that a military threat from the 
PRC was not imminent. Rather, it was concerned about communist China’s apparent 
attempt to isolate Taiwan from the rest of the world. In addition, the leadership feared a 
104 Yongping Wu, “Rethinking the Taiwanese Developmental State,” The China Quarterly 177, March 
(2004): 91-114; Yongping Wu, A Political Explanation of Economic Growth: State Survival, Bureaucratic 
Politics, and Private Enterprises in the Making of Taiwan’s Economy, 1950-1985 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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war of economic attrition in which the PRC’s consumer products might capture a large 
portion of Taiwan’s foreign market.105 This threat assessment led the leadership to 
emphasize sustaining economic viability as a survival strategy.106 
This case study argues that the nature of the ROC leadership’s threat assessment 
influenced the leadership’s decision to exclude the private sector from the state-led push 
toward heavy industrialization. The leadership’s concern for economic survival, coupled 
with the absence of direct military threat from the PRC, arguably led it to balance the 
state’s security needs with the maintenance of economic viability. This arguably increased 
the leadership’s sensitivity to the trade-offs inherent in directing privately held 
conglomerates toward the defense industry “at the expense of civilian development 
objectives.”107 This explains why the ROC government prevented the private sectors 
from participating in the industrialization projects, which might have the potential to 
negatively affect the growth of the state’s overall economy.   
By comparison, the South Korean leadership assessed that North Korea would use 
the US in East Asia as a window of opportunity to realize its revisionist purposes, both 
militarily and politically. This security concern was also reinforced by the withdrawal of 
US forces from Vietnam and US President Carter’s frequent calls to withdraw all US 
ground forces from South Korea. This security assessment led ROK leadership to 
conclude that North Korea presented an imminent military threat. 
Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, 48. 
106 In this respect, Washington assessed that the PRC’s strategy of isolation led the ROC leadership to 
consider establishing economic viability for the state’s survival. See FRUS China 1969-1972, 1003-4. 
Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, 48. 
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Given the nature of the threat assessment, the imperative of establishing autonomous 
defensive capability required the ROK leadership to rapidly increase the development of 
the strategic defense industries. This helps to explain why the ROK government 
depended not only upon state-owned enterprises but also on domestic big businesses to 
establish an industrial basis for increasing defensive capabilities. In this respect, the scope 
of the ROK’s domestic drive was wider than that of Taiwan.   
In addition, the urgency of security led the ROK leadership to prioritize security 
over economic rationale. Thus, the leadership constrained market rationality in favor of 
promoting the targeted industries, harnessing domestic and international market forces 
where necessary for security purposes. As a result, during the 1970s, the state’s defense 
industry and was almost completely insulated from market pressure and even insured 
from failure through government subsidies.  
In contrast, ROC leadership tried to balance security and economic rationale in its 
industrialization policies. In this respect, Nolan suggests the following conclusion: 
 
Both [Taiwan and South Korea] devote enormous resources to military 
preparedness, at obvious cost to their economies. … … The differences between the 
two states, however, overshadow their similarities. Taiwan, as a result of careful and 
deliberate policy, has managed the difficult process of economic growth with a 
minimum of disruption and political discontent. Taiwan’s leaders understand that 
economic difficulties can only heighten the island’s political isolation, perhaps at 
last to a fatal degree. Korea, by contrast, has been overly ambitious and aggressive, 
and the economic problems that threaten its long-term security are largely, though 
certainly not solely of its own making. … … Korea has expanded its economy 
beyond the ability of domestic structures to accommodate change. Rectifying the 
serious imbalances that now exist after more than two decades of blind and rapid 





4.2.5. Policy of Taiwanization 
 
The Kuomintang’s theory of political tutelage rested on the notion that citizens 
should be mobilized behind the initiative of a revolutionary party. Since the early 1920s, 
Kuomintang had attempted to penetrate volunteer associations and subordinate them 
within the party ranks. Soon after it returned to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek 
established a close alliance among the party, military, and government, allowing the 
Kuomintang to function as the core of the alliance.109 Then he took measures to make it 
possible for the party apparatus to penetrate systematically into every sector of society.110 
Accordingly, party cells were established in all societal groups at all levels, which 
included labor unions, farmers’ associations, professional organizations, state enterprises, 
the business community, and student and youth organizations.111 As a result, during the 
1950s, nearly all politically relevant groups were organized by the party or the state 
organs it controlled.112 
The ruling party’s tight control over societal organization suggests that the ROC 
government was able to mobilize a substantial level of societal support under the security 
initiative. So the question is whether the leadership actually mobilized societal support 
under the state’s security initiative in response to the US retrenchment during the 1970s. 
The following examination shows that the ROC government did not mobilize societal 
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support under the state’s security initiative. This is arguably puzzling, considering the fact 
that the ROC leadership faced challenges toward its authority during the 1970s.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC leadership enjoyed domestic and international 
stability.113 Domestic opposition groups were all but invisible because there was no room 
for civil activism to develop under the strong rule of Chiang Kai-shek, while the dynamic 
of state corporatism turned many Taiwanese into supporters of the government. 
Meanwhile, the Cold War confrontation required the US and the international community 
to sustain support for Taiwan as a defense against the expansion of communism in East 
Asia. However, that stability was shaken as the ROC leadership was increasingly 
challenged on both domestic and international sides.  
Taiwan experienced several international setbacks during the 1970s, which were 
followed by declining public confidence and morale, economic difficulties, and stirrings 
of domestic opposition.114 The most serious challenge came from expatriate Taiwanese 
opposition movements, which argued that Taiwan’s hope for freedom only lay in 
replacing the authoritarian government with a leadership of native Taiwanese with no 
territorial claim to mainland China. In addition, there was a domestic movement 
committed to a fundamental reform of the ROC’s political system. The ROC government 
was also faced with criticism of its weak response to Japan’s claim on the Tiaoyutai 




The PRC’s peace offensive also challenged the ROC leadership’s authority.115 
Beijing appealed to the ROC government for a negotiated settlement of Taiwan’s status. 
From Beijing’s standpoint, a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue would open the door 
for the eventual subjugation of the Kuomintang regime. Beijing also took steps to obtain 
the sympathy and support of native Taiwanese in order to alienate them from the 
Nationalist regime.  
What compounded these challenges was the development of factionalism within the 
Kuomintang and uncertainty about the succession to Chiang Kai-shek.116 By 1972, 
Chiang Ching-kuo had taken on many of his father’s responsibilities, but there was no 
consensus within the ruling party regarding whether Chiang Ching-kuo should succeed 
his father. In addition, President Chiang’s increasing infirmity intensified anxieties over 
Taiwan’s political future.  
The emergence of these challenges suggests that the ROC leadership’s link with 
domestic society weakened. This diminished the state’s ability to balance external 
threats.117 If the leadership had felt the urgency to increase security, it would have 
introduced a large-scale domestic campaign to mobilize societal support under the 
security initiative. But the leadership’s assessment of the PRC’s threats suggests that it 
did not have an incentive to introduce such a large-scale domestic drive. The absence of 
direct threats from its adversary also made it hard for the ROC leadership to manipulate 
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external threats to strengthen the state-society link. Rather, the ROC government 
moderated its position in dealing with oppositional movements.  
This moderate policy, which is dubbed “Taiwanization,” attempted to gradually 
incorporate the native Taiwanese into the state’s political system. Two dimensions 
characterized the policy of Taiwanization.118 First, the ROC government tried to reform 
national parliamentary bodies to make them more representative of Taiwan citizens. More 
open electoral competition made it possible to co-opt many social forces. Second, the 
government tried to achieve “interethnic power-sharing” through the method of recruiting 
more Taiwanese into the Kuomintang regime. As a result, the number of ethnic 
Taiwanese in leadership positions at provincial and local levels and in party organs 
rapidly increased after 1972.119 These aspects of political transition suggest that there 
was a shift from hard to soft authoritarianism in the sense that resorting to authoritarian 
repression came to be less frequent, less direct, and more legalistic, even while the 
Kuomintang’s dominance was still guaranteed.120  
The policy of Taiwanization can be seen as the ROC leadership’s strategy to ensure 
the state’s political survival by strengthening its foundation in Taiwanese society.121 In 
the process, Chiang Ching-kuo orchestrated a major party reform to ease the regime away 
from its authoritarian tendencies. In contrast, the imperative of national security in the 
military sense led the Park regime in South Korea to establish a garrison state in South 
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Korea, strengthening government control over domestic society. It also introduced 
ideological mobilization to secure societal support for the state’s industrialization 
program. This pattern, so different from the one in Taiwan, lends support to the argument 
that the state’s willingness to mobilize societal support for national military preparedness 




4.3. The Rise and Fall of Taiwan’s Nuclear Development Project in the 1970s 
 
Dreaming of a triumphant return to mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek made known 
his ambition to retake the mainland using military means. Washington tried to restrain 
Taiwan’s unilateral raids on the mainland and other provocative actions in order to avoid 
a direct confrontation with communist China. In this respect, Washington’s dilemma was 
that it was forced to pursue a policy of dual deterrence. The US had to signal its resolve 
to deter communist China from attacking Taiwan, while ensuring that the Taiwanese 
leadership did not interpret this resolve as a signal to engage in provocative actions 
against the mainland.122 Taiwan’s shift of emphasis from offensive to defensive strategy 
toward the end of 1960s suggests that the ROC had no intention of engaging in a 
unilateral offensive action against the PRC.  
But the development of Taiwan’s nuclear weapon capability posed another challenge 
for Washington’s policy of dual deterrence. Taiwan allegedly engaged in early tentative 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons in response to the PRC’s first nuclear test in 1964.123 
Cha, “Powerplay,” 168-73.
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The Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST), which was founded in 1965 
under the sponsorship of the ROC Defense Ministry, financially supported Taiwan’s 
nuclear program. The program, which was dubbed the “Hsin Chu” program, was placed 
under the authority of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), after its 
beginning in 1967. The program was targeted to produce and operate a heavy-water 
reactor, a heavy-water production plant, a reprocessing research lab and a plutonium 
separation plant.124  
Washington intervened as early as 1966 to ensure that Taiwan would adhere to 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to prevent diversion of materials 
to building nuclear weapons.125 Under US pressure, Taiwan and the IAEA reached a 
safeguard agreement in 1971.126 According to this agreement, any nuclear materials that 
Taiwan acquired would be subject to restrictions in their application under U.S. law. In 
this manner, the US became the ultimate guarantor of Taiwan’s status as a non-nuclear 
weapons state.127 
However, the 1971 agreement could not prevent Taiwan from pursuing a military 
nuclear program. As Chiang Ching-kuo acknowledged in 1975, Taiwan acquired basic 
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capabilities for nuclear weapons production by 1974.128 For example, Taiwan’s Institute 
of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) developed a fuel fabrication factory. In addition, it 
secured approximately 100 metric tons of uranium from South Africa, which was much 
more than was necessary to operate the heavy-water research reactor, which it had 
purchased from Canada in 1969.129 In addition, as a part of the Hsin Chu program, the 
CIST tried to acquire a large-scale reprocessing plant through negotiations with West 
Germany.130  
The development of the Sino-American rapprochement caused Washington to 
become hypersensitive about the direction of Taiwan’s nuclear program. Months after 
Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972, State Department commissioned the CIA to 
prepare a report on the subject.131 The CIA’s report, entitled Special National Intelligence 
Estimate, opined that Taiwan's "present intention is to develop the capability to fabricate 
and test a nuclear device."132 Department of State intelligence did not find any hard 
evidence that the ROC leadership intended to develop an nuclear weapon capability.133 
But the State Department decided to dispatch a special study mission to Taipei to identify 
the “ROC coterie which advocates development of nuclear weapons capabilities.”134 The 
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study team visited Taiwan during November of 1973, picking up hints that Taiwan was 
keeping open the option of developing nuclear weapons.135  
The ROC government decided to develop its nuclear weapons capability as an 
alternative to relying on the US security commitment. As Leonard S. Unger, the US 
Ambassador to Taiwan, pointed out, “Washington would ultimately break diplomatic 
relations and formal security ties with Taiwan as part of a normalization deal with Beijing 
… … ROC actions will probably be affected by its perception of its security following 
the termination of the US/ROC mutual defense treaty.”136 It was plain that the Taiwan’s 
existential vulnerability vis-à-vis the PRC was a driving force behind the development of 
a military nuclear program.137  
However, a study of Taiwan’s military nuclear program during the 1970s should 
consider the following two factors, which, jointly, raise questions about why the ROC 
government attempted to develop nuclear weapons. First, ROC leadership was not 
concerned about direct military threats from communist China. Second, the US was 
“Taiwan’s main market, source of foreign investment, and provider of weapons and 
security guarantees.”138 Considering this dependence, Taiwan was well advised not to 
develop a nuclear weapons capability, as it would conceivably prompt retaliation from 
Washington.139  
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The present study characterizes Taiwan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability as 
a security-seeking strategy designed to pressure Washington to reverse the objectionable 
policy of rapprochement with the ROC’s main adversary. It can be argued that ROC 
leadership tried to increase the price Washington would have to pay for abandoning 
Taiwan, by jeopardizing US strategic interests. The ROC’s pursuit of nuclear weapons 
capability went against US strategic interests in stabilizing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), which was developed in the aftermath of India’s first successful nuclear 
test in 1974. The spread of nuclear weapons capabilities became a major concern for 
Washington; while there were a number of proliferation challenges other than India, such 
as Brazil, Pakistan, and South Korea, Taiwan was a special case because its military 
nuclear program would plainly cause strain on US efforts to place “Sino-American 
relations on a nonconfrontational basis.”140  
Thus, it is no surprise that Washington opposed the development of Taiwan’s 
military nuclear program. Washington began with introducing a low-key approach, 
issuing verbal warnings and blocking the ROC’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons 
technology through foreign assistance. In September 1972, for example, the Nixon 
administration tried to extract a pledge from the leadership of Taiwan to forego pursuing 
an independent nuclear weapons capability.141 Another verbal warning was given to 
which might imperil that relationship would not likely be taken without long and careful study." Thus it 
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Taiwanese officials in October 1973.142 Washington also discouraged the ROC 
government from purchasing a reprocessing facility from West Germany.143  
Facing pressure from its greatest ally, the ROC government assured the US that it 
would definitely drop efforts to acquire a reprocessing plant and limit its nuclear program 
to peaceful uses.144 But it became known later that the low-key approach was not 
sufficient to stop Taiwan’s military nuclear program. This put US policymakers under 
pressure to increase the pressure on the ROC government.145 However, Washington 
could clearly not threaten with sanctions before Congress introduced the Symington 
amendment in 1976, which authorized the US to strengthen its position on nuclear 
proliferation.146 
The absence of a direct threat of sanctions from Washington made it possible for the 
ROC government to continue its military nuclear program. As a 1974 CIA estimate 
concluded, "Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a weapon option clearly in 
mind, and it will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear device after five years or so.”147  
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By September 1976, the Department of State received conclusive evidence that the INER 
was undertaking a covert program to gain reprocessing technology.148  
Reacting to growing concerns about the direction of Taiwan’s nuclear program, the 
State Department instructed the US Embassy in Taipei to clearly threaten “an end to 
nuclear cooperation.”149 Unger was also instructed to deliver the following message: 
“Should the ROC or any other government seek national reprocessing facilities, this 
would risk jeopardizing additional highly important relationships with the US.”150 The 
US ambassador pressed Premier Chiang to give assurances that Taiwan would abandon 
the project to develop a pilot reprocessing plant. In response, Chiang assured the US 
government that the ROC would abandon the project. In September 1976, the Premier 
and his cabinet issued a public statement which declared that the ROC had no “intention 
whatsoever to use its human and natural resources for the development of nuclear 
weapons or to obtain equipment for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.”151  
By the end of 1976, the US embassy in Taipei still reported that “We have rather 
compelling evidence that in spite of solemn and public assurances given by the GROC 
[Government of the Republic of China] and personally by Premier Chiang, the Chinese 
may not yet have given up their intentions of acquiring a capability for reprocessing 
nuclear fuels.”152 The report led Washington to conclude that the ROC government was 
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not living up to its commitment.153 This suggested that Washington’s nonproliferation 
efforts were still too vague for the ROC government to take seriously.154 Consequently, 
Washington increased the credibility of its threats by presenting a number of far-reaching 
demands, which included termination of all fuel cycle activities, reorientation of facilities 
involving or leading to weapons-usable materials, transfer of all plutonium to the US, and 
avoidance of any program or activity which, upon consultation with the US, would be 
determined to apply to the development of a nuclear explosive capability.155 In addition, 
the Carter administration successfully communicated to the ROC government its 
determination to do everything to prevent nuclear proliferation.156  
Taiwan subsequently complied with the US demands to the point that Washington 
became confident of the ROC government’s nonproliferation efforts by the middle of 
1977. As Carter’s security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski reported to him, Premier Chiang 
allowed that Washington’s effort to “crack down” on Taiwan’s nuclear project “clearly 
yielded its desired results.”157 In addition, Unger reported that the ROC government “has 
made an honest, albeit reluctant, effort to comply.”158 The US nuclear team was also 
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confident that “ROC officials were cooperative and indicated willingness to take all steps 
necessary to assure compliance with agreements.”159  
As the case of South Korea, Taiwan’s compliance with the US derived from its 
consideration of that state’s substantial dependence upon the United States. As Premier 
Chiang argued, Taiwan’s vulnerability and unique relationship with the United States 
allowed Washington to deal with the ROC “in a fashion which few other countries would 
tolerate.”160 In this respect, Taiwanese high-ranking officials believed that “it would be 
folly for [the] ROC to endanger its nuclear power program by conducting nuclear 
activities of questionable nature.”161 Thus one can reach the following conclusion: “The 
[Kuomintang] and its successors’ military, political, and economic dependence on the US 
are central to understanding Taiwan’s nuclear history. Nuclear decisions were embedded 
in a model of regime survival emphasizing economic growth, prosperity, stability, and the 
defeat of internal subversion, which explains widespread receptivity to US demands and 
inducements.”162  
The rise and fall of Taiwan’s military nuclear program during the 1970s suggests 
that the ROC leadership, like its counterpart in South Korea, was trying to pressure the 
United States to reverse its objectionable strategic posture in East Asia. According to the 
theory posited in this study, the scope of a regional state’s willingness to engage in 
military behaviors against its patron’s strategic interests is a function of its security 
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concern in response to the patron’s retrenchment. The ROK leadership’s concern about 
North Korea’s revisionist strategy was coupled with its skepticism of the reliability of US 
security commitment. In comparison, the ROC leadership did not have an urgent need to 
militarily balance communist China, even though it was skeptical of its patron’s 
commitment. This suggests that the level of ROK leadership’s security concern was 
relatively higher than that of the ROC leadership. Accordingly, there should be a 
meaningful difference between the two countries in their pursuit of a military behavior 
against the strategic interests of the United States. Regarding this, the present study raises 
the following two points. 
First, the ROC leadership was relatively unwilling to develop a missile capability as 
part of the military nuclear program. Taiwan found it difficult to develop a missile 
capability, an essential part of any nuclear deterrence program, during the 1960s. In the 
mid-1970s, the ROC government initiated a missile program, which included hiring 
missile-related specialists overseas and allocating research resources for developing a 
medium-range ballistic missile. In addition, it was estimated that the ROC’s defense 
industry matured during the 1970s to such an extent that Taiwan was able to produce 
surface-to-surface missiles.163 However, the ROC government did not develop the 
nuclear project beyond the initial stage, as it faced US pressure.164 As a result, Taiwan 
could not develop the medium-range ballistic missiles or space launchers that were 
required to establish a nuclear deterrence capability.165 In contrast, the chapter on Korea 
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shows that the ROK government sustained its project of missile development while 
facing direct pressure from Washington.  
The comparison of Taiwan and South Korea in terms of their response to US 
pressure suggests that the ROC leadership was less committed than its ROK counterpart 
to the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. The ROK leadership was so committed to 
the pursuit of nuclear and missile programs that it was unwilling to abandon the programs 
even in the face of Washington’s coercive efforts to reverse them. In contrast, Washington 
found it relatively easy to make the ROC leadership to abandon the pursuit of a missile 
capability.       
Second, the ROC leadership was relatively divided over the necessity for developing 
a nuclear weapons capability, while the ROK did not witness such internal division. As 
the US Embassy in Taipei reported, Chiang Kai-shek was the prime mover in the nuclear 
weapons project.166 Chiang Ching-kuo, the president’s son and successor, also took the 
initiative in the state’s decision to attempt the separation of plutonium.167 Despite the 
existence of a political initiative to develop nuclear weapons, there was internal division 
within the ROC leadership regarding such a step.   
On the one hand, the ROC military played a key role in developing a nuclear 
weapons capability. Because of its role as the key agency in charge of the nuclear 
weapons development project under the ROC Defense Ministry’s sponsorship, the CIST  
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was a source of concern for Washington’s efforts at nonproliferation.168 Under its aegis, 
the INER secretly developed a small reprocessing facility and acquired a research reactor.  
On the other hand, there were a group of policymakers within the government that 
was opposed to the development of a nuclear weapons capability. General Tang Chun-po, 
Vice Minister of Defense, for example, was opposed to the project, as he believed that it 
would be impractical.169 Professor Ta-You Wu, a science adviser to president Chiang, 
was another member of the group. While witnessing the development of the project since 
its beginning in the 1960s, he criticized it for underestimating the true risk of causing a 
confrontation with the United States and for overestimating its chance of success.170 The 
Atomic Energy Council in Taiwan also played its part. In March 1973, Victor Cheng, 
Secretary General of the civilian-controlled agency, privately informed US diplomats 
about the state’s reprocessing deal with West Germany, emphasizing his concern about 
the military-led project to acquire a fuel reprocessing capability.171 This provided 
Washington with an opportunity to raise concerns over Taiwan’s military nuclear 
program.  
The development of internal division over the military nuclear program suggests that 
the ROC government was less willing than the ROK leadership to pursue military 
behavior against the U.S. strategic interests. Taiwan found it difficult to form a consensus 
between military and civilian sectors over the necessity of developing a nuclear weapons 
capability.  The internal division provided Washington with leverage to control the 
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direction of Taiwan’s nuclear program by strengthening “the hand of moderate elements 
in the ROC with regard to its peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”172 This explains why 





4.4. Chapter Conclusion 
 
The theory of this research hypothesized co-variation between the level of a regional 
state’s security concern and the scope of the state’s efforts to increase the contribution of 
domestic society to the establishment of an autonomous defense capability. This research 
also suggests the existence of co-variation between the level of a regional state’s security 
concern and the level of its commitment to the pursuit of military behaviors against the 
patron’s strategic interests.  
If we compare South Korea and Japan in terms of the leadership’s security concern 
in response to the US strategic posture in East Asia, the former is at one end of the 
spectrum while the latter is at the other end of the spectrum. The ROC leadership 
experienced substantially high level of security concern while the Japanese leadership 
experienced substantially low level of security concern in response to the superpower’s 
retrenchment during the 1970s. This explains why there was a sharp difference in the two 
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states’ security-promoting behaviors during the 1970s. First, South Korea was strongly 
committed to the pursuit of military policies against the US strategic interests while Japan 
developed its military policies in line with the superpower’s strategic interests. Second, 
the ROK leadership introduced huge-scale domestic drives to rapidly increase the 
contribution of domestic society to an autonomous defense capability while the Japanese 
leadership established a minimalist approach to security.  
The present chapter tests the theory of this research against Taiwan’s security-
seeking behaviors during the 1970s in response to the US retrenchment in East Asia. For 
this purpose, the case study documents the nature of the ROC leadership’s security 
assessment. Then it examines whether there was co-variation between the level of the 
leadership’s security concern and the scope of Taiwan’s domestic drives to increase 
domestic contribution to an autonomous defense capability. It also examines whether 
there was co-variation between the level of the leadership’s security concern and the level 
of Taiwan’s commitment to the pursuit of a military behavior against the superpower’s 
strategic interests. 
The present chapter documents the ROC leadership’s security concern. There are 
three points that together suggest that the leadership was highly skeptical of the US 
reliability. First, the US ambiguity during the development of Sino-American 
rapprochement made the ROC leadership skeptical of the patron’s reliability. Second, the 
leadership believed that the US gave up its security commitment to Taiwan. Third, 
Taiwan believed that Washington did not do all it could do, or all it had promised to do, to 
keep the ROC’s representation in the UN. But the ROC leadership also believed that the 
PRC’s offensive military strategy toward Taiwan was constrained by the Sino-Soviet 
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Conflict and the development of the Sino-American rapprochement. This belief lessened 
Taiwan’s security concern.  
Thus the level of the ROC leadership’s security concern is estimated to be relatively 
higher than that of Japan but to be relatively lower than that of South Korea. Accordingly, 
the degree of the ROC leadership’s willingness to promote domestic contribution to 
defensive capability was hypothesized to be relatively higher than that of the Japanese 
leadership but to be relatively lower than that of the ROK counterpart. The case study 
supports this hypothesis. In doing so, it introduces a two-step approach in measuring the 
scope of the ROC leadership’s security-promoting domestic drives during the 1970s.  
On the one hand, the case study finds that the ROC leadership’s security concern led 
to Taiwan’s introduction of security-promoting domestic drives. First, the ROC 
government developed a defense industry as it shifted emphasis toward the development 
of an autonomous defensive capability. Second, it established a highly centralized 
decision-making process to encompass an economic and social agenda in its defense 
program. A third finding is that the ROC leadership pushed for heavy industrialization as 
an alternative to the US industrial base that it had relied upon for defense. The 
government also financially supported the development of its targeted strategic industries, 
which had a decisive importance on Taiwan’s defense capability. 
On the other hand, this case study finds several points to suggest that the leadership 
of Taiwan was less willing than its ROK counterpart to introduce security-promoting 
domestic drives. First, Taiwan did not introduce a policy instrument that particularly 
targeted the extraction of domestic resources toward autonomous defense capability. In 
contrast, South Korea introduced several policy instruments to extract national resources 
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to establish a revenue base of its defensive capability. Second, the ROC government 
decreased the portion of the government’s budget allocated to defense spending while 
increasing the portion allocated to the state’s long-term objectives. This suggests the 
ROC leadership was not under pressure to prioritize short-term security preparedness 
over other long-term objectives. In contrast, South Korea felt itself to be under such 
pressure. Third, Taiwan tried to balance security and economic rationale while pushing 
for heavy industrialization. In contrast, the urgency of security caused the ROK 
government to constrain economic rationality in favor of promoting strategic industries. 
Fourth, the Kuomintang regime did not introduce social mobilization under the initiative 
of national security. In contrast, the imperative of security led the ROK regime to 
establish a garrison state in South Korea while introducing ideological mobilization to 
secure societal support for the state’s push toward heavy industrialization.   
According to the theory of this research, it is also hypothesized that the ROC 
leadership was less committed than the ROK counterpart to the pursuit of a military 
policy that went against the US strategic interests. This hypothesis is supported by the 
case study. Like South Korea, the ROC leadership developed a nuclear weapons 
capability as a strategy to put pressure on the United States to reverse its objectionable 
strategic posture in East Asia. However, the ROC leadership was relatively unwilling to 
develop a missile capability as part of the military nuclear program. In addition, ROC 
leadership was relatively divided over the necessity of developing a nuclear weapons 
capability. The two points suggests that Taiwan’s leadership was relatively less 
committed than their ROK counterpart to the pursuit of a military nuclear program 
against the US strategic interests. This explains why Washington found it relatively easy 
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to force Taiwan to abandon its objectionable military behavior. In contrast, the leadership 
of South Korea was so committed to the pursuit of nuclear and missile programs that it 
sustained the programs even under Washington’s pressure. 
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This research was planned to explore how a regional state could improve its security 
during the time of its patron’s strategic retrenchment. What made this author interested in 
this research topic was an empirical puzzle that is found in the security-seeking behaviors 
of the US allies in Northeast Asia during the time of the Nixon administration’s strategic 
retrenchment in the 1970s. The present research found that Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan did not respond to the US strategic retrenchment in a uniform fashion. Rather, 
each state responded quite differently to promote security under the superpower’s 
retrenchment. Why did they develop such different behaviors?       
To solve this empirical puzzle, the present research introduced a theory of a regional 
state’s security-promoting behaviors during the time of its patron’s retrenchment. The 
theory is composed of three sections: operationalization of a regional state’s security 
concern, a theory of a regional state’s security-promoting domestic drives, and a theory of 
a regional ally’s pursuit of a military policy against the strategic interests of its patron. 
The theory was tested against the context of the security-seeking behaviors of the US 
regional allies in Northeast Asia during the time of the US strategic retrenchment during 
the 1970s.     
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theory 
and research strategy of this study. In the third section, I synthesize the main empirical 
findings regarding how each of the regional allies’ security assessment affected the 
security-seeking domestic and military behaviors during the 1970s. The fourth section 
discusses the implications that can be drawn from this research, with particular focus on 
the context of the security relationship between a superpower and its regional allies. In 
the fifth section, I will suggest an agenda for future research. Then a final section 




5.2. Review of Theory and Research Design 
 
The theory of this research operationally defined a regional state’s perception of 
security under the patron’s retrenchment. Rather than simply considering the state’s 
security concern as the fear of abandonment, the theory treats it as a combination of a 
regional state’s perception of patron reliability and its perception of military threats posed 
by the adversary. This helped to discuss the level of a regional state’s security concern as 
a continuous variable.  
This study introduced three methods to infer each regional state’s security 
assessment. The primary method of inference was qualitative analysis of the written and 
spoken statements of each state’s leadership regarding its adversary’s military threats and 
its patron’s reliability. Ideally speaking, I should have solely used each leadership’s 
statements in measuring each state’s security concern. Because of the limited availability 
of the primary source data, however, this study needed to introduce alternative methods 
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to make inference of the state leadership’s perception of security. In this respect, the case 
study referred to primary source documents and secondary source literature that contain 
information on each state leadership’s perception of security in response to the Nixon 
administration’s retrenchment. It also referred to the development of the security 
environment each regional state directly faced, because this method provides 
circumstantial evidence to make inference of each state’s assessment of security. 
This study argued that a regional state’s security concern will lead the state’s 
leadership to introduce domestic drives to increase societal contribution to its 
autonomous defense posture. Then it was theorized that there is co-variation between the 
level of a regional state’s security concern and the scope of its efforts to increase 
domestic contribution to an autonomous defense capability.  
To measure the state’s security-promoting domestic drives, this study examined a 
change in defense spending as a share of national income because this is a 
straightforward way to measure the scope of a state’s domestic drives to increase the 
societal contribution to an autonomous defense posture. But it also acknowledged that 
this quantitative indicator may not reflect the precise level of a regional state’s security 
concern under the patron’s retrenchment. In this respect, the present study used other 
qualitative indicators to measure the security-seeking behaviors. It examined each state 
leadership’s initiative to direct domestic resources toward autonomous defense capability 
because it is the essential strategy to increase the domestic contribution to autonomous 
defense. It also examined whether each leadership tried to mobilize domestic support 
under the initiative of national security. The case study used the quantitative and  
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qualitative indicators in comparing the selected states’ responses to the Nixon 
administration’s retrenchment in Northeast Asia.  
The present study also theorized that a regional state’s pursuit of military policies 
against its patron’s strategic interests is a function of its security assessment during the 
security provider’s retrenchment. According to the theory, a regional state is supposed to 
maintain deferential behaviors toward its patron when it does not negatively assess the 
security implication of the patron’s strategic posture. As its security concern increases 
under the patron’s retrenchment, however, the theory expected that a regional state 
pursues military policies against the patron’s strategic interests to pressure the security 
provider to reverse course. According to the theory, it was hypothesized that there is co-
variation between the level of a regional state’s negative assessment of security and the 
level of its commitment to the pursuit of a military policy that jeopardizes the strategic 
interests of its security provider.  
The case study used the following three qualitative indicators to measure the level of 
each regional state’s commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against its patron. 
First, it measured the compatibility between each of the regional states’ military 
behaviors and the US’s strategic interests in Northeast Asia. Second, the study examined 
the level of internal cohesion within the leadership of the regional states when pursuing a 
military policy against the US strategic interests. Third, it examined how each of the 
regional states responded to the US’s coercive efforts to reverse the military behaviors 
against its strategic interests.  
This study suggested two points to justify why the theory of a regional state’s 
security-seeking behaviors should be tested against the context of how the three regional 
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allies responded to the Nixon administration’s strategic retrenchment. First, it is arguably 
difficult to find substantial variation among them in terms of the level of security concern 
under the superpower’s strategic retrenchment because each of them was highly 
dependent upon the patron’s military protection. In this respect, each of them is arguably 
a hard case to test the theory of this research that argues that the level of a regional state’s 
security concern is the most proximate cause to explain different security-seeking 
behaviors among regional allies. Second, the case selection arguably isolates the causal 
link between the US strategic posture and the regional allies’ security-seeking behaviors. 
Each of the states could not find an alternative source of allied support under the 
superpower’s retrenchment. In addition, because the three regional states are located in 
the same geopolitical area, the case selection helps to control for factors at the level of 
international system that have the potential to affect each of the regional state’s 




5.3. Synthesis of Empirical Findings 
 
There were two research questions that the case study answered. First, was there 
covariation between the levels of security concern expressed by each US ally in 
Northeast Asia and the scope of each ally’s domestic drives to increase domestic 
contribution to autonomous defense capability in response to the Nixon administration’s 
strategic retrenchment? Second, was there covariation between the level of security 
concern and the level of each ally’s commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against 
the US strategic interests?  
200 
To answer the two questions, each case study examined the level of security concern 
expressed by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan under the Nixon administration’s military 
retrenchment in East Asia and the development of the Sino-American rapprochement. 
The case study of Japan found that Japan was anxious about the US reliability. But it also 
found that the development of the security environment during the 1970s substantially 
mitigated Japan’s security concern. In contrast, the case study of South Korea found that 
the ROK leadership was highly skeptical of the US reliability in response to the Nixon 
administration’s force reduction. In addition, the leadership of South Korea believed that 
North Korea would make use of the Nixon administration’s strategic posture for its 
revisionist purposes. The case study of Taiwan found that the ROC leadership was highly 
skeptical of the US reliability under the development of the Sino-American 
rapprochement. But it also found that Taiwan’s threat perception of the communist China 
came to be mitigated as a result of the state leadership’s belief that the adversary’s 
offensive military strategy was constrained by the Sino-Soviet conflict and the 
development of Sino-American rapprochement. 
According to the case study, the Japanese leadership experienced substantially low 
level of security concern while the ROK leadership experienced substantially high level 
of security concern in response to the Nixon administration’s strategic posture in 
Northeast Asia. In this respect, Japan was at one end of the spectrum while South Korea 
was at the other end of the spectrum, if we compare them in terms of the level of security 
concern. Then the case study of Taiwan found that the level of Taiwan’s security concern 
is estimated to be relatively higher than that of Japan but lower than that of South Korea.  
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The case study examined each regional ally’s domestic drives to promote societal 
contribution to autonomous defense. The case study of Japan found that the Japanese 
leadership restrained itself from introducing domestic drives to promote a societal 
contribution to autonomous defense capability. This was the result of the establishment of 
a minimalist defense posture during the 1970s. In contrast, the case study of South Korea 
found that the leadership of South Korea introduced all-out efforts to promote societal 
contribution to autonomous defense. According to the case study, the ROK government 
made efforts to gain rapid access to national resources. It also pushed for heavy 
industrialization, which was the state’s mobilization strategy to produce the required 
defense materials through the development of targeted strategic industries. Furthermore, 
the ROK regime introduced the Saemaŭl Movement and the Yushin system, which were 
targeted to mobilize societal support of the heavy industrialization project. The case study 
of Taiwan found that the ROC government pushed for the heavy industrialization as an 
alternative to the US industrial base that it had relied upon for defense. But the case study 
also found the ROC leadership did not introduce a policy instrument of extraction that 
was targeted to gain rapid access to domestic resources. It also found that the ROC 
government decreased the portion of the government’s budget allocated to defense 
spending while increasing the portion allocated to the state’s long-term objectives. The 
ROC government also balanced security and economic rationale while introducing the 
heavy industrialization drive. In addition, the case study found that the ROC regime did 
not mobilize social support under the initiative of national security.  
To summarize, comparison of empirical findings from the case study supported the 
existence of covariation between the levels of each regional state’s security concern and 
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the scope of the state leadership’s security-promoting domestic drives. The case study 
documented that the Japanese leadership’s security assessment during the détente period 
led to the establishment of a minimalist posture to security while the substantially high 
level of security concern made the leadership of South Korea try to establish a maximalist 
posture to defense. The case study also found that the degree of the ROC leadership’s 
security-promoting domestic drives was relatively higher than that of the Japanese 
leadership but was relatively lower than that of the ROK counterpart.  
The case study also examined whether each of the regional allies pursued a military 
policy against US strategic interests. The case study of Japan found that the Japanese 
government voluntarily ratified the NPT to ensure that Japan would not pursue nuclear 
armament, despite its capability and the existence of a motive to pursue nuclear weapons. 
The government also institutionalized defense cooperation with the United States. In 
contrast, the case study of South Korea found that the ROK leadership pursued military 
policies which placed the superpower’s strategic interests at risk. The ROK government 
tried to develop a missile capability, even beyond the scope allowed by the superpower. 
This jeopardized the patron’s strategic interests to sustain the status-quo in the Korean 
peninsula. The ROK government also began to develop an autonomous nuclear weapon 
capability, which was evidently against the US strategy to stabilize the NPT system. The 
case study of Taiwan found that the ROC leadership began to develop a nuclear weapon 
capability which was against the US policy to place the Sino-American relations on a 
nonconfrontational basis. But the case study also found that the leadership of Taiwan was 
internally divided over the necessity for the military nuclear program and that the ROC  
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government did not develop its missile program beyond the initial stage, as it faced US 
pressure. 
The empirical findings from the case study supported the existence of covariation 
between the levels of each regional state’s security concern and the level of its 
commitment to the pursuit of a military policy against the US strategic interests. First, the 
case study found that Japan was not committed to the pursuit of a military policy that 
would jeopardize the US strategic interests. Rather, the Japanese government chose to 
develop its military behaviors in the direction favored by the United States. This finding 
lent support to the argument that a regional state is supposed to maintain deferential 
behaviors toward its patron when it does not negatively assess the security implication of 
the patron’s strategic posture. Second, given the ROK leadership’s substantially higher 
level of security concern, it was hypothesized that South Korea was strongly committed 
to the pursuit of a military policy that jeopardized the US strategic interests. The 
empirical findings supported this hypothesis. Third, the case of Taiwan found that the 
ROC leadership was more committed than the Japanese counterpart but was less 
committed than the ROK counterpart to the pursuit of a military policy that went against 





This study suggested the theory of a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors 
based upon criticism of existing scholarship on asymmetric alliance. In this respect, there 
are several points to discuss regarding how the present study contributes to the existing 
scholarship. In addition, the case study suggested several empirical findings that help us 
to better understand the security relationship between the US and its regional allies in 
Northeast Asia. This section discusses three points regarding the implications of this 
research. 
First, this study suggests that a regional state’s assessment of security leads to a    
dynamic of conflict and cooperation in the security relationship between the regional 
state and its superpower patron. This study suggests that a regional state’s choice between 
the contrasting military behaviors toward its patron is a function of its assessment of 
security in response to the patron’s retrenchment. Then the case study finds that South 
Korea and Taiwan commonly pursued military nuclear programs, which led to conflict 
between the superpower and the regional allies. In contrast, the Japanese leadership 
directed the state’s military policies to honor the patron’s strategic interests. This led to 
the development of military cooperation between the US and Japan.  
A second point is about the role of perception in the dynamic of cooperation 
between a regional state and its superpower patron when they do not agree how to 
interpret security environment. In this respect, the case study of Korea finds that the 
different perception of the security environment led to conflict between the US and South 
Korea during the 1970s. US policymakers believed that North Korea would not launch a 
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full-scale military provocation and that South Korea would be able to counter North 
Korea’s military provocations. This belief led to Washington’s conclusion that the Nixon 
administration’s force reduction policy would not affect the overall balance of power in 
the Korean peninsula. In addition, the Nixon administration believed that the 
development of détente in the Korean peninsula would ease tension in the Korean 
peninsula. However, the US assessment of security was substantially different from that 
of the South Korean leadership. The case study finds that ROK government persistently 
emphasized North Korea’s revisionist purpose in the Korean peninsula. Because of this 
concern, the ROK leadership believed that the US force reduction would inevitably lead 
to the adversary’s initiation of a revisionist war against South Korea. Even the 
development of détente in the Korean peninsula did not change the ROK’s threat 
perception. Rather, the ROK leadership expressed the belief that North Korea would 
make use of the détente for its revisionist purpose and that the Nixon administration’s 
rapprochement with communist China would negatively affect the security of South 
Korea. Because of the perception of security, the leadership did not agree with the 
superpower’s strategic posture and even pursued military policies that would jeopardize 
the patron’s strategic interests. In response, Washington criticized the ROK leadership’s 
security assessment and pressured the regional ally to reverse the objectionable military 
behaviors. 
Lastly, this study suggests that the role of perception needs to be fully integrated into 
the existing scholarship on the second-image reversed logic. According to this 
scholarship, the imperative of security competition under the anarchic setting of 
international politics induces states to organize themselves internally in order to meet 
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external threats. While following this logic, the present study suggests that the causal 
effect of anarchy should be mediated by a state’s perception of security. The case study of 
Korea finds that the ROK leadership’s movement to control domestic society was a result 
of its perception of insecurity in response to the Nixon administration’s retrenchment. But 
the case study of Japan finds that the Japanese leadership’s assessment of security led the 
Japanese government to refrain from changing the existing state-society relationship. The 
case study of Taiwan also found that the absence of the ROC government’s movement to 
control domestic society, given the state leadership’s modest level of security concern. To 
summarize, the comparative analysis suggests that a superpower’s retrenchment can be 
discussed as an external factor to affect the state-society relationship of its regional allies 




5.5. Recommendation for Future Research 
 
This research supported the theory of a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors 
by studying the security-seeking behaviors of US allies in the Northeast Asia. In this 
respect, one may suggest that whether the theory can be introduced into the explanation 
of a regional ally in another regional context. This research acknowledges the necessity to 
test the external validity of the main arguments of this research.  
First, testing external validity of the theory needs to consider how to test it against a 
regional state which finds it relatively easy to find alternative sources of allied support. 
For example, it may be argued that a study should test the theory against a regional state 
under multipolarity, because this state may find it relatively easier to secure alternative 
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sources of allied support than another regional state under the structure of bipolarity or 
unipolarity. This research could also be tested against the US allies in Western Europe. 
The presence of institutionalized military cooperation in this region makes each of the 
regional allies relatively less sensitive to the superpower’s strategic retrenchment than the 
US allies in Northeast Asia that do not enjoy benefits of the institutionalized military 
cooperation.   
It also needs to be noted that the three cases examined did not witness a substantial 
level of domestic opposition to the state’s formulation of defense posture. The case 
selection helps to control for the neoclassical realist perspective that a regional state’s 
willingness to introduce security-promoting domestic drives is constrained by its 
relationship with domestic society. This helps to highlight the realist version of the state 
as a rational actor in the security studies that introduces security-promoting behaviors 
according to its assessment of security. Thus this research supports the state’s assumed 
privileged international position and the realist characterization of the state as an agent 
that possesses a realm of autonomous behavior in conducting foreign policy.1 It also 
characterizes the state as “a well-established public arena that is both normatively and 
organizationally distinguishable from private interests and pursuits.”2 
As a neoclassical realist points out, however, it may be hard to support the notion of 
the realist version of rational state in the context of contemporary security studies.3 In 
1 Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” 460. 
2 Kohli, State-Directed Development, 9. 
3 In this respect, Schweller (2009, 249) points out that Waltz’s neorealist version of the principle of the 
balance of powers explains the golden age of the balance of power, which occurred from 1648 to the 
Napoleonic era, when: “(1) the state truly was an individual, and therefore fit the realist assumption of a 
unitary, intentional actor, (2) the state floated above society rather than being integrated with it, and (3) war 
between states overlaid rather than engulfed the lives of average citizens.”  
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this respect, the present research acknowledges that the state-society relationship in South 
Korea and Taiwan has substantially changed as a result of democratization. This suggests 
that the two states’ security-seeking behaviors are likely to be constrained by the state’s 
relationship with domestic society.4 In addition, Japan’s security policy during the 1970s 
was a deviant case for the antimilitarist model. Considering these points, it may not be 
easy to support the notion of the realist version of rational state in the contemporary 
context of the three states.   
This criticism suggests that the theory of this research needs to address how the 
state-society relationship affects a regional state’s security-seeking behaviors, particularly 
when the state leadership and domestic society disagree about the security implication of 
its patron’s strategic retrenchment. The disagreement is likely to occur because the state 
leadership is usually “responsible for long-term grand strategic planning including the 
identification of changes in the global and regional balance of power” while societal 
elites are “primarily concerned about immediate shifts in the domestic balance of political 
power.”5 Given the different emphases, the state leadership is unable to adopt policies 
4 Benson and Niou discuss this point in the context of Taiwan’s independence movement. Sterling-Folker 
examines state-society relationship in Taiwan to explain why Taiwan sustained military competition with 
the mainland China despite the development of economic interdependence during the 1990s, which is an 
anomaly to the liberal interdependence literature. See Brett V. Benson and Emerson M. S. Niou, “Public 
Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait, Security Studies,” Security Studies 
14, no. 2: 274-89; Jenifer Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril despite Profit across 
the Taiwan Strait,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M. 
Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2009), 99-138.   
5 Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” in 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E, Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey 
W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 45-6. To discuss how the disagreement 
between the state and domestic society affects the state’s balancing strategy, Lobell suggests “a complex 
threat identification model” which outlines “the nested and multitiered nature of threat assessment.” Then 
he argues that the complex nature of threat assessment will make it the case that what matters in a state’s 
balancing strategy are “shifts in specific components of the rising state’s power rather than shifts in 
aggregate power alone.”  
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that are consistent with its preferred strategies when it is substantially penetrated by 
domestic society or faced with a substantial level of societal opposition.6 In contrast, the 
state leadership is likely to make the state’s policy consistent with its preferred strategies 
when it is able to override domestic opposition. The same also holds true if domestic 
society does not offer any substantial resistance to the strategies adopted by political 
leaders.7 To conclude, the dynamic of the state-society relationship should be fully 
addressed in a study of a regional state’s security-promoting behaviors in response to its 
patron’s strategic posture. 
 
  
6 Regarding this situation, Christensen suggests a two-step approach that helps to determine the effects that 
state’s relationship with domestic society may have on the state’s implementation of a predetermined 
optimal policy package in response to external security environments. This approach begins with discussing 
which policy options the leadership would prefer if it enjoyed an ideal state-society environment. Then it 
discusses “the degree to which state-society relations distort leaders’ preferred policies depends on the 
height of the domestic political obstacles facing those leaders.” Regarding the two-step approach, see 
Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 24-5. 
7 Ibid., 20-1. 
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5.6. Chapter Conclusion 
 
No one may object to the argument that a superpower’s strategic retrenchment 
affects the security of its regional allies. But this argument should be demonstrated. 
Existing scholarship pays littles attention to elaborating on how a regional state’s security 
concern under its patron’s strategic retrenchment affects its choice of strategy to promote 
security. This criticism led the present study to theorize a regional state’s strategy to 
promote security in response to its patron’s strategic retrenchment. Then the case study of 
the US regional allies in Northeast Asia documented each regional ally’s strategy to 
increase security under the Nixon administration’s strategic retrenchment. I believe that 
the present research demonstrated that a superpower’s strategic posture indeed affected 
security-seeking behaviors of its regional allies. 
What is the relevance of this research in the context of the unipolar system where 
the United States has sustained the global hegemony? There may be the chance that the 
superpower will be tempted to retrench militarily in the face of a decline in her relative 
power vis-à-vis other major powers and domestic public attitudes hostile to high level of 
global military commitment. Facing pressures from the international and domestic 
situations, the superpower may introduce another Nixon Doctrine. This will be a chance 
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